740.00119 Control (Italy)/5–1145: Telegram
The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Patterson) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 11—10:45 a.m.]
82. My 77, May 9. I am firmly of the opinion that United States and British Governments should give SACMED full political support in maintaining Allied occupation of Trieste corridor if necessary by [Page 1156] force. If we give in to Tito in this instance we may face the same problem in Carinthia and Salonika. Yugoslav units are already in Klagenf urt and in a speech May 9th Tito claimed Carinthia. For the past week other units have been moving south into Macedonia and an OSS39 officer there reported his impression that Macedonian troops are preparing to move to Salonika.
The time to stop the Yugoslav Army is now in Venezia Giulia, where we have or can have ample forces. Would it not be better to run a risk of some bloodshed now rather than let Tito pursue a course leading to more serious consequences? Our position regarding new boundaries has been made clear, but can this be maintained if before the peace conference we permit the Partisan Yugoslavs to occupy and govern what areas they choose? By their well-tried methods they can so terrorize the peoples of the areas they occupy that there would be almost no chance of a free plebiscite, in our sense of the term, even with Allied soldiers by the ballot boxes.
I realize that United States and British Governments would be bitterly critcized if forced to take armed action against the Partisans. They therefore should simultaneously give fullest publicity to the facts and necessity for the action.
Sent Department as 82, Caserta as 31.