740.0011 PW/12–1644
Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Grew) to the Secretary of State
Mr. Secretary: I discussed this matter29 fully with Admiral Nimitz30 as well as with his psychological warfare officers and we were [Page 516] in complete agreement that for the present we had better let the Emperor alone, as he might be found to be an important, if not an essential asset, both in bringing Japan to unconditional surrender and in avoiding chaos and guerilla warfare after our eventual occupation of Tokyo. In other words, the presence of the Emperor may conceivably be the source of saving thousands of American lives. At least, the Emperor’s voice is the only voice which the Japanese people, and probably the Japanese military forces, are likely to obey. This, of course, is as yet an imponderable factor in the situation, but the Admiral feels, as do I, that it would be stupid to deprive ourselves through blind prejudice of any conceivable asset in solving these future problems, difficult enough as they are.
Bob Sherrod’s use of the word “appeasement” indicates that he may be more inclined to listen to uninformed public opinion than to the carefully studied views of our military and naval leaders.