840.4016/11–2345
The United States Political Adviser for Germany (Murphy) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 10.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to my secret telegrams no. 1015 of November 15, 11 a.m., no. 1049 of November 17, 8 p.m. and no. 1066 of November 21, 11 a.m.75 The first of these outlined the program developed in the Prisoner of War & Displaced Persons Directorate, Allied Control Authority, for the repatriation of German minorities from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Austria. It was stated in the second telegram that the Coordinating Committee had approved the plan submitted to it by the Directorate and had referred it to the Control Council. The latter accepted the plan in its Twelfth Meeting as stated in the third telegram. There is transmitted with this despatch, for the Department’s information, a copy of the plan drawn up by the Directorate of Prisoners of War & Displaced Persons.76
As outlined in my secret telegram no. 758 of October 12, 8 p.m.77 and as envisioned in the plan for the overall transfer of German populations transmitted in my secret despatch no. 1224 of October 31, 1945, the resettlement of German populations falls within two broad categories, the first being the transfer back to areas of former domicile of those German nationals displaced within Germany as a consequence of the war and the second being the resettlement within Germany of Reichsdeutsche and Volksdeutsche from beyond the boundaries of occupied Germany.
Partial resettlement of internally displaced German nationals was provided for in the plan forwarded with my secret despatch no. 1223 of October 30, 1945.78 The program of the interzonal exchange of German populations on a one for one basis provided therein is now proceeding between the United States and Soviet Zones and between [Page 1311] the British and Soviet Zones. Remaining interzonal exchanges still await implementation. According to present estimates, the United States Zone contains approximately 1,345,000 Germans who belong in one of the other three zones in Germany. The numbers belonging in the Soviet Zone are 820,000, in the British Zone 300,000, and in the French Zone 225,000. It is estimated that there are in the Soviet Zone approximately 500,000 German nationals whose former domiciles were in the United States Zone, about 75,000 in the British Zone, and approximately 60,000 in the French Zone, a total of 635,000 to be received into the United States Zone on the basis of the one for one transfer. As a consequence of these exchanges, the United States Zone will be left with a residue or excess of roughly 750,000 German nationals who formerly resided in other zones. At the present time, with the exception of the French acceptance from the United States Zone of all German nationals formerly resident in the French Zone, as communicated in the first telegram under reference above, no provision has been made for the transfer of the remainders respectively belonging in the Soviet and in the British Zones. In view of the acute housing and food situation in and the fundamentally industrial character of the British Zone, its absorptive capacity is relatively low, hence not much hope is entertained that the British will be able to take the 225,000 German surplus now in the United States Zone who formerly resided in the British Zone, particularly as in the plan outlined for the transfer of German minorities enclosed in this despatch, the British are receiving approximately 1,500,000 German nationals whereas their expectation did not exceed 1,000,000. It is possible that the Soviet Zone will be willing to accept the 320,000 German nationals in the US Zone if the attitude displayed by the Soviets in the discussion on the plan under reference prevails. At that time when the French member of the Prisoner of War & Displaced Persons Directorate stated the French Zone would be unable to accept any German minorities (see telegram first under reference above), the Soviet member suggested that the 650,000 German nationals allotted to the French Zone be divided between the Soviet and the United States Zones on the basis of 500,000 to the former and 150,000 to the latter. The subsequent allocation under which the French accepted 150,000 minorities gave only 250,000 to the Soviet Zone and since the surplus in the United States Zone of German nationals formerly resident in the Russian Zone is only 70,000 more than the numbers which the Soviet Zone would have absorbed under the initial proposition, it is quite possible the latter would be willing to have the 320,000 surplus now in the United States Zone.
The second phase of the resettlement of German populations—that of repatriating those from beyond the bounds of occupied Germany—is [Page 1312] undertaken in the program which is transmitted with this despatch. It will be noted that in this plan arrangements are made for the transfer of approximately 6,650,000 persons, of whom 3,500,000 will come from Poland, 2,500,000 from Czechoslovakia, 500,000 from Hungary, and 150,000 from Austria. The Polish areas included in these calculations contains those eastern regions of Germany which are now under Polish administration. It is estimated that the population of this latter area in 1939 was slightly more than 8,500,000. While exact data are not available, it is believed that approximately 5,000,000 of the 1939 figure have already abandoned this area. It is known, for example, that in August and September 1945 approximately 500,000 German refugees per month came into Berlin alone, purely on a transient basis before being sent further westward and practically all of these persons came from the east. The rate recently has been somewhat reduced but nonetheless great. According to statistics secured from the Department for Expelled and Returning Persons (Abteilung Ausgewiesene und Heimkehrer, Hauptamt für Sozialwesen) Magistrat of the City of Berlin, there arrived in Berlin in the period September 20–26, 1945, inclusive, 42,842 German refugees of whom 20 per cent came from East Prussia, 19 per cent from West Prussia, 18 per cent from Neumark, 17 per cent from Silesia, 14 per cent from Pomerania, 5 per cent from Warthegau, 1 per cent from Czechoslovakia and the remaining 6 per cent from various places in Germany. The same source indicates that between September 27–October 5 inclusive, 49,611 German refugees arrived in Berlin and from October 7–13 inclusive, 29,283 refugees entered, with approximately the same distribution in each case among sources as was indicated for the previous lot. It is believed among refugee authorities that a downward trend, indicated by this latter figure, has set in and will continue.
Members of my staff who have seen the refugee trains from the East arrive state that the condition of these people is in most instances pitiable. The stories told by individuals talked to at random indicate that they were evacuated from their former, homes with little advance notice and in many cases were harried from the time they left their homes almost until the time they reached Berlin. They tell tales of progressive robbing and the taking of the few possessions they were allowed to remove from their homes and most of the individuals arriving in Berlin have had only a small amount of hand luggage. While final conclusions cannot be deduced from these limited observations, other evidence which has come to the attention of the Mission from widely assorted sources indicates that the pattern of ill treatment and robbery is widespread.
The last paragraph of the enclosed plan provides that immediately after its approval, the Governments of Czechoslovakia and Poland and the Control Commissions of Austria and of Hungary will be in [Page 1313] formed of its terms. By this device it is hoped that expulsions, such as those which have been taking place, will be completely eliminated and that the orderly transfer of German populations will remove the political pressure upon the Governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia. Copies of the enclosed plan are being transmitted to the Missions concerned.
There has been established in the United States Zone an Evacuation and Resettlement Committee, made up of twenty German citizens representing the three Lander in the United States Zone, which prepares recommendations on pertinent matters for the Minister Presidents. In a meeting at Stuttgart on November 11, 1945, the problem of resettling German evacuees was discussed. The Committee was advised of the extent of the problem of resettling German evacuees, both refugees and minorities, and were advised of their responsibility relative thereto. Full and free discussion on the problem was urged by United States authorities who attended the meeting and a series of recommendations emerged from the convention. It was quite obvious, however, that in spite of the careful briefing done by United States military authorities, the representatives failed to grasp the magnitude and the complexities of the problem. Subject to the approval of the Länderrat, the following distribution of evacuees among the three Länder, was recommended: Bavaria 50 per cent, Gross Hessen 27 per cent, and Württemberg-Baden 23 per cent. The principal grievances of the Committee, for which it requested amelioration, were as follows: (1) there should be one United States officer and one only in each Länd from whom the German authorities received orders and instructions on refugees instead of the present many sources which give confusing and often conflicting orders, (2) failure to notify Burgomeisters in advance of arrivals of refugees, (3) destruction of factories, warehouses, and similar installations, which although not completely suitable will nonetheless provide adequate protection for refugees from the weather, (4) according to present estimates German food stocks will not be ample to provide for refugees and expellees, (5) extensive requisitioning of available housing for displaced persons, especially in Württemberg, and apparent failure to distribute equitably these requisitions with resultant dissatisfaction among the German population and German authorities, and (6) the usual complaint that Nazis are being left undisturbed and that anti-Nazis are being penalized. It is felt among OMGUS officials that some of the complaints have a legitimate basis and should be remedied, but that some of them are completely at variance with occupation policy and hence must be ignored.
A meeting of representatives of various interested Divisions of OMGUS was called on November 22 to consider the report just discussed and the plan for the resettlement of German minorities. It [Page 1314] was the consensus of those present that it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to undertake beginning December 1, 1945 the repatriation of German populations from beyond the boundaries of occupied Germany. It was pointed out that the welfare agencies in the United States Zone were already overwhelmed with the burden thrust upon them by the interzonal transfers which are taking place and that they would be utterly incapable of assisting materially the individuals coming from other countries. The transport representatives indicated that it would be next to impossible to obtain adequate transport facilities to move these people. First, truck transportation would not be available because it is not intended this winter to keep open the highways and heavy snows prevail in the mountains of southwestern Germany blocking road routes over which the majority of these people might come. Second, the rolling stock necessary to move these people is not available; that military commitments for the moving of freight during the month of December were almost 50 percent higher in tonnage than the facilities available afforded. Health authorities indicated that while no serious threats of disease were now present in the United States Zone, it was believed that typhus was more prevalent in the areas from which these people would come and in the Soviet Zone than it was in the United States Zone. As a consequence of the interzonal transfer between the Soviet and United States Zones, the incidence of typhus in the United States Zone was slowly climbing and while every effort was being made to dust these transferees, it was felt that the problem would become much more difficult if to the interzonal transfers were added the Czech and Hungarian transfers. Reportedly a preponderant proportion of the refugees now flowing into the US Zone is old women and children, both groups being particularly susceptible to disease. It was the belief of all present that it would be much more humane and satisfactory to postpone the international transfers until April 1, 1946 if that could be done and it was proposed that a statement to that effect, supported by comments of the various operating Divisions represented in the meeting, should be presented to General Clay for consideration.
Respectfully yours,
- With regard to telegrams 1049 and 1066, see footnote 72, p. 1308.↩
- Enclosure not printed; for text of the plan for the transfer of the German populations to be moved from Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland into the four occupied zones of Germany, see telegram 1147, November 30, from Berlin, p. 1316.↩
- See footnote 65, p. 1303.↩
- Not printed.↩