Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: Political and Economic Matters, Volume II

Moscow Embassy Files: 500 Conference of Foreign Ministers

United Kingdom Delegation Record of a Conversation at the Kremlin, December 1945, 7 p.m.⁶³

Moscow, December 24, 1945, 7 p.m.

[Extracts]

• U.S.S.R.
  • Generalissimo Stalin
  • M. Molotov
  • M. Gusev
  • M. Pavlov
• U.K.
  • Mr. Bevin
  • Sir A. Clark Kerr
  • Sir A. Cadogan
  • Mr. McAfee

Iran

Mr. Bevin said that he had communicated with H. M. Government, who could not help feeling that, although of course they recognised that the Soviet Government were entitled to take all measures to protect the Baku oilfields, the situation was not such as to justify the maintenance of so large a force in Northern Iran. British troops had been reduced in number to 4,000 and these were stationed at a considerable distance from the capital. Even if the last British troops were withdrawn, the situation which had developed would mean that there was no complete settlement. Therefore, he had submitted to M. Molotov a proposal for a three-Power commission with a draft of their terms of reference. He felt, and H. M. Government felt, that the three Governments having had this area placed at their disposal for the purposes of the war, it would be unfortunate if they had to come before the United Nations in order to clear up the situation. Nor did they wish it to give rise to any misunderstanding between our two Governments. He thought that the proposal now submitted offered a chance of clearing up the situation, safeguarding the integrity of Iran and removing difficulties between Russia and the United Kingdom.

Generalissimo Stalin said that this proposal might serve as a basis for some sort of agreement. He would have some amendments of no very great substantial importance to propose and he would communicate these that night or the following morning.

Mr. Bevin said that these amendments when received would be carefully considered and he would then consult with Mr. Byrnes and M. Molotov and try to get an agreement.

Generalissimo Stalin said that he hoped that our two Governments might find a common ground. What was Mr. Byrnes’ position?

Mr. Bevin said that Mr. Byrnes had not definitely committed himself but he would see him on the following day.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Access to the Baltic

Generalissimo Stalin said that he would like to clear up the question of the Skaggerak. The Soviet Government did not know whether Russian shipping was entitled to free passage.

Mr. Bevin said that his information was that there was absolutely free passage through the Skaggerak. Now that Germany was defeated we hoped it would be possible to establish the principle of free passage for ships of all nations. H.M. Government, on the other hand, would not approve the idea of any bases in this particular area.

Generalissimo Stalin said he did not refer to bases at all.

Dodecanese

Generalissimo Stalin referred to Mr. Bevin’s recent proposal for handing these islands over to Greek administration. He said that he had no objection in principle to these islands being transferred, but he would not like to see this question settled separately from the Italian peace treaty of which it formed part. The Soviet Delegation at the London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers had been somewhat offended by the attitude of the British and American Governments, who had seemed to be afraid of agreeing to Soviet trusteeship for Tripolitania. If that could have been agreed, Great Britain would have lost nothing because she already had plenty of bases all over the world, more even than the United States. Could not the interests of the Soviet Government also be taken into account?

Mr. Bevin said that as regards the Dodecanese, he agreed with Generalissimo Stalin. He had made the proposal for immediate transfer to Greece when it seemed that it was impossible to look for any early progress in the making of peace treaties. Now, however, that we had come so far towards agreement in this matter he thought that the transfer of the Islands could well await a final settlement.

As regards Tripolitania, Generalissimo Stalin had touched on a very sensitive point. Mr. Bevin had told M. Molotov in London that he for his part would have been ready to put Tripolitania under Italian trusteeship. But that raised certain difficulties and when the proposal was made for an international trusteeship, by which he understood a four-Power trusteeship, H.M. Government had agreed. He had thought that the Mediterranean being so troublesome and dangerous an area it might be better to have an international trusteeship rather than one individual Government installed as trustee.

Mr. Bevin recalled that in the case of Tangier, the Soviet Government had been consulted and their request to participate in the new arrangements had been acceded to. He thought that international arrangements of this kind might make for peace in the Mediterranean. The matter might be reconsidered again later when our friendship had grown and developed further. Mr. Bevin pointed to the fact that an agreement had now been reached providing for the withdrawal of troops from the Levant. He could not imagine any of the great Powers fighting each other. The last two wars had both been started by Germany. He did not want to rely too much on bases. He preferred to work for the development of better understanding between the Governments.

Generalissimo Stalin said that he noted that the British were not prepared to trust the Soviet in Tripolitania to which Mr. Bevin replied that there was no question of lack of trust but a desire to avoid competition.

Generalissimo Stalin said that, as he saw the situation, the United Kingdom had India and her possessions in the Indian Ocean in her sphere of interest: the United States had China and Japan, but the Soviet had nothing.

Mr. Bevin pointed out that the Russian sphere extended from Lübeck to Port Arthur.

As regards Indonesia, H.M. Government were determined to withdraw from there as soon as possible. British troops were due to leave Indo-China this week, their task there was finished and the Japanese had been completely disarmed. If a settlement could be reached between the Dutch and the Indonesians, British troops would be withdrawn also from there. British intentions were not so reprehensible as Generalissimo Stalin might think.

Generalissimo Stalin said he was not particularly anxious to see the British leave certain territories. That might indeed be to the disadvantage of every one. For instance, the presence of the British in Egypt during the war had been of considerable value.

Mr. Bevin said that H.M. Government had certain responsibilities in that region and must devise means for the defence of Egypt. But in matters of trade, etc., Egypt must be opened to all the world. When we came to deal with that part of the world, seeing that Generalissimo Stalin recognised that the British had a duty to police it, he hoped that H.M. Government could count on the Generalissimo’s sympathetic consideration.

Generalissimo Stalin indicated assent.

63. One copy of this record of conversation was given by Pierson Dixon of the United Kingdom delegation to Mr. Bohlen for delivery to the Secretary of State at the request of Foreign Secretary Bevin. Another copy was given to Ambassador Harriman.