740.00119 Council/12–2645
United States Delegation Minutes of an Informal Meeting, Conference of Foreign Ministers, Moscow, Spiridonovka, December 24, 1945, 3:15 p.m.
Present:52 | ||
The Secretary | Mr. Bevin | Mr. Molotov |
Mr. Harriman | Sir A. Clark Kerr | Mr. Vishinsky |
Mr. Bohlen | Sir A. Cadogan | Mr. Gusev |
Mr. Cohen | Mr. Malich | |
Mr. Pavlov |
Subject[s]: | 1. Atomic Energy |
2. Rumania and Bulgaria | |
3. Iran | |
4. Austria | |
5. Japanese Fleet | |
6. Japanese Islands | |
7. German Assets in Austria | |
8. Peace Treaties | |
9. Rumania and Bulgaria | |
10. Atomic Energy |
1. Atomic Energy
Mr. Byrnes opened the meeting and proposed to resume discussion on points outstanding with regard to the atomic energy proposals. Mr. Bevin had agreed to circulate a draft embodying the two amendments which were still pending.
Mr. Molotov stated that he had not yet seen this draft. However, he had certain proposals with regard to Section II. In the draft which Mr. Byrnes had submitted yesterday,53 Section II consisted of two paragraphs. Mr. Molotov proposed that the words “with the consent of the Security Council” be inserted in paragraph (a) after the words “made public” at the end of the first sentence. With regard to paragraph (b), Mr. Molotov proposed to add that the Atomic Energy Commission should be accountable to the Security Council for its work.
Mr. Molotov also stated that he was not sure that the next to last paragraph in the draft, beginning “The work of the Commission should proceed by separate stages,” was necessary. The Commission would, of course, establish its own rules of procedure since this was left to its discretion under Section IV.
Mr. Bevin suggested that in adopting their procedure the Commission and Security Council should make a reference to point 8 of the Washington Declaration. He stated that Canada was particularly interested in this.
Mr. Molotov said that this would not be “convenient”. The Washington Declaration had been made with participation of the United States, Britain and Canada. The Soviet Government had not been a party to this Declaration. Accordingly, it would be better not to refer to a matter in which not all the Governments concerned had participated. However, the Washington Declaration remained binding upon those who were parties to it.
Mr. Bevin replied that it seemed expedient to refer to this point in the draft although not necessarily mentioning the Washington [Page 763] Declaration. Mr. Bevin desired to include the principle involved, which would serve as a directive for the work of the Commission.
Mr. Molotov said that this proposal could be referred to the Commission itself.
Mr. Byrnes asked Mr. Molotov to agree to the inclusion of this point since it had been agreed to by the President and two Prime Ministers. For his part he would agree to Mr. Molotov’s amendment to Section 11(b) reading, “in such matters the Commission will be accountable to the Security Council,” and also to Mr. Molotov’s suggestion in regard to the next to last paragraph under Section V.
With regard to Mr. Molotov’s proposal concerning the addition of the words “with consent of the Security Council,” in Section II (a) at the end of sentence one, Mr. Byrnes inquired whether it would be acceptable to employ the following language: “shall be made public unless the Security Council in the interest of peace and security otherwise directs.” In this event, the Commission would be entitled to take the initiative in issuing minor reports in which the Security Council would not be interested. However, the Commission could not issue a report if the Security Council did not desire. This gave the Security Council full control as regards peace and security.
Mr. Bevin said that he was disturbed by the veto aspect of this matter, with reference to publication.
Mr. Cohen explained that in accordance with the language proposed by Mr. Byrnes, reports and recommendations of the Commission could be made public unless the Security Council by affirmative vote decided otherwise.
Mr. Bevin stated that he now understood and was in agreement.
Mr. Byrnes inquired whether Mr. Molotov would accept this proposal, pointing out that he was willing to accept the language proposed by Mr. Molotov in (b).
Mr. Molotov said he would have to think it over. It seemed possible to reach agreement on this matter.
2. Rumania and Bulgaria
Mr. Byrnes proceeded to the proposals regarding Rumania and Bulgaria. After his conversation with Mr. Molotov yesterday afternoon, he had told Mr. Bevin this morning of the agreement regarding this subject reached in that conversation. He had written out what in his opinion was the agreement arrived at yesterday. Mr. Bevin had said that this was satisfactory to him. Mr. Byrnes circulated two papers embodying the agreement as he had formulated it (Enclosures 1 and 2).
Mr. Molotov requested time for translation of Mr. Byrnes’ papers which he had received just before the present session began. He observed [Page 764] that the proposals apparently stood in need of some amendments.
3. Iran
Mr. Byrnes proceeded to the question of Iran.
Mr. Bevin stated that he had promised Generalissimo Stalin to study this question. He wished his colleagues to consider a settlement which he had formulated. Mr. Bevin circulated a paper on this subject (Enclosure 3).
4. Austria
Mr. Molotov inquired whether the other delegates had examined his paper on Austria.54
Mr. Bevin said that he had received a preliminary reply from London but not a final reply and that he hoped to be prepared to discuss this question tomorrow. If by tomorrow he did not receive a full answer from London he would provide such information as he had received.
5. Japanese Fleet
Mr. Molotov stated that he wished to discuss a further point with regard to Japan. He had exchanged letters with Mr. Byrnes with regard to the Japanese fleet.55 The proposal had been made that the Japanese fleet be scuttled. He had agreed with this proposal but with certain qualifications. He had thought it desirable that the smaller vessels be divided up. In any event the Soviet Union would receive ¼ of these vessels. Mr. Byrnes had expressed agreement to this. Mr. Molotov added that the same applied to the Japanese merchant shipping. He inquired as to how it would be best to get this matter underway.
Mr. Byrnes replied that he had accepted Mr. Molotov’s proposal and had issued instructions to the Navy to fulfill the agreement which they had reached. He did not remember the exact language of the correspondence. However, he had already instructed the U.S. Navy to proceed in accordance with the agreement.
Mr. Bevin inquired whether the British Government was a party to this agreement.
Mr. Byrnes replied that it was.
Mr. Molotov inquired about the Japanese merchant marine.
Mr. Byrnes replied that this depended upon what had been placed into the agreement.
[Page 765]Mr. Molotov read a section from Mr. Byrnes’ letter regarding the Japanese merchant marine.
Mr. Byrnes said that the Navy had informed him that it was necessary to use all possible Japanese vessels for the transport of supplies, et cetera. As soon as these operations were completed, he would instruct them to get in touch with the Soviet and British authorities and settle the matter.
Mr. Bevin stated that, as he recalled, the British proposal had been that the Japanese naval fleet should be sunk. With regard to the merchant marine, had not a reservation been made as to fishing vessels? Even though the Japanese had been defeated, it was necessary for them to go on living somehow.
Mr. Molotov said that some portion of the fishing fleet should be left to the Japanese, but not necessarily all.
Mr. Byrnes said that the question of fishing vessels had not been discussed in his letter and he had no facts on this question. He did stand by the agreement reached in the correspondence and would take up later the question of fishing vessels.
Mr. Molotov reiterated that this matter should be placed into definite channels. It had started as far back as last October.
Mr. Byrnes said he regarded it as a settled matter. He would find out from the Navy the status of the program set forth in his letter.
Mr. Molotov said that the Japanese fishing fleet should be included in the merchant marine.
Mr. Byrnes said that this raised another question, one concerning which he had no information.
Mr. Bevin said that it would be necessary for him to study the question.
6. Japanese Islands
Mr. Molotov inquired whether the other delegates could give him any information regarding the projected disposition of the Japanese islands and Japanese mandated islands in the Pacific.
Mr. Byrnes replied that so far as the United States was concerned no solution had been arrived at and there could be no solution until the peace treaty problem was approached. He knew of no agreement except that with regard to the Kuriles.56 He had not known about that agreement until he had been advised that an understanding had been reached at Yalta.
Mr. Bevin inquired whether the British Government had participated in that understanding.
[Page 766]Mr. Molotov replied in the affirmative. With regard to the other Japanese islands, he inquired whether this question would be discussed in the future.
Mr. Byrnes said that he would be delighted at any time to discuss the question.
Mr. Bevin said with regard to the secret agreement signed by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, he personally had never seen anything concerning the Kuriles. The British Government knew nothing about it. It had been an agreement between Prime Minister Churchill, President Roosevelt and Generalissimo Stalin. However, the Cabinet members had no knowledge concerning it.
Mr. Molotov pointed out that Ambassador Clark Kerr and Mr. Cadogan knew about this agreement.
Mr. Bevin said that the British Government had not gone back on the agreement after it had learned about it and did not intend to go back on it. However, it created a “frightful” difficulty for him when matters were “thrown at” him in this fashion without his being informed in advance.
Mr. Molotov said that he was not pressing for an immediate discussion of this question. He only meant to inquire whether information could be expected upon it. If the question were not going to be decided, it would be desirable at least to set a time for deciding.
Mr. Bevin stated that any time Mr. Molotov informed him of a matter which Mr. Molotov felt was not being handled expeditiously, he would immediately take it up with his colleagues.
Mr. Molotov replied that both Mr. Bevin and his colleagues were present at the moment and that therefore there could be no better opportunity.
7. German Assets in Austria
Mr. Byrnes recalled that he had inquired earlier in the conference regarding the determination of what constitutes German assets in Austria. He desired to urge agreement upon his proposal that this question be referred to the Allied Control Council in Vienna and that the Soviet Government authorize its representative there to come to a decision on the question. There were some United States properties in Austria. The Nazis had taken charge of Austrian properties belonging to Americans. The claim had been made that these were Nazi assets. It was essential that prompt decision be reached in such questions as otherwise irritation was created. The United States Government had authorized its representative to fettle these matters on the spot but its representative had replied that the Soviet representative had no such authorization.
Mr. Molotov replied that this general question had been discussed at the Berlin Conference and inquired whether there were any specific matters concerning it.
[Page 767]Mr. Byrnes said that the claim had been raised that purely Austrian properties and American properties were really German properties.
Mr. Molotov said that specific cases should be considered individually.
Mr. Byrnes agreed. However, when the United States representative had asked that such specific questions be considered, the Soviet representative had replied that he was not authorized to decide them.
Mr. Molotov said that he would attempt to clear up this question before Mr. Byrnes’ departure.
8. Peace Treaties
Mr. Byrnes pointed out that general agreement had been reached on the peace treaty proposal. China had been informed, and had concurred on this document.57 Mr. Bidault had also been informed and had said that he personally was disposed to accept it but that he had no authority to do so and would have to speak to General de Gaulle.58 Mr. Byrnes had put in a telephone call to Mr. Bidault for this afternoon. In the event that the French were in agreement, would Mr. Molotov and Mr. Bevin be willing to issue this document to the press? Since the conference had begun the press had been given no news concerning it. It would be desirable to issue this one statement and to say that the work of the conference was proceeding in a friendly spirit and that there would be a communiqué within a few days.
Mr. Molotov said that this was acceptable to him.
Mr. Bevin said that before publishing this document he wished to study further the wording of paragraph 4. His Government had called his attention to a constitutional question involved therein. The second line of this paragraph included the words “signed on behalf of”. His Government preferred the words “signed by the governments”. This was proposed since otherwise it might be assumed that Mr. Bevin had agreed to sign on behalf of Canada, et cetera.
Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Molotov said they had no objection to this change.
Mr. Molotov suggested that it read “signed by representatives of” the states in question. Mr. Bevin agreed to this.
9. Rumania and Bulgaria
After a recess, Mr. Molotov distributed Soviet drafts on Rumania and Bulgaria.59
[Page 768]After a preliminary study of these papers Mr. Byrnes inquired whether the Soviet draft implied that the reorganized government of Rumania would contain only one representative from both the Peasant and Liberal Parties.
Mr. Molotov replied that there would be one representative from each party. Two suitable representatives could be found.
Mr. Byrnes stated that he remembered saying in yesterday’s conversation that the persons taken into the reorganized Government should be truly representative of their parties. Mr. Byrnes said that this certainly should be in the draft.
Mr. Molotov suggested that this was covered by the provision that the representatives taken in would be from groups not now participating in the Government.
Mr. Byrnes replied that there might be certain cases in which men would belong to groups not now participating in the Government, but nevertheless would not be truly representative of their parties.
Mr. Molotov said that he had no objection to a person from the Maniu group but that Maniu himself would not be acceptable.
Mr. Bevin inquired whether it was necessary to mention the three individual men in a document of this character.
Mr. Molotov said that it had been stated at the outset that these three men were unacceptable. His colleagues had agreed to this.
Mr. Byrnes said that it would not be proper for the three Governments to take specific notice of individuals. Instructions could be sent to the representatives of the three Governments that these three individuals should not be selected. However, the individuals themselves would not be made the subject of special mention.
Mr. Molotov pointed out that Mr. Ethridge had mentioned these individuals in his paper.
Mr. Byrnes replied that there was a difference between the report of an individual and an agreement among three great Governments.
Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet Government considered the reference to these individuals to be necessary.
Mr. Bevin pointed out that there had been an assumption that the United States and British delegates were pressing for the inclusion of these three individuals. However, this did not follow from the proposal which Mr. Byrnes had presented. There would be misunderstanding in Great Britain if Mr. Bevin mentioned in the agreement three individuals whom he had never seen. Mr. Bevin concurred in Mr. Byrnes’ suggestion that the representatives of the three powers be instructed not to select these individuals. However, it would be awkward publicly to ostracize men in their own country. It was another thing to have an understanding that the Commission to be formed would not consider selecting them.
[Page 769]10. Atomic Energy
Mr. Byrnes inquired whether the atomic energy document had been finally disposed of.
Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet Delegation was in agreement with the document (Enclosure no. 4). The Soviet Delegation also agreed to issue a statement to the press as Mr. Byrnes had proposed.
Mr. Bevin suggested with regard to the Atomic Energy Commission that all three governments approach France and China with the document and that he would approach Canada as a Dominion. These countries would be requested to sponsor the proposal before the United Nations. This would be done in order to have the proposal placed on the agenda at the forthcoming meeting of the General Assembly.
Mr. Byrnes stated that this was satisfactory to him and that in fact he had assumed this would be done. However, he suggested that the proposal be submitted to the Drafting Committee.60
Mr. Byrnes suggested that in view of the fact that he had not yet received a reply from Mr. Bidault, the public statement to be issued this evening should say that the peace treaty agreement had been communicated to France and China and that France and China had been invited to adhere to it. He proposed that the statement be released not later than 10 p.m.61
Mr. Bevin and Mr. Molotov agreed to this.
It was agreed that the reference to Paris as the site of the peace conference would be struck out pending the French reply.
It was agreed to refer the Atomic Energy Commission agreement to the Drafting Committee.
A Protocol Committee was appointed consisting of Mr. Cohen, Mr. Malik, and Sir Ronald Campbell.
[Page 770]- According to the United Kingdom delegation minutes of this meeting, the following additional persons participated: For the United States—James B. Conant; for the United Kingdom—P. J. Dixon and W. McAfee.↩
- According to the United Kingdom delegation minutes of this meeting, Molotov referred to the American draft originally submitted by the Secretary of State at the Third Formal Session of the Conference on December 18 and included as enclosure 3 to the United States delegation minutes of that meeting, p. 663.↩
- Presumably reference here is to the Soviet memorandum on German and other military units in Austria, included as enclosure 3 to the United States delegation minutes of the Informal Meeting of December 21, 2:30 p.m., p. 721.↩
- For the exchange of letters between the Secretary of State and Foreign Commissar Molotov on the disposition of the Japanese fleet, see telegrams 2175, October 17, 2197, October 20, and 2199, October 22, all to Moscow, printed in vol. vi , section under Japan entitled “Surrender of Japan …”, Part IV.↩
- Presumably reference here is to the Agreement Regarding Entry of the Soviet Union into the War Against Japan, February 11, 1945, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, p. 984.↩
- For Chinese concurrence in the formula for preparing the peace treaties, see telegram 16, December 23, from Chungking to Moscow, p. 759.↩
- Regarding Bidault’s disposition to accept the formula for preparing the peace treaties, see footnote 50, p. 761.↩
- Enclosures 6 and 5 to these minutes, pp. 773 and 772, respectively.↩
- According to the United Kingdom delegation minutes of this meeting, Foreign Secretary Bevin suggested, at this point, the following draft resolution for submission to the United Nations by the six sponsoring powers: “Resolved by the General Assembly of the United Nations to establish a Commission, with the composition and functions set out hereunder, to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy and other related matters.” It was agreed by the Conference that this draft resolution should be referred to the Drafting Committee. (Moscow Embassy Files: 500 Conference of Foreign Ministers)↩
- Regarding the Secretary’s efforts to obtain a reply from the French Government, see telegram 7332, December 24, from Paris to Moscow, supra, and footnote 50. The statement from the Conference regarding the preparation of peace treaties with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland, which was released on December 24, was subsequently included as section I of the Communiqué on the Conference, released on December 27; for text of the Communiqué, see telegram 4284, December 27, 3 a.m., from Moscow, p. 815.↩
- According to despatch 2337, January 3, 1946, from Moscow, which transmitted to the Department certain records and documents relating to the discussions at the Conference of the Iranian question, this particular British memorandum incorporated changes made at the suggestion of the Secretary of State of the original British memorandum of December 20 on Iran (see p. 708); in particular, paragraphs 1, 2, 4, 8, and 10 of the present document were suggested by the United States delegation and accepted by Foreign Secretary Bevin (740.00119 Council/1–346).↩