Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: Political and Economic Matters, Volume II

SCI Files

Minutes of a Meeting of the Combined Policy Committee

[Washington,] March 8, 1945.

[Extracts]

Present:
Members:	The Secretary of War, Chairman
	Dr. James B. Conant18
	Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson
	Dean C. J. Mackenzie,19 representing Mr. C. D. Howe
By Invitation:	The Eight Honorable The Earl of Halifax20
	Sir James Chadwick
	Major General L. E. Groves
Joint Secretaries:	Mr. Harvey H. Bundy
	Dr. W. L. Webster
	Mr. D. H. F. Eickett21

. . . . . . . .

[3.] (e) Action in Brazil.

The Committee had before them a memorandum²² by the Chairman of the Trust²³ submitting a report by Major Vance who had been present with Secretary Stettinius during his discussion with President Vargas on February 17th.

As a result of this discussion which, as agreed with the United Kingdom Government, had been of an exploratory character only, President Vargas had said that he would be willing for further negotiations to take place between the United States and the Brazilian Governments with regard to the granting of an option to the United States Government to purchase Brazilian production of thorium.

The Committee:—

Took note of this report and agreed to discuss further the control of thorium supplies in the next item of their agenda. (See conclusion 4 (b) below.)

4. Supplies and Requirements of Raw Materials.

The Committee had before them the following papers:

Two memoranda, dated February 3rd and March 3rd²⁴ respectively giving the views of Sir John Anderson on supplies and requirements of raw materials for the project.

A memorandum by General Groves to the Secretary of War, dated March 7th,²⁵ commenting on Sir John Anderson’s views.

(a) Uranium.

Briefly summarized, Sir John Anderson’s views were:

(1) that the deposits in the Belgian Congo should be exploited as rapidly as possible and the material, both of high grade and low grade, removed to safe territory;

(2) a program of exploration should be instituted to decide what were the ultimate resources in the Belgian Congo;

(3) the Trust had recommended that supplies in North America should be conserved so far as possible. This raised the question whether Canadian production should be maintained at a high level;

(4) the information service initiated by the Trust should be maintained at a high level of efficiency;

(5) commercial action should be taken quietly wherever opportunity offered to obtain control of minor sources of supply but no attempt should be made to cover this by political agreement.

The memorandum by General Groves pointed out that while Sir John Anderson had estimated the annual needs of North America for uranium at 600 tons, the present United States estimate for the next five years, based on experience so far obtained and as calculated for the plants now in operation or being completed, was 2000 to 2400 tons of uranium oxide per annum.

With reference to (4) of Sir John Anderson’s views summarized above, it was explained that much fuller information was needed to discover the location of uranium deposits throughout the world, particularly those of low grade ore.

The Committee:—

Took note of Sir John Anderson’s views on requirements and supplies of uranium as summarized above which were in accordance with those of the U. S. authorities. Action by the Trust on these lines in the areas for which it was responsible was accordingly approved in principle by the Committee.

(b) Thorium.

The Committee considered what further action should be taken to follow up the preliminary approach which had been made to the Brazilian Government as reported in conclusion 3 (e) above.

It was noted that while in Sir John Anderson’s view it seemed clear that really useful action to deny supplies of thorium to other countries was not possible, it was equally clear that if such action was to be attempted at all it should be taken quickly. Sir John Anderson had, however, assumed that the need of the cooperating Governments for large quantities of thorium in addition to or instead of the large quantities of uranium already secured had not been established.

On this point the Committee noted that the latest experimental data, while still incomplete, gave every promise that thorium would be of great use and that once the reaction had started it could be continued on a large scale without the use of further uranium.

The Committee were also reminded that while the extent of world supplies of thorium was unknown, the cost of purchasing the whole pre-war output of Brazil would be negligible in comparison with the general scale of expenditure on the project. Any objections to such action, therefore, must be based on considerations of security.

In a letter to the Chairman of the Committee from the Chairman of the Trust, dated March 8th,²⁶ the Combined Policy Committee were asked to give guidance to the Trust as to the importance of acquiring or controlling supplies of thorium. The policy adopted in regard to Brazil would necessarily determine the line on which action should be taken to deal with supplies in India and the Netherlands East Indies, the other two large sources of supply. The letter proposed that an executive agreement on thorium between the Governments of the United States of America and Brazil should be negotiated in the near future which would provide for control of exports of thorium and for information to be furnished in regard to stock piles and exploration of deposits. The United Kingdom would probably not be a formal party to this agreement which might be based on the present relations existing between the United States and Brazil. In this event the equal participation of the United Kingdom and the United States in all rights and obligations under the agreement should be recorded formally presumably by an exchange of letters between the two Governments or in the Minutes of the Combined Policy Committee or the Combined Development Trust. In any case there would be full consultation between the Secretary of War and the Ambassador and their representatives at every stage in the negotiations. Careful consideration should be given to the diplomatic and commercial procedure to be followed.

There was general agreement that action on these lines in regard to Brazil was desirable. This raised the further question of the steps to be taken in respect to Travancore and the Netherlands East Indies.

After a full discussion the Committee:—

(a) Agreed that the Trust should be directed to draw up the principal provisions of a proposed agreement between the United States and Brazilian Governments under which the United States Government would acquire certain thorium-bearing sands from Brazil, while the Brazilian Government would agree not to sell any thorium-bearing sands to any other country without consulting with the United States Government. The equal interest of the United Kingdom Government in this agreement should be recorded in some appropriate manner.

(b) Agreed that the Trust should submit recommendations regarding the procedure to be followed in negotiating this agreement which would then be discussed between the Secretary of War and the British Ambassador and their representatives.

(c) Agreed that when a political agreement had been negotiated with the Brazilian Government as indicated in (a) and (b) above, it would be for the Combined Development Trust to arrange for the negotiation of suitable contracts for the purchase of thorium from the Brazilians.

(d) Agreed to recommend that the United Kingdom Government should take steps to secure that exports of thorium from Travancore should be controlled and to secure that the supply should be available to the two Governments. These steps should be so timed that control could be put into effect and supplies assured upon a satisfactory basis as soon as the negotiations with the Brazilian Government had been concluded.

(e) Agreed that the Combined Development Trust should review as rapidly as possible the information available on thorium deposits in the Netherlands East Indies and should report the general result of this inquiry to the members of the Combined Policy Committee. Should these deposits be found to be of substantial importance, arrangements should be made between the United States and the United Kingdom members of the Committee for negotiations to be opened with the Netherlands Government with a view to securing control of these deposits.

5. Relations With the French.

(a) Position of the French Government.

Lord Halifax informed the Committee that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had had a conversation with M. Joliot on February 23rd in London. The Chancellor had been away from London for a few days after this meeting and Lord Halifax had not yet received a full report of it. From what he had heard, however, it appeared that it had passed off in general satisfactorily.²⁷

The Committee:—

Took note of this information.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Harvey H. Bundt
William L. Webster
D. H. F. Rickett

[On March 15, 1945, Secretary of War Stimson spoke to President Roosevelt about the status of atomic research and development and the need to decide between (a) an attempt at Anglo-American control through secrecy and (b) an international effort based on free inter-change of scientific information and free access to the laboratories of the world. Roosevelt agreed that the matter must be decided before the first bomb was used, but he died on April 12 without having taken further action (The New World, 1939/1946, page 340).

On April 25 Stimson and Groves presented to President Truman two memoranda, one pointing out the important implications of the bomb for international relations, the other describing the genesis and current status of the atomic project. After further discussions Stimson saw the President again on May 2 and completed arrangements for the appointment of an advisory group, which came to be known as the “Interim Committee”, to recommend early steps with regard to postwar policies and relations with other governments. Stimson served as Chairman. Assistant Secretary of State William L. Clayton was one of the members, and James F. Byrnes soon joined the group as a special representative of the President (The New World, 1939/1946, pages 342–346).

During May and June 1945 the principal civil and military officials of the United States, and their scientific advisers, held various meetings to discuss atomic developments, particularly with regard to (a) possible use of the atomic bomb against Japan, (b) the question of informing the Soviet Union, (c) domestic legislation, and (d) possible measures of international control (The New World, 1939/1946, pages 347–371).]

18. Chairman of the National Defense Research Committee.
19. Chalmers J. Mackenzie, President of the Canadian National Research Council.
20. British Ambassador.
21. Denis H. F. Rickett, Personal Assistant to Sir John Anderson.
22. Supra.
23. Reference is to the Combined Development Trust, of which General Groves was Chairman. This agency was established by the Agreement and Declaration of Trust, signed by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, June 13, 1944; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. ii, p. 1026. The Combined Development Trust was to operate under the direction of the Combined Policy Committee; its main function was to secure control and insure development of uranium and thorium supplies located outside the jurisdiction of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Dominions, India, and Burma.
24. Neither printed.
25. Not printed.
26. Not printed.
27. A record of the meeting between Anderson and Joliot, authorship not indicated, is in the Department of State files. According to this document, Joliot indicated that the Russians had been approached to ascertain whether they were interested in information on atomic energy; they said that they were, but, when they asked what had been done so far, were told that no information could be given. The memorandum concluded by saying that it was Anderson’s impression that Joliot would most likely not take drastic action in the near future, but that he had made it clear to the Chancellor that France would turn to the Soviet Union unless admitted to collaboration by the United States and Great Britain on atomic energy. (Files of S/AE, the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Matters)