740.00119 Council/9–3045
Memorandum of Conversation33
| Present: | The Secretary |
| Mr. Dunn | |
| Mr. Bohlen | |
| Mr. Molotov | |
| Ambassador Gusev | |
| Ambassador Gromyko35 | |
| Mr. Pavlov | |
| Mr. Bevin | |
| Sir Ronald Campbell | |
| Sir Archibald Clark Kerr | |
| Mr. Ivanov |
Mr. Bevin said he had asked Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Molotov to come see him in order to try and work out the question of what to do about the September 11 decision and the question of the protocol. He said that the fact is we had passed a resolution and somewhere in the protocol it must be included.
Mr. Molotov said he had a suggestion to make. He said he thought since the three of them were those authorized to prepare peace treaties by the Berlin decision that they had in effect invited China and France on the 3rd to attend without right of vote on certain questions. It would, therefore, be correct if the decision of September 11 was [Page 490] noted in the proper manner. For example, in regard to the protocol on the Italian peace treaty it should be stated in the beginning that the four countries, the United States of America, the U.S.S.R., Great Britain, and France, had invited China to attend without a vote. In regard to the Balkan treaties it should state in the beginning that the three Governments signatory to the armistice, namely, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R., had invited France to participate and not vote. In regard to Finland it should state that Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. had invited France, the United States of America, and China to participate and not vote. In each of these protocols he continued there would be a notation that on September 30 this decision of September 11 had been rescinded. In this way there would be the proper mention in the proper place of the decision of September 11 and the statement that the embodying powers had on September 30 rescinded that decision. He said it was obvious that France and China could not invite themselves and could not insist on the continuance of an invitation which they had no part in issuing. He said that under his proposal the general protocol signed by five ministers would contain no reference to the decision of September 11.
Mr. Byrnes said he wanted to be clear on this point and make sure that he understood Mr. Molotov. Mr. Molotov was proposing that the September 11 decision as worded should not be included.
Mr. Molotov said that this was correct although the same effect would be achieved by putting it into separate protocols. However, he was quite prepared not to make any mention of the September 11 decision in any of the protocols. But if it was mentioned as he proposed there should also be reference to its cancelation. He could not agree to its inclusion in the general protocol since he felt that the decision had not been taken by the five ministers.
Mr. Byrnes then said that looking to the future we must decide what our deputies would have to do. Would this mean that the deputies of France and China would not sit in at the discussions as their Foreign Ministers had, of course, always with no right to vote where they were not signatories.
Mr. Molotov replied that they could not. There would be four deputies for the Italian treaty, three for the Balkan, and two for Finland.
Mr. Bevin remarked that that was where the difficulty lies.
Mr. Byrnes added that he did not see why the deputies could not be given the same status as their respective Foreign Ministers had.
Mr. Molotov replied that he had already made it plain that he considered the decision of September 11 a mistake and that to continue it in violation of the Berlin decision would not be acceptable to the Soviet delegation.
[Page 491]Mr. Byrnes inquired whether or not the deputies of France and China could not be regarded as having been invited.
Mr. Molotov replied that there could be no agreement on that basis. He repeated that he had already said that he felt the decision of September 11 to be a mistake and in violation of the Berlin agreement. He said he put his proposal before them but he must make it plain that he could not sign any protocol embodying what he felt to be a violation of the Berlin Conference. He said, for example, if a misprint had occurred in the document it would be absurd to continue to make the same misprint.
Mr. Byrnes replied that he was merely asking in order to obtain information and not to continue the argument as to the interpretation of the Berlin agreement. He said he thought that we had just as much right to invite the deputies as we had to invite the Foreign Ministers.
Mr. Molotov repeated that the decision of September 11 was a mistake and that the Foreign Ministers had taken on a right which they did not have.
The Secretary replied that he fully understood.
Mr. Molotov replied that he had at the moment only the question of drawing up the protocols in mind and that his suggestion had related only to that.
Mr. Bevin said he hoped Mr. Molotov would understand him but that in his view on Saturday night they had gone through all the proceedings and had agreed on protocols recording them.
Mr. Molotov stated that he could only agree to four separate protocols and not to one.
Mr. Bevin explained that he had in mind separate protocols.
Mr. Molotov went on to say that both Mr. Bevin and Mr. Byrnes knew what the Heads of Government had decided at Potsdam and that he felt they should not waste any more time over the rectification of one mistake which all had made. He said he was prepared to assume his share of the responsibility for this mistake but that he felt no more time should be wasted in correcting it. He said he felt they were all being stubborn in refusing to recognize a mistake. If they did not wish to correct it then they should say so openly. He added that he felt that in this Conference they had also neglected to have sufficient prior consultation between the three of them in the opening days of the Conference and that if this had been done many subsequent difficulties would have been avoided.
Mr. Byrnes said that he thought that the idea of four protocols was correct and that Mr. Molotov’s suggestion of separate headings reflecting the September 11 decision was an interesting one and he suggested that Mr. Molotov put it to the Council.
Mr. Molotov said he would do this.
[Page 492]Mr. Byrnes observed that he thought this might be a way out of their difficulty.
Mr. Molotov then remarked, however, that he would not sign these various protocols in the presence of the representatives of any country who was not a signatory to the respective armistice terms.
Mr. Bevin said this raised the whole issue again and inquired whether Mr. Molotov meant that there could be no discussion of Mr. Molotov’s proposal in the full Council.
Mr. Molotov replied that if the three of them here accepted the amendment that that would be sufficient. He then added in conclusion that he was not subordinate to Mr. Bevin and Mr. Byrnes and they were not subordinate to him and said he would submit his suggestion in writing to them. He added that he must warn his colleagues that the Soviet delegation would only consider the general protocol in the presence of the full Council.
The meeting then adjourned to join the full Council.