Office of the Historian

740.00119 PW/7–2845

The Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Ballantine) to the Assistant Secretary of State (MacLeish)

[Washington,] August 8, 1945.

In reply to your memorandum of August 899 in regard to suggestions for guidance to OWI, we offer comments as follows:

(1)
As it is conceivable that the offer made in the Potsdam Proclamation may be withdrawn before it is accepted the answers to your questions may depend somewhat upon whether the Proclamation is accepted by Japan. This would apply with special force to the question propounded to you orally, that is: Do we propose to deal with the Japanese Government or to take over power and control in Japan as we have done in Germany? We would say that paragraphs 7 and 12 of the Proclamation leave open the question whether Allied military forces will supervise the Japanese Government or govern Japan directly.
With regard to the interpretation of the second sentence in paragraph 10 which reads: “The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people”, it is not clear from the wording whether this refers to a Japanese Government with which we now propose to deal or to a Japanese Government which we shall recognize in conformity to the provisions of paragraph 12.
(2)
The term “self-willed militaristic advisers” appears to us to be synonymous with “militarists”. We take this term to include military leaders and other flagrant exponents of ultra-nationalism.
(3)
The wording in the ultimatum does not indicate to us that we should no longer imply or state that the Emperor has been deceived and misled.
(4)
“Points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied” does not necessarily imply a token rather than complete occupation. As indicated in paragraph 1 above, paragraphs 7 and 12 of the Proclamation leave open the question whether Allied military forces will supervise the Japanese Government or govern Japan directly.
(5)
The policy of this Government regarding Japanese war criminals has not been determined.1 It is envisaged, however, that Japanese charged with violations of the laws and customs of war will be apprehended and tried as war criminals. It is further anticipated that the Jackson program will be applied in the Far East with such [Page 592] deviations as special circumstances and conditions in that area may require.2
(6)
It is not clear what is meant by the question propounded in paragraph 5 of Mr. Vinacke’s memorandum to you.3 We would say that there is nothing in the Proclamation to exclude the taking by the Allies themselves of steps to revive and strengthen “democratic tendencies among Japanese people”.

  1. Not printed.↩
  2. For documentation, see pp. 898 ff.↩
  3. Justice Robert H. Jackson, of the U.S. Supreme Court, was U.S. Chief Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis War Criminals and signed the Four-Power Agreement in regard thereto at London, August 8; Department of State Bulletin, August 12, 1945, p. 222. For his report to President Truman, see White House press release of June 7, ibid., June 10, 1945, p. 1071.↩
  4. Not printed; Harold M. Vinacke was Japan specialist of the Office of War Information.↩