S/AE Files
Memorandum by Major John E. Vance, on the Staff of the Commanding General, Manhattan Engineer District (Groves)
1. Col. Lansdale and the undersigned arrived in Stockholm on 5 August in response to a request by Mr. Herschel V. Johnson, the [Page 51] United States Minister to Sweden. During the first meeting with Mr. Johnson he reported that he had made the initial approach to the Swedish Government based on the draft instructions dated 20 July 1945, which had been transmitted to Mr. Johnson in London. Prior to 5 August, Mr. Johnson had seen Mr. Stig Sahlin (Secretary General of the Swedish Foreign Office). Mr. Assarsson (Deputy Secretary General) and Mr. Undén, who became Foreign Minister on 1 August. Mr. Johnson reported that he had been told by Mr. Sahlin that there was no doubt that the Swedish Government would agree to control the Swedish materials but some doubt was expressed that the Swedish Government would agree to US and UK control of their uranium supply for a long period of years. Mr. Johnson also stated that Mr. Per Albin Hansson, the Prime Minister, had been informed of our requests by Mr. Undén.
2. After a discussion with Mr. Johnson and the British representatives (Mr. Jerram, the British Minister to Sweden, and Mr. Sayers) the draft of 7 August86 was prepared. On the morning of 7 August the Stockholm papers carried the story of the atomic bomb. Mr. Johnson was of the opinion that the publicity would not be harmful since it emphasized the great importance of the matter and the need for speedy conclusion of the agreement.
3. The draft of 7 August, approved by the two Ministers, was taken by Mr. Johnson to the Foreign Office on 8 August where he saw both Mr. Undén and Mr. Sahlin. At this meeting it was apparent that the Swedish Government was well aware of the necessity of controlling these materials but that they believed any action which would place the control of Swedish uranium-bearing materials in the hands of the US and UK would jeopardize the strict neutrality which has been maintained by the Swedish Government; in other words, they felt they would have to refuse any requests made by the US and UK since they firmly intended to refuse any requests made by Russia.
4. On 15 August a meeting was held with the following present: Mr. Assarsson, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Jerram, Mr. Labouchere (Counselor of the British Legation), Prof. Siegbahn (Physics Professor at Stockholm University), Col. Lansdale, Mr. Sayers and Maj. Vance. Mr. Assarsson, for the Swedish Government, said that the purpose of the meeting was to obtain information which could be presented to the Prime Minister so that he might better understand the purpose of the agreement. Col. Lansdale then presented the required background in a very general way. Mr. Assarsson pointed out that other large countries would probably seek Swedish supplies though no approach had yet been made. Mr. Johnson replied that this emphasized the need for control of Swedish resources by the US and UK because of their military value and expressed the opinion that it would be [Page 52] to the best interests of the Swedish Government to enter into an obligation with the US and UK so that future demands by other governments could be referred to them.
5. On 16 August, Mr. Jerram advised Mr. Johnson that a message had been received from the British Government which took exception to the draft of 7 August with respect to the provisions concerning a firm commitment to purchase materials and the stimulation of Swedish production. After discussing the two points with Washington and London, a new draft was prepared on 22 August87 in order to avoid a delay in the negotiations. The draft was concurred in by the two Ministers; one copy was forwarded to General Groves and one copy to Mr. Rickett.
6. On 28 August, Mr. Johnson met with Mr. Undén for a lengthy discussion of the proposed agreement. Mr. Undén made several objections to the proposals: (a) acceptance of the proposals in full would mean a virtual abandonment of the basic Swedish policy of neutrality; (b) The agreement would make Sweden’s position more difficult politically if an approach was subsequently made by other powers; (c) there was a serious question of the legality of an agreement concluded by the Swedish Government without reference to the secret Joint Foreign Affairs Committee of the two Houses of the Swedish Riksdag.
Mr. Undén added that the Swedish Government would have no hesitation in participating in an international arrangement for the control of uranium materials.
In reply to Mr. Undén, Mr. Johnson pointed out: (a) that the position of the Swedish Government would be, in fact, much stronger in relation to other powers if committed to the US and UK on a contractual basis; (b) since the US and UK already possessed control of the majority of the world’s resources, a continued Swedish policy of neutrality with respect to these materials might possibly be a dangerous temptation to outsiders; (c) while he recognized there would be some question of the validity of the agreement beyond the life of the present Swedish Government, that was a risk we would have to relation to other powers if committed to the US and UK on a control was a matter for future action and that such a possibility should not influence present negotiations.
As a result of the above discussion, Mr. Johnson believed it would be imprudent to press the Swedish Government for an immediate decision.
7. On 11 September, Mr. Johnson reported he had seen the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister stated that Sweden could not possibly conclude an agreement along the lines suggested for the following reasons: (a) essential security could not be maintained because of the [Page 53] constitutional requirement that such an agreement be submitted to the Joint Foreign Affairs Committee of the Riksdag, consisting of 32 members, which also has the power to put the matter before the entire Riksdag; (b) it was impossible to word the agreement in such a way that it would not be regarded by Russia as a political act of an unfriendly nature on the part of Sweden and would result in a further deterioration of the relations between the two countries; (c) the US and UK could not make themselves responsible for the relations between Sweden and Russia.
In place of meeting our requests, the Prime Minister stated that Sweden was prepared to guarantee that none of the materials would be exported and that suitable legislation would be enacted in the very near future. He further pointed out that temporary control could be effected by existing laws which require all exports to be licensed by the government. The Prime Minister said that the Swedish reply would take the form of a unilateral declaration in a letter to Mr. Johnson and would not be made public in Sweden.
After a discussion with Mr. Johnson, it was decided to request the Swedish Government to include the following points in their reply: (a) that information be made available to the US and UK both now and in the future, on Swedish resources and the exploitation and production of uranium-containing materials; (b) that the two governments be informed immediately if the Swedish Government found it advisable in the future to collaborate with other powers in the exploitation of their resources that the US and UK be given first opportunity to make mutually satisfactory arrangements; (c) in the event that the Swedish Government rescinds their restrictions on the exports of these materials that the US and UK be given first refusal for the purchase of such materials.
9. On 11 September, Mr. Johnson, the British Minister and Col. Lansdale met with Mr. Undén and Mr. Assarsson to discuss the Swedish reply and to request the inclusion of the three points in the above paragraph. The Swedish representatives stated that they would give an oral assurance to furnish information and that they could not agree to giving us first refusal in the event that restrictions on exports were lifted in the future. With slight change, the provision with respect to future collaboration in the event of a change of policy was incorporated in the note.88 At our request, Mr. Undén and Mr. Assarsson agreed to advise us in the event that the Swedish Government was approached by any other power with respect to same or similar matters. For obvious reasons they objected to incorporating such a statement in the note.