Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The British Commonwealth, The Far East, Volume VI

740.00119 FEAC/6–245

Report by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East⁴⁶

SWNCC 65/2

[Washington, 30 April 1945.]

Establishment of a Far Eastern Advisory Commission

the problem

1. To determine:

a. The United States’ commitments to consultation with its Allies in the war in the Pacific on questions connected with the termination of hostilities and on conditions and situations which may constitute a threat to peace and security in Far Eastern areas.

b. The procedure to be followed in such consultation.

facts bearing on the problem

2. The Declaration of the four nations at the Moscow Conference of 30 October 1943⁴⁷ states that the four Governments:

“. . . . recognizing the necessity of ensuring a rapid and orderly transition from war to peace and of establishing and maintaining international peace and security with the least diversion of the world’s human and economic resources for armaments; jointly declare:

“1. That their united action, pledged for the prosecution of the war against their respective enemies, will be continued for the organization and maintenance of peace and security.

“2. That those of them at war with a common enemy will act together in all matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of that enemy.

“3. That they will take all measures deemed by them to be necessary to provide against any violation of the terms imposed upon the enemy.

. . . . . . .

“5. That for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security pending the re-establishment of law and order and the inauguration of a system of general security, they will consult with one another and as occasion requires with other members of the United Nations with a view to joint action on behalf of the community of nations.…”

3. The Cairo Declaration of 1 December 1943 issued by the President, the Prime Minister and the Generalissimo⁴⁸ states that “The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan.” Such a statement is clearly indicative of the intention of these three countries to cooperate among themselves on matters concerning Japan. The fact that the Soviet Union is not today at war with Japan nor a party to the Cairo Declaration does not detract from our present obligations thereunder in reference to consultation or united action. The Declaration further states certain objectives in reference to the treatment of Japan and concludes that:

“With these objects in view the three Allies, in harmony with those of the United Nations at war with Japan, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan.”

4. The Teheran Declaration of 1 December 1943⁴⁹ by the President, the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin further indicates the intention of this Government to consult with its Allies. It reads:

“We shall seek the cooperation and active participation of all nations, large and small, whose peoples in heart and mind are dedicated, as are our own people, to the elimination of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance.”

5. None of the three Declarations referred to above specifies either the time or method of procedure of such consultation as far as the Far East is concerned.

6. Annex 2 of the Protocol signed at Moscow⁵⁰ established a European Advisory Commission to study and make joint recommendations to the three Governments upon European questions connected with the termination of hostilities which the three Governments considered appropriate to refer to it.

7. The Yalta Communiqué of February 12, 1945,⁵¹ states that permanent machinery should be set up for regular consultation between the Foreign Secretaries of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union and that they “will, therefore, meet as often as may be necessary, probably about every three or four months.”

8. Up to the present time no international body of any sort has been provided to consider and recommend joint policies to be followed by the interested nations and their agencies on questions arising from the termination of hostilities and on conditions and situations which may constitute a threat to peace and security in the Far East.

9. The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, at its 17th meeting, considered SWNCC 65/1, reached certain decisions in respect thereof, and directed the Subcommittee for the Far East to revise SWNCC 65/1 in the light of the agreement reached at the meeting. The minutes of this meeting included a draft of the Terms of Reference of a Far Eastern Advisory Commission, prepared substantially in accordance with such decisions.

Discussion

10. See Appendix “B”.

conclusions

11. It is concluded that:

a. This Government is committed to consultation with certain of its Allies on matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of Japan, and generally for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security pending the re-establishment of law and order and the inauguration of a system of general security.

b. The best method of implementing some of the commitments of this Government to consultation with its Allies on problems of the Far East arising directly from the unconditional surrender or total defeat of Japan is through the establishment of a Far Eastern Advisory Commission with Terms of Reference as stated in Appendix “A”.

recommendations

12. It is recommended that the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

a. Forward this document to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for an expression of their views relative to the military implications therein.

b. Consider Appendix “A” in the light of the views expressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with a view to its approval and use at the appropriate time in the establishment of a Far Eastern Advisory Commission.⁵²

[Enclosure 1]

Appendix “A”

The Far Eastern Advisory Commission Terms of Reference

I. Establishment

The Governments of the . . . . . . hereby establish a Far Eastern Advisory Commission composed of representatives of the Participating Powers.

II. Functions

A. The Far Eastern Advisory Commission shall be responsible for making recommendations to the participating Governments:

1. On the instruments to carry out the terms imposed upon Japan as a result of its unconditional surrender or total defeat;

2. On the terms and provisions to be imposed on Japan, including the measures necessary to ensure the complete disarmament and subsequent effective control of Japan;

3. On the machinery required to ensure the fulfillment of these terms and provisions, including the form of post-defeat military government; and

4. On the measures needed for dealing with such related subjects, arising out of the implementation of the terms and provisions to be imposed on Japan, as United Nations nationals who have been prisoners of war, displaced persons and refugees, reparations and restitution, war criminals, conduct of Japan’s foreign relations, and removal of Japanese officials and civilians from territory formerly under Japanese control.

B. The Commission shall have no authority with regard to the conduct of military operations in prosecution of the present war nor shall it make recommendations in regard to territorial adjustments.

C. The Commission shall perform such other duties as may be assigned to it by agreement of the participating Governments.

III. Other Methods of Consultation

The establishment of the Commission shall not preclude the use of other methods of consultation on Far Eastern issues by the participating Governments.

IV. Composition

The Far Eastern Advisory Commission shall consist of one representative of each of the states party to this agreement. The membership of the Commission may be increased, as conditions warrant, by the addition of representatives of other United Nations in the Far East or having territories therein. Such United Nations not members of the Commission shall be invited to sit with the Commission when matters deemed by the Commission primarily to affect the interests of such nations are under consideration. In addition, the Commission shall provide for full and adequate consultations, as occasion may require, with representatives of the United Nations in the Far East or having territories therein and not members of the Commission, in regard to matters before the Commission which are of particular concern to such nations. The chairmanship of the Commission shall be held in rotation by representatives of the permanently participating states.

V. Location and Organization

The Far Eastern Advisory Commission shall have its headquarters in Washington. It may meet at other places as the occasion requires.

Each representative of the Commission may be accompanied by an appropriate staff comprising both civilian and military representation.

The Commission shall organize its secretariat, appoint such committees as may be deemed advisable, and otherwise perfect its organization and procedure.

VI. Termination

The Far Eastern Advisory Commission shall cease to function upon notification by one of the constituent states of its desire to terminate the agreement creating the Commission. Prior thereto, the Commission shall cease to perform those functions which may be absorbed by or transferred to any interim or permanent security organization of which the participating Governments are members.

[Enclosure 2]

Appendix “B”

Discussion

1. In view of the statements in the Moscow, Cairo and other declarations, to which this country is a party, this Government is committed to consultation with other interested Powers on matters concerning the unconditional surrender or total defeat of Japan and the varied problems arising in connection therewith. The increased tempo of operational and political developments in the Far Eastern area indicates the advisability of an early decision by this Government on the procedure of consultation with our Allies to be instituted at an appropriate time.

2. It is the considered position of the Department of State that:

a. It is to the best interests of the United States to share with its Allies the responsibility for matters pertaining to the unconditional surrender of Japan and the enforcement of the provisions following surrender.

b. After the unconditional surrender of Japan, there should be, as far as is practicable, Allied representation in the army of occupation and in military government by those countries which have actively participated in the war against Japan.

c. If the forces occupying Japan and the personnel of the military government are restricted to those of the United States, this Government would carry the sole burden for enforcement of the terms of surrender. Such a situation would force the United States alone to bear whatever cost, effort and responsibility were necessary for such control—a condition which the American people might support only grudgingly.

d. The Japanese must be forced to realize that the greater part of the world, both Occidental and Oriental, is against them. The use of Asiatic units in the Allied occupation forces and in the military government of Japan would be evidence of this fact and would prevent the Japanese from interpreting the war in the Pacific as a racial war and as one designed to spread “white imperialism” throughout Asia.

3. This Government is under moral obligation to give careful consideration to the opinions of its Allies who have suffered extensively as a result of the war in the Pacific. For example, the contributions by China in the war against Japan, extending over a period of eight years, entitle that country, in the eyes of all peace-loving peoples, to a voice in determining the policy to be applied to Japan.

4. It will be noted in Section II–B of the Terms of Reference (Appendix “A”) that the Commission shall have no authority with regard to the conduct of military operations in prosecution of the present war nor shall it make recommendation in regard to territorial adjustments. It is to be noted, further, that the Terms of Reference (Appendix “A”) limit the Commission to the consideration of problems arising directly out of the unconditional surrender or total defeat of Japan, unless other duties are specifically assigned it by agreement of the participating Governments as provided in Section II–C of the Terms of Reference. It is also specifically limited to the making of recommendations to the participating Governments. Furthermore, it is probable that matters will arise with respect to the Pacific and Far Eastern areas, even within the Japanese Empire, of such vital importance to the security of the United States that this Government will not wish to have them submitted to discussion within the Commission; the Terms of Reference are so limited as adequately to safeguard this consideration.

5. The establishment of a Far Eastern Advisory Commission at this time is complicated by the fact that as yet the U.S.S.R. is not at war with Japan, but this fact does not minimize the necessity for united action, in the application of joint policies by those members of the United Nations now at war with Japan, and for the continuation of joint action in the application of those policies in the post-hostilities era.

6. The Far Eastern Advisory Commission should be kept as small as possible. The primary parties in interest at present, from both a political and a military standpoint, are the United States, the United Kingdom and China. It would appear that, initially, the Far Eastern Advisory Commission should be composed of representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and China, and the Soviet Union, if it enters the war against Japan. When matters are being considered which affect the particular interests of one or more of the governments of Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Canada, or France, representatives of these governments should be invited to sit with the Commission and collaborate in the determination of the particular question under consideration.

7. It has been stated that the Department of State has no intention of raising at present with our Allies the question of the establishment of a Far Eastern Advisory Commission. It desires, however, that an early decision be reached within this Government as to the procedure of consultation to be followed on problems resulting from the defeat of Japan if such consultation should be requested by one of our Allies actively participating in the war against Japan.

46. Revised from SWNCC 65/1 after the 17th meeting of the full Committee and submitted to the latter for approval.
47. Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. i, p. 755.
48. President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek; for text of Declaration, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 448.
49. Ibid., p. 640.
50. Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. i, p. 756.
51. Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945 p. 968.
52. For revised text of Appendix A as presented to the British, Chinese, and Soviet Governments, see telegram 7106, August 21, 8 p.m., to London, p. 683. For an account of the origin and organization of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission, see The Far Eastern Commission, A Study in International Cooperation: 1945 to 1952, by George H. Blakeslee, Department of State publication No. 5138, Far Eastern Series 60 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1953), pp. 2–5.