740.00119 PW/10–1945

The Chief of Staff (Marshall) to the Secretary of State

Dear Mr. Secretary: I am attaching a one page summary of the present situation as known to the War Department concerning Allied occupation forces for Japan. In addition to forces of the Allied Powers, the War Department is considering the use of up to 50,000 Filipinos, U.S. equipped and under U.S. command.

Faithfully yours,

G. C. Marshall
[Enclosure]
The War Department to the Department of State

Memorandum Concerning Status of Allied Occupation Forces for Japan

The British Chiefs of Staff have indicated informally that they are considering an occupation contingent of three or four brigades of about 7500 men each. These might be one brigade from the U.K., one from India, one or two from Australia and perhaps one from New Zealand. Also, there might be one from Canada.

The Australians have approached General MacArthur directly on the matter of an Australian force to serve directly under his command rather than as part of the British Empire contingent as it is understood the British envisage.

The Generalissimo has indicated to General Wedemeyer60 that he is considering the provision of a Chinese army of three divisions (30,000 [Page 763] men) but this provision will be at some later time and in a priority below that of forces to secure liberated areas in China.

The Russians have made no proposals other than their suggestion at the time of the surrender of the Japanese that they take over the northern half of Hokkaido.61

In summary, no formal proposals have been made by any of the Allied powers for provision of occupation forces for Japan. The United States Chiefs of Staff have indicated formally to the British that they expect a proposal concerning troops for Japan and also for Korea. So far as is known, the State Department has not initiated any conversations with Allied powers on the subject.

As to the status of U.S. planning, General MacArthur has stated (1) that there must not be separate Allied “area” commands, and (2) that if the U.S. is to retain dominance in the occupation of Japan, at least half of the occupation forces must remain U.S. On the basis of this, the Planners have reached the conclusion, and so reported to the Chiefs of Staff, that we should consider British, Chinese and U.S.S.R. forces of about 30,000 each. General MacArthur has further stated he will make firm plans for deploying these forces when he receives knowledge of their composition, strength and date of arrival. He envisages a two-area organization in Japan with a U.S. army corps headquarters in each area, appropriate Allied elements in each area, and token forces from each power in Tokyo.

Recognizing that the provision of Allied occupation forces is a matter for negotiations on a governmental level, the Joint Staff Planners have presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a proposed memorandum to State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on the matter, which is attached.62 The Joint Chiefs of Staff have not yet approved the paper.63

  1. Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, Commanding General, U.S. Forces in the China Theater, concurrently Chief of Staff of the China Theater.
  2. See Generalissimus Stalin’s message of August 16, p. 667.
  3. J.C.S. 1398/4 (October 11), p. 744.
  4. See footnote 35, p. 744.