Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The British Commonwealth, The Far East, Volume VI

740.00119 Council/12–2545

Memorandum of Conversation, by the First Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Page)⁷⁸

Gagri, October 25, 1945.

Present:	Generalissimus I. V. Stalin
	Mr. Pavlov, Soviet Interpreter
	W. A. Harriman, American Ambassador
	Edward Page, First Secretary of Embassy

Subject: The Japanese Situation

After preliminary remarks on railroad construction in the Caucasus, the Ambassador stated that as the Generalissimus had originally raised the Japanese question he now wished to clarify certain aspects of this matter. The President was hopeful that the Generalissimus would send a representative to Washington to participate on the Far Eastern Advisory Council at which time the question of the control machinery for Japan would be discussed. If desirable, bilateral conversations could be carried on before the general meeting.

The Generalissimus stated that it would be “very difficult” for him to send a representative to Washington. The Soviet Government had been given no responsibilities in Japan and it would be difficult for it to figure as an “annex” without having shared responsibility for policies in Japan or without having had any influence on such policies.

The Ambassador stated that it was the thought of the President to thrash out all such matters in the Advisory Council by those powers principally concerned. Some method must be found to do this. The President understood that the Soviet Union had accepted on September 5th the invitation to attend the conference. He had hoped that this meeting would have taken place some time ago and it would have, had it not been for delays caused by the British. The Generalissimus stated that Mr. Molotov had informed Mr. Byrnes that the situation in Japan had since changed and that it was now time to organize a control commission. The British apparently were of similar mind. The Soviet Government did not believe that the Advisory Commission was a satisfactory means in any respect to consider the question of control machinery for Japan.

The Ambassador explained that one of the terms of reference of the Advisory Commission was to consider the control machinery for Japan. The President hoped that the Generalissimus would agree that the meeting in Washington was the proper place to discuss these matters. If the Generalissimus did not agree the President would wish to know what other way he wished to deal with this matter.

The Generalissimus stated that this subject could not properly be handled by the Advisory Commission. The question of the control machinery for Japan could only be decided by the governments themselves—no one else was qualified to discuss this matter. The Ambassador inquired whether the Generalissimus desired to discuss this matter bilaterally on a government level. The Generalissimus replied that there was no other way to handle the question. The Advisory Commission was not the appropriate or proper place for such discussions. They should be on a government level. The Ambassador inquired whether these discussions should be on a bilateral basis. The Generalissimus replied that there were three, in fact four, governments involved. However, the main discord appeared to be between the United States and Soviet Governments. Therefore they should take the initiative in reaching agreement. The Ambassador stated that he did not know that there had been any actual disagreement. The Generalissimus maintained that there was and added that if two nations failed to agree that proved that disagreement existed. The Ambassador stated that as far as he could judge there was only one disagreement on the method of carrying on discussions. Mr. Molotov desired to discuss Japanese control at the Foreign Ministers Council. Mr. Byrnes was not briefed for such discussions. The United States Government had suggested the Advisory Commission. The Soviet Government now replied in the negative. This was not disagreement in substance but in procedure. The substance of Japanese control had not as yet been discussed. The Ambassador stated that he regretted that he was unable to offer a concrete proposal—he had furnished the Generalissimus however with the general thinking of the United States authorities on this question. When it came to concrete proposals there might develop disagreement on various points. However, at the present time he did not believe that the points of view of the two countries were very far apart.

The Generalissimus stated that this was quite possible. He continued that in suggesting the Advisory Commission the Americans were going along the same road as followed prior to the victory over Germany when the European Advisory Council was set up, which in turn established the German control machinery. Therefore it was probable that the Americans could not understand why the Russians did not agree to join in the Advisory Commission for Japan, having once joined in an Advisory Commission for Germany. The Ambassador stated that this was of course not clear, especially so after the Soviets had signified their agreement on September 5th. The Generalissimus stated that Germany had not been defeated when the plans were drawn up for the establishment of the EAC. The situation was now entirely different. Japan had been defeated and the Soviet Union was waiting for the establishment of a control commission. This should be done quickly.

The Ambassador inquired as to what brought about the change in the Soviet point of view since September 5th. The Generalissimus stated that more than a month bad passed since September 5th, during which time no reply had been made to the Soviet Government on this question. The British had objected to the United States proposal. The Soviets last month had also objected but had received no reply to Molotov’s letter to Secretary Byrnes. It appeared to the Soviet Government that the British and Americans were inclined to drag out this question. Mr. Byrnes refused to discuss it in London. Furthermore the Soviet Government felt that it could not bear responsibility for MacArthur’s actions in Japan since it had never been informed or consulted on Japanese matters. It had decided to recall its representative, General Derevyanko because he was not receiving any information on policies or developments in Japan. The Soviet Government had its self-respect as a sovereign state. No decisions made by MacArthur were being transmitted to it. In point of fact the Soviet Union had become an American satellite in the Pacific. This was a role it could not accept. It was not being treated as an Ally. The Soviet Union would not be a satellite of the United States in the Far East or elsewhere. These were the reasons Mr. Molotov had raised the question of control machinery in London.

The Ambassador stated that there must be a complete misunderstanding. It had never been the intention of the President to disregard the views of the Soviet Union. He wished fully to consult with the Russians on all matters of mutual interest and Japan was certainly one of these matters. This question must be straightened out.

The Generalissimus replied that the President may not have had such thoughts in his mind but he was speaking of what had actually happened. Soviet views on Japan were completely disregarded. The Soviet Union was not informed of measures adopted there. Is this the way to treat an ally? If this regime were to continue the Soviet Union would leave Japan for it could not be responsible for actions it only learned of through the press. Did MacArthur represent the Soviet Union? No. It would be more honest if the Soviet Union were to quit Japan than to remain there as a “piece of furniture”.

The Ambassador stated that in the early days, that is at the time of the capitulation of Japan, he had received thousands of words to and from MacArthur on directives issued to him and what he was doing in regard to Japan. These messages had been transmitted to the Red Army General Staff by the Military Mission. Since MacArthur had established himself in Japan, arrangements had been made for the Soviet General to have radio communications with Marshal Vasilevsky⁷⁹ and MacArthur had furnished Derevyanko full information for transmission to Vasilevsky. Then messages to the Embassy ceased and the Ambassador had assumed that the Soviet representative was obtaining all information and transmitting it to Vasilevsky. To this the Generalissimus replied that the Soviet Government knew nothing whatever as to what was going on in Japan. Its representative received no word, for example, on the new Japanese Government and the changes therein. It had not been informed of the reasons for making these changes. This was only one example, there were many more.

The Ambassador stated that this was all news to him and that he would report this matter to his Government. The Generalissimus stated that he could not understand why the Japanese press and radio were permitted to denounce the Soviet Union. The Soviets were Allies. He also could not understand why the higher Japanese commanders were allowed to remain at liberty and were not isolated. Was Japan a conquered country or not? Did any censorship exist there?

The Ambassador explained that MacArthur had issued a directive to the effect that no criticism in the press or on the radio should be leveled against the Allies. He had no information on the attacks mentioned by the Generalissimus. The Generalissimus stated that he did not doubt that such a directive had been issued but nonetheless the Japanese press had vilified the Soviet Union with impunity. The Soviet representative in Japan had twice approached MacArthur on this question. The press attacks had stopped and then recommenced in a truly fascist manner. The Soviet Government would never permit such a thing to go on in its zones of occupation. If any newspaper in Rumania, for example, should attack the United States its editors would be immediately punished. Such questions however could only be handled through a control commission. The Generalissimus continued that in view of the present facts the situation in Japan was deteriorating from day to day. This was why Molotov had raised the question of a control commission in London. The Ambassador inquired as to the nature of the Japanese press attacks. The Generalissimus stated that he did not remember the facts but that Mr. Molotov could advise the Ambassador in the premises. The Ambassador then inquired why the Generalissimus considered the situation in Japan to be deteriorating. It was his (the Ambassador’s) impression that satisfactory progress was being made. The Generalissimus stated that he was speaking of the Soviet position. The Soviet representative was merely a “piece of extra furniture” with the regime established by MacArthur. This was a very embarrassing position.

The Ambassador said that he would like to make a general statement regarding the Japanese surrender. The capitulation of Japan was quite unique in history. It was the general conception that MacArthur would proceed to Japan as Supreme Commander on behalf of all the Allies, force the Japanese to lay down their arms and obliterate their military power. He would take[make?] no permanent future commitments during the surrender period except for the destruction of the Japanese military machine. It was thought that this first surrender period would last about two months so that by November 1st this phase of the occupation of Japan would be over. With that in mind his Government had proposed on August 21 that an advisory council be established and meet promptly in Washington in order that Japanese political, economic and other policies could be discussed and the Allies could consult. Every effort would be made to reach agreement on policy. In the meantime each Ally had a military representative in Japan. The Ambassador assumed that these representatives were informed of developments. He also assumed that if there had been objection to any action protest would have been made. So far as he was aware no protest had been registered. Now the advisory commission meeting had been postponed for various reasons of which the Generalissimus was aware. However, he knew that he could say that there was never any intention on the part of the President not to consult fully with the Soviet Union on Japan especially after this first phase of the surrender period had terminated.

The Generalissimus remarked that recently the banks had been closed in Japan and their assets had been confiscated. What objections could be made after such a definite action had been taken? The Ambassador stated that the Soviet Union would be furnished with full information on all these subjects. These were matters which would be discussed at the advisory council. He continued that the Generalissimus would find that MacArthur had done only what was necessary to carry out the surrender terms and to protect the interests of the Allies. For this reason the President hoped that the Generalissimus would send a representative to Washington to discuss these matters.

The Generalissimus repeated that the establishment of the advisory council was an incorrect solution. If he sent representatives to Washington he feared that they would interfere with the work of the commission; they would become a nuisance and there would be a further deterioration in Soviet-American relations. Would it not be better for the Soviet Union to step aside and let the Americans act as they wished in Japan? The Soviet Union would not interfere. For a long time the isolationists had been in power in the United States. He had never favored a policy of isolation, but perhaps now the Soviet Union should adopt such a policy. Perhaps in fact there was nothing wrong with it.

The Ambassador stated that he could only report to the President. He had informed the Generalissimus how the President wished to concert policy on Japan—this included full consultation with the Soviet Union and the other Allies. He had also explained that full consultation had perhaps been difficult during the first initial period of the surrender. After all, a period of two months was not a long time in the history of the two countries. The Generalissimus had spoken of Rumania and Bulgaria. During a similar period the Americans and the British had been upset as to the treatment accorded their representatives so that the Generalissimus’ emotions were the American emotions during that period. The Generalissimus replied that the situation in the Balkans was entirely different. The Americans were accorded the same treatment the Soviets were extended in Italy. Then the situation changed. In addition there were no American or British troops in the Balkans. The Soviets had troops on Japanese territory. After Potsdam the treatment accorded to the American and British representatives in Bulgaria and Rumania was changed for the better. However no change was made in Italy with respect to the Soviet representatives. In addition, the Russians had maintained 20 to 40 divisions on the Manchurian frontier for the last ten years and recently up to 70 divisions had been in operation against Japan. The Soviet Union had made its contribution in the Japanese war. No one could say they had done nothing. Furthermore it had been ready to help the United States by landing troops on the Japanese islands. This offer had been rejected.^* The Soviet Union had never done anything against the Allies in Bulgaria and Rumania which had not been done to the Soviet representatives in Italy.

The Ambassador stated that this was a matter of opinion. In any event the United States Government intended to treat the Russians honorably in Japan. If the Generalissimus thought that the situation had worked out otherwise he deeply regretted it. He had no information regarding the treatment of Soviet representatives in Japan. He could not speak of this matter. However, he wished to say a few words about the situation in Bulgaria and Rumania. According to his reports the American representatives there were in no way given as favorable treatment as that accorded to the Soviet representatives in Italy. However, he did not wish to argue this point. It was past history. He only wished to point out that these questions looked differently in Washington than in Moscow. Nonetheless they were ones which should be talked over as Allies and friends until agreement were reached.

The Ambassador recapitulated. He stated that according to his understanding the Generalissimus had suggested that the question of a control commission for Japan should be the subject of discussions between the two Governments and that the Soviet Government would not send a representative to Washington. The Generalissimus stated that this was correct. The advisory commission would not be able to decide anything. Such decisions must be reached on a government level. The Ambassador stated that he would return to Moscow in the morning where he had good communication facilities and that he would report fully to his Government.

[For portion of memorandum here omitted, concerning procedural questions of the Council of Foreign Ministers, see volume II, page 567.]

78. This conversation was reported to the Department in telegrams 3664 and 3670, October 26, from Moscow, neither printed.
79. Marshal Alexander Mikhailovich Vasilevsky, Soviet Assistant Commissar of Defense and Chief of the Soviet Army General Staff until June when he became Commander in Chief of Soviet Forces in the Far East and received the surrender of the Japanese Kwantung army in Manchuria, August 19.
80. Interpreter’s note: When Stalin made this remark it was quite obvious from the tone of his voice and from the expression on his face that he was still very irked at our refusal to permit Soviet troops to land at Hokaiko [Hokkaido], [Footnote in the original.]