Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: Political and Economic Matters, Volume II

SCI Files

Minutes of a Meeting of the Combined Policy Committee

[Washington,] July 4, 1945.

[Extracts]

Present:
Members:	The Secretary of War, Chairman
	Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson
	The Hon. C. D. Howe
	Dr. Vannevar Bush
By Invitation:	The Eight Hon. The Earl of Halifax
	Sir James Chadwick
	Major General L. R. Groves
	Mr. George Harrison28
Joint Secretaries:	Mr. Harvey H. Bundy
	Mr. Roger Makins29

. . . . . . . .

3. Use of Weapon Against Third Parties.

Field Marshal Wilson stated that the British Government concurred in the use of the T. A. weapon against Japan. He added that the Prime Minister might wish to discuss this matter with the President at the forthcoming meeting in Berlin.³⁰

The Committee:—Took note that the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States had agreed that T. A. weapons should be used by the United States against Japan, the agreement of the British Government having been communicated by Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson.

4. Disclosure of Information by the Two Governments on the Use of the Weapon.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Chairman said there were two conclusions:

1. The scientific principle of the weapon would inevitably be known as soon as it is used, and other countries would understand that one of three or four processes had been employed.

2. The technical and mechanical difficulties encountered in the production of the weapon and the methods by which they have been overcome need not and should not be disclosed.

Lord Halifax said that the greater the amount of information which was disclosed to other countries, the less inducement there might be for them to agree to measures of international control, should we ever desire to suggest them.

The Chairman said he was thinking of an earlier period, viz., the forthcoming meeting with Stalin.³¹ His own opinion had been very much influenced by the probable use within a few weeks after the meeting. If nothing was said at this meeting about the T. A. weapon, its subsequent early use might have a serious effect on the relations of frankness between the three great Allies. He had therefore advised the President to watch the atmosphere at the meeting. If mutual frankness on other questions was found to be real and satisfactory, then the President might say that work was being done on the development of atomic fission for war purposes; that good progress had been made; and that an attempt to use a weapon would be made shortly, though it was not certain that it would succeed. If it did succeed, it would be necessary for a discussion to be held on the best method of handling the development in the interests of world peace and not for destruction. If Stalin pressed for immediate disclosure the President might say that he was not prepared to take the matter further at the present time. The Chairman added that the knowledge of the large deposits in Sweden did not cause him to modify his advice to the President.

Lord Halifax said that he would propose to inform Sir John Anderson of what Mr. Stimson had said.

The Chairman agreed.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6. Allocation of Material.

Mr. Bundy said that the supplies of material from the Belgian Congo received by the Trust,³² as well as some captured material which had been turned over to the Trust, were on their way to the United States, but it was appropriate that the position in regard to the allocation of material should be on record.

Lord Halifax observed that the effect of the decision, with which the Chancellor of the Exchequer entirely agreed, to allocate to the United States all the material which could be used in the American plants for the production of weapons against Japan, was that at the end of the war the United States would have a stock of weapons and of material in and awaiting process, while the United Kingdom would have no raw material except what it could secure by release at that date from Trust purchases. This was a position which caused the Chancellor some concern in relation to Parliament and public opinion and he desired that his position in the matter should be clearly understood. He hoped that when the time came for allocation of material for purposes other than the production of material for the present war, all relevant factors would be taken into account.

After further discussion the Committee:—

Determined that while the war lasts all uranium supplies received by the Combined Development Trust for the joint account of the United States and the United Kingdom should be allocated to the United States Government for the production of weapons for use against the common enemy. The Committee’s attention having been called to the fact that this policy will leave Great Britain without any reserve of supplies of this material for future use, the Committee noted this statement of the British members and agreed that insofar as the material received by the Trust exceeds the quantity required for the production of weapons against the common enemy in the present war it should be held by the Combined Development Trust to be disposed of or otherwise dealt with in accordance with paragraph 3 (1) of the Agreement of 13th June 1944,³³ and that in making future allocations all relevant factors should be reviewed.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Harvey H. Bundy
Roger Makins

28. Special Consultant to the Secretary of War.
29. British Minister in Washington.
30. Reference is to the Potsdam Conference, July 16–August 2, 1945; for specific references to documentation on this subject, see Foreign Relations, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, vol. i, Index, entries under Japan, p. 1072; ibid., vol. ii, Index, entries under Atomic energy, p. 1604; and Japan, p. 1623. (This publication is hereinafter referred to as Conference of Berlin (Potsdam).)
31. Generalissimo Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, Chairman, Council of People’s Commissars of the Soviet Union.
32. For text of the Memorandum of Agreement, September 26, 1944, between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Belgium relating to this subject, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. ii, p. 1029.
33. See footnote 23, p. 7. Paragraph 3(1) of the Agreement read as follows: “The Trust shall carry out its functions under the direction and guidance of the Combined Policy Committee, and as its agent, and all uranium and thorium and all uranium and thorium ores and supplies and other property acquired by the Trust shall be held by it in trust for the Two Governments jointly, and disposed of or otherwise dealt with in accordance with the direction of the Combined Policy Committee.”