Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: Political and Economic Matters, Volume II

S/AE Files

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman

Washington, September 25, 1945.

Subject: U. S. Policy Regarding Secrecy of Scientific Knowledge About Atomic Bomb and Atomic Energy.

The conclusion of this memorandum is that a policy of secrecy is both futile and dangerous and that the real issues involve the methods and conditions which should govern interchange of scientific knowledge and the international controls which should be sought to prevent a race toward mutual destruction.

The premises upon which this conclusion rests are as follows:

(1) Scientific opinion appears to be practically unanimous that the theoretical basic knowledge is widely known at present; that foreign research can come abreast of our present knowledge in a comparatively short time; that foreign industrial engineering and development in, for instance, the Soviet Union, can equal our present development in about five years; that there is little prospect of developing effective defensive measures against the bomb. In other words, what we know is not a secret which we can keep to ourselves: once known to others, there is no certain way that we can protect ourselves from its use against us.

(2) This scientific knowledge does not relate merely to another and more powerful weapon. It relates to a discovery more revolutionary in human society than the invention of the wheel, the use of metals, or the steam or internal combustion engine. Its development cannot be suppressed or confined to one country. Development on the destructive side, as on other sides, is in its infancy and sober scientists contemplate the possibility of explosives which, when combined with the rocket principle, will be capable of the mutual destruction of vast areas which employ it against one another. In other words, if the invention is developed and used destructively there will be no victor and there may be no civilization remaining. The advantage of being ahead in such a race is nothing compared with not having the race.

(3) The moral and political nature of our people is such that the use of the atomic bomb for an unwarned attack on another nations is not a practical possibility. Therefore, the advantage of unannounced attack would be with others.

(4) At the present time the joint development of this discovery with the U.K. and Canada must appear to the Soviet Union to be unanswerable evidence of an Anglo-American combination against them. To their minds, there is much other evidence of this.

(5) It is impossible that a government as powerful and power conscious as the Soviet Government could fail to react vigorously to this situation. It must and will exert every energy to restore the loss of power which this discovery has produced. It will do this, if we attempt to maintain the policy of exclusion, in an atmosphere of suspicion and hostility, thereby exacerbating every present difficulty between us. For us to declare ourselves trustee of the development for the benefit of the world will mean nothing more to the Russian mind than an outright policy of exclusion.

(6) Over-all disagreement with the Soviet Union seems to be increasing. Yet I cannot see why the basic interests of the two nations should conflict. Any long range understanding based on firmness and frankness and mutual recognition of the other’s basic interests seems to me impossible under a policy of Anglo-American exclusion of Russia from atomic development. If it is impossible, there will be no organized peace but only an armed truce.

(7) The question whether or not to attempt a program of mutual exchange of information and cooperation in this field with the Soviet Union cannot be avoided by proposals for control by the United Nations Organization. The United Nations cannot function in this field without agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.E. This agreement, if it is to be reached, should be attempted directly and not with the added complication of fifty or more other countries being involved at the start.

(8) Without the same informed and extensive public discussion that preceded the San Francisco Conference⁸⁵ and an opportunity to hear fully the opinions of the scientists on which the scientific premises are based, the public and Congress will be unprepared to accept a policy involving substantial disclosures to the Soviet Union. But postponement of an approach to the USSE is also untenable. The resulting deterioration in Russian relations would not only adversely color our domestic discussions but would also make the Russian attitude less favorable for an ultimate program of collaboration. It is necessary that public opinion be given an opportunity to mature at the same time that action is taken to prevent Russian fear and suspicion from increasing and crystallizing.

Recommendations—

That an approach be made by the United States to the Soviet Union after discussion with the British, as required by our arrangements with the latter, having for its purpose the working out of a program of mutual exchange of scientific information and collaboration in the development of atomic power to proceed gradually and upon condition:

• First, that the exchange should be mutual and that we become convinced that United States scientists are being fully informed of Soviet developments;
• Second, that an agreement be reached on mutual renunciation of further development of the destructive features with adequate opportunity for inspection to give mutual confidence that this was being done;
• Third, that initially and perhaps permanently, depending on developments, collaboration should go forward on the development of atomic power and not on the production of the military weapon; and
• Fourth, that a plan be worked out to extend these principles to other countries in due course, probably through the mechanism of the United Nations.

This approach to the Russians would seek to reach an agreement on the terms under which full collaboration would later proceed. It need not involve at this time any disclosures going substantially beyond those which have already been made to the world.

Concurrently with the initiation of these discussions with the Soviet Union, the President might send a message to the Congress stating the reasons which lead him to urge an ultimate program of collaboration and which make necessary the immediate approach to the USSR, recommending that the Congress proceed with its own full consideration of the problem of atomic energy, indicating the type of domestic legislation favored by the President, and stating that the outcome of the negotiations with the Russians will be reported to the Congress as soon as they are completed and that requests for Congressional action will be made on any resulting agreements requiring it.

Dean Acheson

85. Reference is to the United Nations Conference on International Organization, held in San Francisco, April 25–June 26, 1945; for documentation on this Conference, see vol. i, pp. 1 ff.