Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The British Commonwealth, The Far East, Volume VI

740.00119 PW/8–645

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Ballantine) to the Under Secretary of State (Grew)⁹⁵

[Washington,] August 6, 1945.

Subject: Comments on memorandum forwarded by Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson on “Observations on Post-Hostilities Policy Toward Japan”

(1) The memorandum forwarded by Secretary of War Stimson raises the basic question as to whether the Japanese are to have the major responsibility for running their own country immediately following hostilities with the Allies remaining in the background and exerting a minimum of control, or whether the Allies are to assume supreme authority over Japan in line with a strict interpretation of the term “unconditional surrender” and hence assume the responsibility for all matters in Japan following surrender. The Department of State has in its planning for the post-hostilities treatment of Japan been influenced by the basic fact that until recently this Government has insisted on a rigid interpretation of “unconditional surrender” for Japan and that this policy has been reiterated on several occasions by both President Roosevelt and President Truman. Consequently there was worked out, in conjunction with the War and Navy Departments, basic policy documents and terms of surrender for Japan predicated on the assumption that we would obtain supreme authority over Japan upon its “unconditional surrender” or total defeat.

(2) With the issuance at Potsdam on July 26, 1945 of the statement by the Heads of the Governments of the United States, United Kingdom and the Republic of China on terms for Japan⁹⁶ which would be acceptable to us at the present time, the possibility of a fundamentally different policy program has been raised and the necessity arises for considering a policy from a different point of view.

(3) The Department has been fully aware of the necessity, as clearly set forth in the memorandum forwarded by Secretary Stimson, of advocating policies (a) which would be particularly applicable to Japan as distinct from Germany; (b) which would be politically acceptable to the American people; (c) which would require a minimum period of control over Japan consistent with the fulfillment of our basic objectives; and (d) which would be compatible with our basic war aims. Consequently, it has been recognized in the Department that any policy for Japan to be successful (1) must rely on the Japanese themselves for the development of democratic institutions; (2) must not interfere with the institution of the emperor so long as the Japanese people demand its retention; and (3) must permit the emergence of Japan as a peace-loving nation and its eventual participation in world trade. The Department attempted to reconcile these basic concepts with our declared intention of the unconditional surrender of Japan in document SC–138a entitled “Initial Post-Defeat Policy for Japan”,⁹⁷ approved by the Staff Committee on June 26, 1945.

(4) In reference to the memorandum forwarded by Secretary Stimson, it should be noted that the views expressed therein are closer to those of the British Foreign Office, as communicated in a memorandum delivered by Mr. Balfour,⁹⁸ and are more in line with the Potsdam announcement of July 26, 1945 than are the policies advocated in “Initial Post-Defeat Policy for Japan”. There are obvious disadvantages to both a plan which envisages complete control over Japan by the Allies and to one in which the role of the Allies is largely supervisory. The memorandum forwarded by Secretary Stimson points out many of the weaknesses in the former plan. On the other hand, it must be realized that if a United States policy program is based entirely on the assumption that the Japanese will develop, largely on their own initiative, “a genuine democratic movement” and such a movement does not develop, the Allies will be faced with the choice of either stepping in and taking over more control or leaving the Japanese to develop internally as they see fit. It is doubted, moreover, if the philosophy of militarism can be completely and permanently discredited in the minds of the Japanese people unless the extent of their defeat is brought home to them by the occupation, even if only for a brief period, of a substantial part of their territory. Furthermore, recent public opinion surveys in this country show that a third of those questioned advocate the execution of the Emperor after the war, a fifth voted for his imprisonment or exile, a sixth wanted a court to decide his fate, while only three percent supported his use by the Allies. It is questionable, therefore, whether or not it would be politically practicable for the Allies to use the Emperor to the extent suggested in the memorandum. However, if Japan accepts in the near future the terms as defined at Potsdam on July 29 [26?] 1945, many of the suggestions made in the memorandum forwarded by Secretary Stimson would be more appropriate.

(5) On the other hand, if Japan does not accept the Potsdam terms and the Allies are forced to fight their way into the main Japanese islands and to defeat the Japanese Army in the homeland, it may be that no central Japanese authority will be in existence and that the Allies may be forced to assume the supreme authority of Japan and to exercise that authority for a limited period.

(6) If Japan capitulates before an invasion of the homeland or the defeat of her armed forces in the field, however, a compromise plan might be preferable which contained parts of the old concepts of supreme authority and the new concept of a surrender based on specific terms and with the Allies exercising only partial control.

(7) Such a partial compromise is in fact under consideration by the State, War, Navy Coordinating Sub-Committee for the Par East. Tentative plans for the control of Japan envisage three main periods. The first of these, which would probably not exceed 18 months, would be one in which the Supreme Allied Commander for Japan would assume authority over Japan and would enforce disarmament and demobilization. These military aspects of Japanese surrender might be carried out either through partial or complete occupation of the home islands. The Japanese administrative structure would be used to the fullest possible extent but all policies would be decided by the supreme commander. The Emperor and his immediate family would be placed in protective custody so that the Institution of the Emperor would, in reality, be continued. The second period, as at present envisaged, would be characterized by the transfer of authority in Japan from the supreme commander to an Allied Supervisory Commission, composed of civilian representatives from the major Allies at war with Japan. The policies of the Commission would be implemented by the Japanese themselves. The Commission would support such measures as would facilitate development by the Japanese of democratic institutions. Limited Allied military, naval and air forces would be stationed at points from which the policies of the Supervisory Commission could be enforced when necessary. As the Japanese developed a willingness to follow the suggestions of the Supervisory Commission and increasingly cooperated with the Allies, authority would be turned over to the Japanese. This second period should likewise be limited in duration and such controls as were necessary for a more extended period could be exerted through the control of exports and imports. It is envisaged further that basic differences in policies between ourselves and our Allies could be settled in the proposed Far East Advisory Commission.

(8) If circumstances warranted it, a more complete compromise might be preferable under which the Allies would exercise supreme authority over Japan during a short initial period with only partial occupation. At the beginning of the second period of control, however, authority in Japan might be transferred from the supreme commander to Japanese governmental authorities and any Allied Supervisory Commission which might be formed to continue control over Japan would have only limited authority. It is believed that such a compromise plan would meet many of the points raised in the above-mentioned memorandum, would be closer to the ideas expressed by the British Foreign Office, would be workable from a practical point of view and would, at the same time, give us reasonable assurance that our basic objectives towards Japan could be achieved.

In summary:

(1) The United States early announced that it would demand the unconditional surrender of Japan;

(2) The Potsdam Proclamation, July 26, 1945, announced terms of surrender, which might bring about an early capitulation of Japan;

(3) The memorandum presented by Secretary Stimson presents a plan which is along the line and in amplification of the Potsdam Proclamation and in harmony with the present views of the British Foreign Office.

(4) If the Japanese Government should in the near future offer to surrender, the terms of the Potsdam Proclamation, possibly amplified along the lines of the submitted memorandum, would be applicable;

(5) If, however, it is necessary to invade and conquer Japan, it is possible that, as in the case of Germany, no Japanese Government will be in existence. In such a case the early plans of the Department would naturally come into operation;

(6) If Japan should surrender at some time before the complete conquest of the main islands, the terms of surrender to be enforced on Japan would depend upon the conditions, political, military and economic, existing at the time.

J[oseph] W. B[allantine]

95. Drafted by George H. Blakeslee and Hugh Borton of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs.
96. Foreign Relations, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, vol. ii, p. 1474.
97. June 27, p. 555.
98. August 1, p. 582.