740.00119 F.E.A.C./10–2045: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)
2198. Referring urtel regarding interview with Stalin.64 On August 21 we sent a proposal to the governments of USSR, United Kingdom, and China, proposing the establishment of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission. Under the terms of reference the Commission will make recommendations to the respective governments as to occupation policies.
On August 31 China accepted and on September 7, the Soviet Union accepted. We received no response from the British government until September 28 when the British accepted. In a separate communication [Page 766] the British made two requests: (1) that India be invited to join the participating governments; and (2) that the Commission be authorized to meet in Tokyo if it so desired. These were merely requests and not conditions of acceptance.
We advised the Foreign Ministers of USSR and China of the acceptance by the United Kingdom and transmitted the two requests. We asked that representatives be appointed at an early date for the organization meeting.
On October 2 Molotov advised me that he thought the functioning of the Advisory Commission should be preceded by the establishment of a Control Council.
While in London, Mr. Molotov had proposed adding to the agenda of the Foreign Ministers the question of establishing a Control Council. I took the position that the subject was not on the agenda submitted to the Council by the Berlin protocol65 or by agreement of the governments concerned. I stated that, consequently, I was not prepared to discuss the matter, did not know the views of the President nor the views of the Supreme Commander, but would, upon my return to Washington, present the matter to the President. On several occasions I urged that the orderly procedure would be for the Advisory Committee under its terms of reference to consider whether or not there should be a Control Council and, if so, what form that Control Council should take. On October 6 we telegraphed invitations to all governments mentioned in the original proposal, asking them to meet October 23. The Soviet Government responded that it was still of the opinion expressed October 2 that the Advisory Commission which it had previously agreed to should not begin to function until there was established a control council as now proposed by them. All the other governments announced their intention to have representatives at the meeting. Later at the request of two or three representatives, the meeting was postponed until October 30.
I advised Mr. Molotov that I would present his views to the President. I have done so. The President, however, agreed with me that the representatives of the Advisory Commission should be permitted, in accordance with their terms of reference, to make recommendations to their governments as to policies to be followed during the period of occupation. If proposals are made to revise the original terms of reference and to broaden the authority of the commission, such proposals would of course be considered with open-mindedness on their merits.
The Supreme Commander has not made any definite decision as to occupation forces. The thought is that the USSR, United Kingdom [Page 767] and China should furnish 30,000 each. It is thought that the Soviet Government contribution might be one reinforced infantry division. The forces provided would be integrated operationally with the United States forces under General MacArthur. It should be emphasized this plan is only under study. When the details are worked out the proposal will be submitted to the several governments for negotiation.
Under the terms of surrender agreed upon by our governments and communicated to the Japanese Government prior to surrender, the Emperor and the Japanese government are to carry out the orders of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers. Since no mention was made in the surrender terms of a Control Council, we could not approve a proposal to substitute a Control Council for the Supreme Allied Commander.
It is my thought, however, that there should be established, under the Supreme Allied Commander, an Allied Military Council composed of representatives of each of the major governments having military forces in the Army of Occupation. This Allied Military Council would thus be, in effect, an executive council of the ranking allied commanders through whose military forces the allied decisions must in the last analysis be carried out. The Supreme Commander would be its chairman, and in cases of divergences of views his direction would resolve the matter. General directives and important policy guidance forwarded to the Supreme Commander through the regular channels of the United States Military Command would be submitted to the Council for the consideration of appropriate procedures for their execution.
The above is simply for your own information and guidance. While it should enable you to indicate to Stalin our approach to the problem, it is not intended for direct communication to him. I hope to cable you further regarding the Military Council as I have not yet cleared the proposal with our military.
- Telegram 3595, October 19, 10 a.m., to Moscow, p. 758.↩
- August 1, 1945, Foreign Relations, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, vol. ii, p. 1478.↩