740.00119 Control(Japan)/10–2645: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 26—4:09 p.m.]
3669. Supplementing my 3664, October 26.80 At the second meeting with Stalin (October 25) the subject of Japan was uppermost in his mind. He said he was unwilling to send a representative to the meeting of the Far East Advisory Commission October 30 as the time had come for the establishment of a control commission for Japan. This matter must be settled on a governmental level. The [Page 794] Advisory Commission was not an appropriate medium to deal with this matter. He admitted the European Advisory Commission had dealt with similar problems in Germany but that was months before the defeat of Germany. Now that Japan was defeated no useful purpose would be served by discussions in such a body.
When I referred to the fact that he had accepted our invitation to participate in the Commission, on September 5, he said the situation in the meantime had changed. He referred to Molotov’s statements to Byrnes in London and to subsequent communications to which no reply had been received. He insisted that the time had come for the matter to be settled directly between the four principal Govts and since the Soviet Govt and the US were at disagreement the matter might be discussed on a bilateral basis. The two of us ought to take the initiative in reaching an agreement. He said that he knew nothing about what was going on in Japan except what he read in the newspapers; that he had recalled his General Derevyanko as he was being neither informed nor consulted and that under such circumstances the Soviet Govt could not accept responsibility for actions taken in its name by MacArthur. The Soviet Union was being treated as a satellite state and not an ally and this did not become the dignity of the Soviet Union.
He listed a number of complaints such as that the Japanese press and radio had been allowed to vilify the Soviet Union; changes in the Govt had been made without informing or consulting him; Japanese banks had been closed without information as to the disposition of their assets; et cetera. I, of course, explained that General MacArthur was carrying out the surrender terms that had been agreed to by the Soviet Govt on behalf of the US and its Allies; that the operation had many dangers and difficulties and that except for the obliteration of Japanese military power, no commitments had been taken for the future and that assets taken were being held for eventual disposition—all of this in the interests of the Allies. I continued the US had proposed the establishment of the Commission on August 21 to consider all of the matters the Generalissimus had in mind but due to delays which were not our fault the meeting could not take place until October 30; that if he sent a representative to Washington full information would be given him, bilateral talks could be had in addition and that this proposal was an orderly manner to reach agreement.
Stalin then reiterated that he had been disregarded and that his representative had been treated like “a piece of furniture”. He was fearful that at a meeting of the Advisory Commission differences would arise which would further strain our relations. He said that if the US did not want the Soviet Union to participate in Japan it [Page 795] would be better “for us to step aside and let you act as you wish and we will not interfere”. He suggested that the Soviet Union might then pursue an isolation policy as the US had done after the last war, which he had not thought wise. He insisted that if we wished to come to an agreement with the Soviet Union it could only be done properly in negotiations between our Govts.
I said that I could only report our conversations to the President. I repeated that we had every intention to attempt to concert our policy on Japan with our Allies and that I believed our actions had indicated we intended fully to consult with the Soviet Union. I had no information about his complaint of the treatment of his General but in any event he was referring only to the brief surrender period.
I recalled that during a similar period we were equally dissatisfied with the treatment we were accorded in Rumania and Bulgaria. This led to some argument about similar treatment being accorded to Soviet representatives in Italy and Stalin continued that the situation in Japan was not comparable to the Balkans as Russia had had 30 to 40 divisions on the Manchurian border all through the war, had engaged Japan with 70 divisions and had been ready to assist in the occupation if this proposal had not been rejected.
I pointed out that all of these considerations were matters of opinion which looked differently in Washington and in Moscow and that we should be able to thrash them out as between allies.
Stalin concluded by insisting that the time had come for discussions of the setting up of a control commission for Japan as between our two Govts and referred to his proposals given me the night before as reported in my previous message. I agreed to report his position fully to my Govt.
I am satisfied that nothing will move Stalin from his position. He is obviously fearful that if he sends a representative to Washington there will be another public disagreement as there was in London and he insists on knowing our proposals before taking any further steps. I have of course no information on how General Derevyanko was treated in Tokyo but it would seem wise to keep Stalin informed of our intentions whatever they may be and of what we are attempting to accomplish in Japan. The way things have developed he has become suspicious that it may be our intention to disregard the Soviet Union in connection with Japan which will lead to greater difficulties in other directions.
I will report the conclusion of the conversation regarding the London Conference in an immediately subsequent telegram.81