811.34553B/12–1045

The Secretary of State to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Bevin)4

I have given careful consideration to your personal message to me of November 27 and to the aide-mémoire of November 29 in regard to the Azores and the Cape Verde Islands. I am grateful for your assurance that your Government is ready to consider to what extent [Page 221] it can be of assistance to us in this matter. For my part I should like to assure you in turn that the United States Government will not make an approach to the Portuguese Government until there has been full discussion between you and me as to the best method of proceeding.

As you know, our military people are using the field at Santa Maria in our redeployment program and it will be necessary for us to continue to operate the field as a military airport for a good many months in bringing our soldiers home. In my earlier message I informed you that our military people feel strongly that it is necessary that both the field at Santa Maria and the field at Lagens be operated so that one will be available when the other is unusable for weather reasons. Our Chiefs of Staff, therefore, feel that if your Government finds it necessary to move out of Lagens that arrangements would be made for our Air Transport Command to take over the operation of this field for continued use in our redeployment program.

In the circumstances, would it not be a good idea for your Government to continue to operate the field at Lagens for the frank purpose of assisting the United States in its redeployment program? It seems to me that it would be preferable that you do this rather than that we have to take over the operation of the field for this purpose.

The idea of emphasizing the Azores as a great civil air communications center set forth in your message of November 27 appeals to me. I do not, however, feel that it would be desirable to bring Brazil or Canada into this situation. They are not parties to present agreements and the advantages of bringing them in would, I think, be offset by irritation in France and perhaps in USSR and other countries over their being left out.

What would you think of an approach to the Azores problem along the following lines: The United States would open negotiations with the Portuguese Government for an agreement under which the United States would assist Portugal in maintaining and operating a civil airfield at Santa Maria. It is clear that Portugal is not now in a position to take over the operation of this field. It should be operated as a great civil airport with transit and technical stop rights for civilian planes open to everybody. The agreement would provide that it either be operated by the United States on behalf of Portugal or that there be a Joint United States-Portuguese Commission to operate it.

The United States agreement in regard to Santa Maria, while emphasizing the operation of the airport for civil purposes, would provide that the United States should have the right to land military planes there and that in an emergency the field would be made available to the Security Council on its call. In the event it became [Page 222] necessary to use the field for military aviation purposes the United States would assist Portugal in providing the necessary collateral facilities necessary there in operating and defending the field.

The United Kingdom Government would approach the Portuguese and negotiate an agreement along similar lines for the joint United Kingdom-Portuguese operation of the field at Lagens. Our people would probably like an understanding or an agreement to the effect that if you do not exercise your option of operating the field at Lagens the United States should have the right to replace the United Kingdom in the joint operation of this field with Portugal. If you wish, our5 there could be a parallel provision giving you the right to operate Santa Maria if we should elect not to do so.

Our agreement with Portugal would provide that our military planes should have the right to make collateral use of Lagens and your agreement would provide that your military planes have the right to make collateral use of Santa Maria, each of us mutually to recognize such rights.

While this procedure has not had full discussion here, I am willing to give it full support if it meets the difficulties you have mentioned and if you will support us in a vigorous presentation of the plan to the Portuguese Government. We could then consider future installations in the Cape Verdes, with the ice broken and this more important negotiation behind us.

  1. This message was sent to the British Ambassador on December 10 for transmission to Mr. Bevin.
  2. Presumably the word “our” should be omitted here. The original indicates that an erasure was made prior to final agreement on this sentence, and it is most likely that the word “our” was not erased through oversight.