740.00/119 Council/9–3045
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State
| Participants: | The Secretary |
| Mr. Bohlen | |
| Mr. Molotov | |
| Ambassador Gusev | |
| Mr. Pavlov |
The Secretary said he had wanted to see Mr. Molotov since it was apparent that all their difficulties at the Council stemmed from the same central question about future procedure. He felt that they ought to be able to find some formula which would accept Mr. Molotov’s position as to the preparation of the peace treaties and at the same time give some indication to the world that broader participation would be provided for before final decision was taken on these treaties. It was for this reason that he had proposed the suggestion regarding a conference.
Mr. Molotov said that what Mr. Byrnes was suggesting was the appearance of an agreement when none existed. He saw no use in that. He felt that when we could not decide a given question it was best to postpone it in the hope of finding a future solution. He said Mr. Byrnes referred to a conference, but how could they hold a conference to consider peace treaties with Rumania and Bulgaria when the United States Government would have nothing to do with the Governments of those countries.
Mr. Byrnes said he was thinking of the work of the Council, and he felt that we ought to be able to adopt some resolution which would [Page 488] be in conformity with the Berlin decision, but at the same time indicate that we wished to consult other interested nations. As to the question about the Balkan countries, he felt that we could continue to consider that through diplomatic channels. He added that if some changes could be made in those governments which would afford us a basis to change our position, we would certainly consider it.
Mr. Molotov replied that the agreement with regard to procedure was of secondary importance. The United States had their point of view, the Soviet Government had theirs, but it was not a question of principle but one of secondary importance. Pie added that if the United States was anxious to reach an agreement in regard to a conference, then the best thing to do would be to try to get a common attitude toward the Governments of Rumania and Hungary [Bulgaria?]. Then we could agree on a conference without much trouble. In any event he suggested that they not attempt to hurry these questions, but publish the decisions we have already made, and wait until the next session of the Council, and not attempt to settle questions which were not yet ripe.
Mr. Byrnes said that he was glad to learn Mr. Molotov’s views on this, but he could not see what we were going to do about the Deputies unless we could agree on procedure.
Mr. Molotov replied that if the Berlin decision was followed, the matters relating to the peace treaties would be referred only to those of the countries signatory to the armistice.
The Secretary replied that he did not intend to discuss the interpretation of the Berlin decision—that was clear enough to all. He felt, however, that he had made a concession to Mr. Molotov in being willing to agree to accept his position for the future preparatory work of the Council, and that all he was asking in return was that there be some provision made for the summoning of the conference. He did not care in what form the conference was set up, but he did wish an indication of our willingness to consult other nations.
Mr. Molotov repeated that he felt that this question was of secondary nature, and that we could agree on it without trouble. He added that he had no instructions from Moscow, but he was sure his Government would not understand how it would be possible to call a conference in regard to peace treaties with Rumania and Bulgaria when the United States and Great Britain did not recognize those governments. He said he understood the position of the United States Government; President Truman had made it clear at Potsdam; but two months had passed and there was no change in the American position, which was their right. He said, however, he had some hope for the future, since soon there would be elections as a result of which there would be new governments in these countries, which should make it easier for the United States. If this was so, and it was possible for [Page 489] the United States to recognize these governments, then the question of a conference could be decided without trouble. He said he felt these two questions were linked up together.
The Secretary said that he felt that it was too bad to link them up. In regard to recognition, he said as we agreed at Potsdam we had looked into the situation in Hungary, and on the basis of our reports had found it possible to justify our recognition of the Government. Our reports from Rumania and Bulgaria did not justify such action in regard to those Governments. He added we did not like the present situation, and wished to find some means of justifying such a step as recognition. He continued that if some change could be made in the governments of these countries, it might be a way out, but we did not feel we could accept the responsibility of approving these governments in their present state.
Mr. Molotov said that he felt that the United States position was based on a whim, and that to change the government would be a violation of the sovereignty of these states.
The Secretary said he was not asking for any overthrow of the government, but some changes that would convince the world that these governments were really representative.
Mr. Molotov repeated they could not do this since it would be misunderstood and resented in any democratic country.