740.00119 Control (Italy)/5–1145: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy (Kirk)40
803. The President has sent this afternoon the following message to Prime Minister Churchill:41
“Since sending you my telegram of April 30 I have become increasingly concerned over the implication of Tito’s actions in Venezia Giulia. You are no doubt receiving the same reports which indicate that he has no intention of abandoning the territory or of permitting a peaceful solution of this century old problem as part of a general pacific post-war settlement. I have come to the conclusion that we must decide now whether we should uphold the fundamental principles of territorial settlement by orderly process against force, intimidation or blackmail. It seems that Tito has an identical claim ready for South Austria, in Carinthia and Styria and may have similar designs on parts of Hungary and Greece if his methods in Venezia Giulia succeed. Although the stability of Italy and the future orientation of that country [Page 1157] with respect to Russia may well be at stake the present issue, as I see it, is not a question of taking sides in a dispute between Italy and Yugoslavia or of becoming involved in internal Balkan politics. The problem is essentially one of deciding whether our two countries are going to permit our Allies to engage in uncontrolled land grabbing or tactics which are all too reminiscent of those of Hitler and Japan. Yugoslav occupation of Trieste, the key to that area and a vital outlet for large areas of central Europe, would, as I know you will agree, have more far-reaching consequences than the immediate territory involved. In these circumstances I believe the minimum we should insist upon is that Field Marshal Alexander should obtain complete and exclusive control of Trieste and Pola, the line of communication through Gorizia and Monfalcone, and an area sufficiently to the east of this line to permit proper administrative control. The line suggested by Alexander at Allied Force Headquarters in March extended to include Pola would, I believe be adequate. Tito seems unsure of himself and might not put up more than a show of resistance, although we should be prepared to consider if necessary further steps to effect his withdrawal. I note that Alexander, who has lost patience with Tito’s latest moves, is prepared to go ahead if we agree.
I suggest that as a first step we instruct our Ambassadors at Belgrade to address Tito along the following lines:
[Here follows text of proposed note which is substantially the same as that quoted in telegram 86, May 14, 11 a, m., to Belgrade, printed on page 1161.]”
[For press release of May 12 regarding the situation in Venezia Giulia affirming the view of the United States Government that a disinterested military government was essential and that the disposition of Venezia Giulia must await a definite peace settlement, see Department of State Bulletin, May 15, 1945, page 902.]