811.34553B/12–1045

The Secretary of State to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Bevin)6

Your messages of November 15th7 and of November 27th8—the latter accompanied by aide-mémoire, indicate that you intend to make further reply to mine of November 7th [6th] and 19th after consultation with your advisers. Since, however, you request additional information from me, and because the subject is for several reasons somewhat urgent, I attempt now to furnish you with the added information which you require and which I hope will enable you to assist us in this procedure which I first mentioned to you in London.

Let me say at once that I agree with much of the thought contained in your personal message of the 27th November and will send you [Page 223] further reply in respect to the Portuguese negotiations. However, I am convinced that in the case of nearly all of these bases, including those in Iceland and the Azores, it will be far easier for the United States and the British Government unilaterally or jointly to continue in being the bases, and the rights to them, which were established by them during the war and to join the governments having sovereignty in turning them over to the United Nations Organization, as established, going, concerns, than it will be to bring about with the nations concerned, common consent to appropriate locations, renegotiate contracts, and provide for the hundreds of details and thousands of procedural questions that will arise if the United Nations Security Organization seeks to create and organize these facilities afresh. Without pessimism, I submit that our experience justifies this conclusion. I feel that to hold bases against the completion of the United Nations Organization will inspire and continue faith that it will come into being as an effective organization, and that to abandon bases will detract from such faith.

It is precisely because of the early date of expiration of existing agreements, and the irritation likely to arise as to the precise date of expiration of many of them, that I feel your help will be greatly appreciated here while we seek approval of the various agreements under consideration between our governments.

In most of these cases except those to which the traditional position of the United States attaches for western hemispheric reasons, the United States will, I am sure, welcome participation by the British Government in the rights and duties to be performed as trustee for the future United Nations Organization, and if I failed to stress this before, it has been because you advised me orally that the task might be a heavy one for the British Government during the next year or two.

Specifically we would have no objection to negotiations by the British Government with the Government of the Philippine Islands to rights at the Manila base similar to those which we expect to obtain, but I think that future reflection might cause you to question the procedure.

As respects the disputed islands in the Pacific, there is a definite program to maintain military bases on three of them, and no definite program now for the improvement of others as commercial air fields. The idea is rather now to settle amicably a dispute and provide this country with added assurance of cooperation by your Government at a time when we seek to extend cooperation to your Government.

As regards requests by the United States for base rights from other countries in Europe and Africa, we are frankly uncertain whether to make them. While there have been suggestions to that [Page 224] end by the military, it is likely that procedure in respect to such requests will depend to an extent on whether or not the program set forth in my memorandum of November 7th [6th] is realized. We have made no such requests of which you are not apprised.

If with these assurances you are willing to assist us with respect to the Portuguese negotiations, and to consider details of long-term leases on those bases of the list sent you with my note of November 7th [6th] which are under the control of the British Government, I will be pleased to propose agreements, send one or more representatives to England, or take any other steps deemed suitable by you to expedite serious consideration of the program, for there are perhaps some reasons why it would be better to conclude the Portuguese negotiations ahead of those with Iceland.

  1. This message was sent to the British Ambassador on December 10 for transmission to Mr. Bevin.
  2. Ante, p. 214.
  3. Ante, p. 217.