Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: Political and Economic Matters, Volume II

Council of Foreign Ministers Files: Lot M–88: CFM 1945 London Minutes

Record of the Fourth Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Lancaster Home, London, September 14, 1945, 4 p.m.⁹⁸

London, September 14, 1945, 4 p.m.

C.F.M. (P) (45) 4th Meeting

Present

U.K.	U.S.A	U.S.S.R
Mr. Bevin	Mr. Byrnes (Chairman)	M. Molotov
Sir R. I. Campbell	Mr. B. V. Cohen	M. F. T. Gousev
Sir A. Clark Kerr	Mr. J. Dunn	M. A. Gromyko99
Mr. A. Duff Cooper	Mr. J. F. Dulles	M. K. V. Novikov
Sir N. Charles	Mr. C. E. Bohlen	M. S. A. Golunski

France	China
M. Bidault	Dr. Wang Shih Chieh
M. Couve de Murville	Dr. Wellington Koo
General Catroux	Dr. Victor Hoo
M. Fouques Duparc	Dr. Hollington Tong
	Mr. Yang Yun Chu

1. Control and Administration of Germany

M. Bidault circulated a memorandum by the French Delegation on the control and administration of Germany (C.F.M.(45) 17).¹

2. Reparations From Germany
(Previous Reference C.F.M. (P) (45) 3rd Meeting, Minute 1)

The Council agreed to defer consideration of the question whether the Soviet memorandum on this subject (C.F.M.(45) 15²) should be added to the agenda for the present Conference.

3. Italy: Draft Heads of Peace Treaty
(Previous Reference C.F.M.(P) (45) 3rd Meeting, Minute 5)

Dr. Wang Shih Chieh read out the text of a draft letter,³ prepared in accordance with the Council’s decision at their meeting that morning, to the Italian Representative in London, the Yugoslav Ambassador in London, the Right Hon. H. V. Evatt, the High Commissioner for Australia, the Acting High Commissioner for New Zealand, the Acting High Commissioner for Canada, the High Commissioner for the Union of South Africa and the Secretary of State for India, inviting them to send representatives to the Council’s meeting on Monday, 17th September, if they so desired, to present the views of their Governments on the question of the Yugoslav-Italian frontier and the future of the city and port of Trieste.

The Council invited Dr. Wang Shih Chieh to despatch letters to the representatives of these Governments in the terms of this draft.

4. Italy: Disposal of Italian Colonies

The Council proceeded to discuss Section III of the memorandum by the United States Delegation (C.F.M. (45) 16⁴) dealing with the disposal of the Italian Colonies.

Mr. Byrnes said that the first question was whether the Italian Colonies should be left with Italy or taken from her. Italy had not used her opportunities as a colonial Power to the best advantage. She had failed to develop her colonial peoples in the direction of self-government. He had concluded that Italy’s Colonies should not be returned to her, but should be placed under trusteeship.

The peoples of the world would not have responded to the call to join the United Nations in the war if certain hopes had not been held out to them and certain promises made. In the Atlantic Charter, the Moscow Declaration and on other occasions the principal Powers had declared that they sought no territorial advantages and intended to secure for the peoples of the world an opportunity to choose the form of government under which they wished to live.

The United States Delegation proposed, as regards Libya, a promise of independence after a ten-year period of trusteeship under an administrator appointed by the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations. All States members of the Council of Foreign Ministers would have a voice in the selection of this administrator. He would be assisted by an Advisory Committee including representatives of all States members of the Council of Foreign Ministers except China, and also representatives of Libya and Italy, who would be able to provide information relating to the territory which would be of value to the Committee. If the administrator failed to discharge his responsibility to the satisfaction of any of the States represented on the Committee, any one of them would be entitled to bring the matter before the Trusteeship Council.

This arrangement would give an assurance to all that the Italian Colonies would not be developed to the military advantage of any one nation. It would be left to the Security Council to determine where, if necessary, any strategic bases might be located.

Such a plan, in his submission, would give heart to the peoples of the world, since it would show that the Great Powers sincerely intended to give them at the earliest possible opportunity freedom to determine the type of government under which they wished to live.

M. Bidault said that he had not had time to give detailed consideration to the United States proposals, which differed in some respects from those put forward by the British Delegation in C.F.M.(45) 3, and at the present stage he could only express provisional views. The territories under discussion were of great importance to France, and he must ask that full consideration should be given to the views of the French Government before any final decision was taken about their disposal. In the view of the French Delegation it would be neither equitable nor wise to deprive Italy of all those Colonial territories which she had held before she herself came under the domination of the Fascist system, which now had happily been overthrown by the joint efforts of the United Nations. Italy was a small country, with a high birth rate. In pre-Fascist days Italy had rendered service to these territories. Further, he did not think it fair that Italy, who had in the later stages of the war made some contribution towards the overthrow of Fascism—within her own territory and outside it—should receive the same treatment as a country which had made no such contribution. The question of prestige for the new Italy must also be remembered. M. Molotov had referred that morning to the effect which the demilitarisation of Pantellaria would have on the national feelings of Italy: the loss of her Colonies would be far more serious from this point of view. He did not imply that the French Delegation favoured the retention of the status quo ante bellum. France would ask for certain rectifications in the Italian colonial Empire, as he believed would the British Commonwealth, whose armies had struggled for so long in the sands of North Africa. He suggested that these adjustments should be studied by the Deputies.

As regards the proposals made by the United States delegation, he raised no objection in principle to a system of trusteeship. He would, however, remind the Council that the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations Organisation were that very afternoon beginning their discussions on the possibility of administering the kind of collective trusteeship which the United States Delegation had in mind. If the Council were now to accept the solution proposed by Mr. Byrnes, they would not know in any detail to what they were committing themselves. Trusteeship under a single country was very different from collective trusteeship of the type proposed. How such a collective system would work, particularly in the territories under discussion, was not known.

In his opinion, subject to certain reservations, he saw advantages in setting up for these territories which were to be detached from Italian rule a system of trusteeship under the control of the United Nations. He thought, however, that the Deputies should examine the whole matter, if necessary sending representatives to the territories concerned.

Dr. Wang Shih-Chieh said that the Chinese Delegation favoured the United States proposals. This plan was in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. At San Francisco the Chinese Delegation had proposed, and insisted, that the independence of peoples should be one of the objectives of international trusteeship. The present plan did not diverge from this objective, nor from the principles adopted at San Francisco; and he hoped that the Council would seek a solution on these lines.

Mr. Bevin said that at this stage he wished to raise three points:—

(a) The United States memorandum referred to Libya. Libya in fact comprised two territories—Cyrenaica and Tripolitania. Could these territories be named separately?

Mr. Byrnes agreed.

(b) If this matter were remitted to the Deputies could it be understood that they were empowered to study, not only the proposals in the United States memorandum, but also such other proposals as might be put forward by other States members of the Council or by other United Nations at war with Italy. He would like the Governments of the British Dominions to be given an opportunity of putting their views to the Deputies. It was not yet known what form collective administration would take—e.g. whether there would be an international administrative Service for this purpose and a system for sharing the costs of collective administration. This was a new experiment, which the British Government would try to make work, but to be committed to this method of trusteeship, without the possibility of altering it if it were found to be unworkable, would put them under a difficulty.

(c) The British Government were also in a difficulty as regards the Senussi. In 1940, when they were fighting in the North African desert, they had given a public pledge, which they had repeated in 1942, that they would not be parties to putting the Senussi back under Italian rule.⁵ No nation had objected to this pledge and the British Government felt that they were to some extent committed. The principle of trusteeship did not conflict with this undertaking, but Cyrenaica and Tripolitania should be dealt with separately as conditions were different in the two territories.

M. Molotov supported Mr. Byrnes’ statement that Italy had not made good use of her colonial opportunities. They were conquered territories which Italy had used for aggressive purposes, with no regard to the interests of the local populations. From this he drew the conclusion that M. Bidault’s suggestion that the Colonies should be left with Italy was not the right one. Any comparison with Pantellaria was out of place, as Pantellaria was not a colonial possession.

M. Molotov went on to associate himself with Dr. Wang in saying that the advantage of Mr. Byrnes’ proposal was that it would maintain the principle of the independence of these territories. It would safeguard the control of the United Nations and would also serve to ensure the independence of these countries in the shortest possible time. Nobody could pretend that Italy had cared about the independence of these countries; and, if they were returned to Italy, who had waged war at the side of the Germans against the countries represented at the table, no one would believe that there was any hope of Colonial territories becoming independent.

M. Molotov said that, before he put forward the proposals of the Soviet Government, he would like to mention a point of principle on which he and Mr. Byrnes were united. From what had been said that afternoon it appeared that all the States members of the Council recognised the principle of trusteeship as the appropriate method of dealing with all the Italian Colonies. Apart from the reservation made by M. Bidault, they all agreed that these Colonies should not be left to Italy. They also agreed that they should be placed under the trusteeship of the United Nations in accordance with the San Francisco decisions.

Further, they were all interested in the method by which the general principle of trusteeship should be applied in individual cases, and that was of particular importance here because this was the first practical application of the principle. He fully appreciated Mr. Bevin’s warning that they should be careful in its application in the initial stages. Mr. Byrnes had put forward a very interesting proposal which was worthy of careful study, particularly his suggestion that collective trusteeship should be combined with individual responsibility in the person of a permanent administrator. But he was not certain what was involved in the principle of a permanent administrator with wide authority, and the difficulty would be to find such a person who would be acceptable to all the members of the Trusteeship Council.

What then were the proposals of the Soviet Delegation? They took the view that the principle of trusteeship might be applied to some of the Italian Colonies on the basis of individual trusteeship by a single Power and that, for others, the administration might be entrusted to a number of Powers on the basis of collective responsibility. If there was doubt about the feasibility of collective responsibility, the Soviet Government would have no objection to placing each of the Italian Colonies under the individual trusteeship of a particular Power. The Soviet Government favoured individual trusteeship by one Allied nation chosen by the United Nations,

The Soviet Government itself had certain claims. Those claims were based on the fact that Italy had attacked the Soviet Union, with ten divisions and three brigades of Blackshirts, who had devastated large areas of the Soviet Union penetrating as far as Stalingrad, the Northern Caucasus and the Crimea. The Soviet people could not ignore what they had done. It was possible to be kind hearted, but one should first be kind hearted on one’s own account and not on account of other countries. M. Molotov asked M. Bidault to appreciate the feelings and interests of the people of the Soviet Union. The Soviet newspapers had published the previous day particulars of the damage done to Soviet property during the war. This amounted to no less than 269 billion roubles, and a considerable part of it had been caused by Italian troops. It would, therefore, give satisfaction to the feelings of the Soviet Union if Italy were to be deprived of her privileges in territories where she had proved unequal to her responsibilities.

Another important reason for the Soviet claim was that the Soviet Government had wide experience in establishing friendly relations between different nationalities. This experience could be used to advantage in one of the Italian Colonies, and the Soviet Government would undertake to use the authority given them by the United Nations in such a way as not merely to maintain, but to enhance, the prestige of the United Nations.

The Soviet Government accordingly proposed that they should be made responsible for the trusteeship of Tripolitania. He could assure the Conference that the ten-year trusteeship period proposed by Mr. Byrnes would be sufficient to accomplish the task entrusted to the trustee Power by the United Nations, namely, to prepare the territory for an independent existence.

Mr. Byrnes, referring to what Mr. Bevin had said, said it was important that the Council should discuss this question themselves before referring it to the Deputies, since the discussion had revealed that there were questions of policy that must be determined before the Deputies could consider the details. Thus, the Council should themselves decide:—

(i) whether the Colonies were to be taken from Italy;

(ii) whether they agreed that the principle of trusteeship should be applied to these territories—on this the French had expressed some reservations, but the other Powers appeared to agree;

(iii) whether, if there were to be a trusteeship arrangement, it could be limited to a ten-year period for Libya and Eritrea;

(iv) whether the Colonies were to be administered by particular States or by individuals selected by the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations;

(v) if the Colonies were to be administered by individual States, which States should be responsible for which Colonies.

The United States Delegation thought that it would be extremely difficult for the Council to agree which States should administer particular Colonies. M. Molotov had expressed a fear that, if the United States proposal were adopted, the Trusteeship Council would not be able to agree on the individual to whom the task should be entrusted; but he (Mr. Byrnes) thought it would be much easier to agree on an administrator to act under a collective trusteeship than on particular States to be responsible for individual trusteeship. The selected individual could not be charged with having any desire to develop the colony for military or commercial advantage, since he would have no incentive to do so. The United States Delegation believed that these colonies constituted a trust, and would be a burden to any State which administered them. They should not be regarded as spoils of war or recompense for damage inflicted. There was no question about the sufferings of the Soviet people at the hands of the Italian troops, and he was satisfied that the British Commonwealth could make out a similar case in respect of the injuries inflicted on them by the Italians in the early days of the war. That was true of France also. If, however, any one of those three Governments were to be selected as trustees, then, no matter how they tried to avoid the charge, they would be accused of using their trust to reimburse themselves for the losses which they had suffered during the war. His information was that the colonies which they were discussing had proved a burden to the Government entrusted with their administration, and there was no hope of securing reparations from them.

M. Molotov said that he had no such intention.

Mr. Byrnes said that he had no doubt of that. But he repeated that these territories were and would continue to be a burden on whatever Government undertook their administration. It would be a sacred trust on such a Government to develop self-government among the natives. Furthermore, if these Italian colonies were assigned respectively to those three States and were developed militarily, they would be sowing the seeds of future trouble instead of promoting peace.

M. Molotov said that nobody had suggested using these territories for military purposes.

Mr. Byrnes agreed. But this was one of the things they must think of, for the future. No State should be subjected to this temptation. The United States Government had no desire to participate in trusteeship for any of these colonies, but was prepared to serve as contemplated in the United States proposal, in the hope that this might contribute to a solution of this very difficult problem.

M. Molotov said that he had put forward two arguments for his present proposal—the moral rights of the Soviet Union, and the experience of the Soviet Government in nationality matters.

On the first point, he agreed that rights in this matter were not confined to the Soviet Union: the British Commonwealth had no less a right. He need not dwell at length on the sacrifices and contribution of the Soviet Union in the war against Germany and Italy because the part that she had played was well known. He did, however, want to emphasise that the Soviet Union, thanks to the part she had played in the war, had a right to play a more active part in the fate of the Italian Colonies than any rank and file member of the United Nations, and he stressed the role of the Soviet Government in deciding the destinies of Europe, of which Italy formed an important part.

As regards the experience of the Soviet Union in dealing with relationships between various nationalities, he thought that this could be usefully applied in Tripolitania and could yield fruitful results. He excluded any possibility of using Tripolitania to make good the damage which the Soviet Union had suffered or of using it for military purposes, since it was self-evident that no armaments could be tolerated in a former Italian Colony.

As regards Mr. Byrnes’ statement that it was easier to choose individuals to administer the Colonies than to choose States, M. Molotov argued that an individual must be a national of some State and would therefore be, not merely an individual, but the representative of a nation. In either case therefore it was impossible to get away from the question of particular States. As it was not possible to avoid the question what States should be closest to the administration of a particular Italian Colony, was it not simpler to make a State rather than an individual responsible for the administration?

Mr. Byrnes pointed out that an international trusteeship did not exclude the possibility of using the experience of the Soviet Government in administering the Italian Colonies. The Soviet Government would provide a representative on the Advisory Committee to give guidance on the spot to the administrator. The United States Government also had some experience in controlling territories; but they would be content to apply that experience through their representative on the Advisory Committee. He did not share M. Molotov’s view that it was impossible to ignore the citizenship of the administrator. The United States Government would vote for an administrator who had the necessary qualifications, were he a citizen of the Soviet Republic, of the British Empire, or of France. They would know that such a man would have no power to harm any of the other States, but would have the power to improve the lot of the inhabitants of the country which he was to administer.

Mr. Bevin said that, if these matters were to be decided by reference to the war effort of the various nations in particular parts of the world, then indeed the British Commonwealth would have strong claims in respect of the Italian Colonies. In 1940 Ethiopia and Eritrea were liberated by the force of British arms, though the task was a hard one, and much of this was done in the years when Britain stood alone in the war against Fascism. This was a memory which was deeply burned into the hearts of the British people. But the British Commonwealth asked for no territorial accessions: they asked only for the assurance of a lasting peace. And the immediate problem was to find the best method of applying the principle of trusteeship to these territories.

He thought that the difficulty with regard to the nationality of an administrator had been over-emphasized. Such a man would have to have an international rather than a national outlook, once he had been appointed to his position.

It would be wrong for the Council to attempt to decide at once, before the matter had been fully considered in all its aspects, that one State or another would assume trusteeship in respect of these territories. A hasty decision in a matter of this importance would rightly shock the conscience of the world. This was a very difficult problem which should be given full consideration. He would like the Council to adjourn the discussion until the following day, when he hoped to be in a position to give the considered views of the British Government.

M. Bidault associated himself with Mr. Bevin’s concluding remarks. The French Government were deeply interested in the future of the Italian Colonies, not only from the security aspect, but also bearing in mind the battles in which the French forces had joined their British comrades in these territories. His observations on this matter must for the present be regarded as provisional and he too required further time to reflect on the problem. M. Molotov had suggested that he was being kind-hearted to Italy. France had suffered much at Italy’s hands—in President Roosevelt’s phrase, she had been stabbed in the back by Italy. He was influenced, not by kindness to Italy, but by principles of public policy. He would like, finally, to make it clear that the French Government made no reservations with regard to the principle of trusteeship. They had subscribed to that principle at San Francisco.

The Council agreed to resume their discussion of these questions on Saturday, 15th September, at 3 p.m.

98. For text of the communiqué released to the press by the Council of Foreign Ministers regarding this meeting, see Department of State Bulletin, October 14, 1945, p. 564.
99. Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko, Soviet Ambassador to the United States.
1. Memorandum by the French delegation, September 13, “Control and Administration of Germany”, p. 177.
2. Memorandum by the Soviet delegation, September 14, “Reparations from Germany”, p. 175.

3. The letter, dated September 14, 1945, read as follows:

   “At their meeting this morning the Council of Foreign Ministers now in Session

   at Lancaster House in London agreed to enquire of the Government of . . … whether they wished to represent their views to the Council on the question of the Yugoslav-Italian frontier and the future of the city and port of Trieste.

   “Accordingly, as the Chairman of the Council of Foreign Ministers on that occasion, I was asked to invite the Government of . . … to nominate a representative, if they so desired, to attend the meeting of Foreign Ministers to be held in Lancaster House on Monday, 17th September, at 4.0 p.m. to express the views of the . . …Government on these problems.”

   The letter was signed by the Chinese Foreign Minister. (Council of Foreign Ministers Files: Lot M–88: CFM Miscellaneous)

4. Memorandum by the United States delegation, September 14, “Suggested Directive to Deputies from the Council of Foreign Ministers to Govern Them in the Drafting of a Treaty of Peace with Italy”, p. 179.
5. For the statement by the British Foreign Secretary on January 8, 1942, regarding the determination of the British Government that the Senussi of Cyrenaica would not again be subject to Italian rule, see Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 377, col. 78. For documentation regarding the noncommittal attitude of the United States in regard to this British pledge to the Senussi, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. iii, pp. 33 ff.