740.00119 Council/9–2645
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State
| Participants: | The Secretary |
| Mr. Dunn | |
| Mr. Bohlen | |
| Mr. Molotov | |
| Ambassador Gusev | |
| Mr. Pavlov | |
| Mr. Bevin | |
| Sir Ronald Campbell | |
| Mr. Dixon | |
| Mr. Payton-Smith |
Mr. Molotov said that he wished to circulate a proposal to settle the procedural question. His proposal read that the decision of September 11 with regard to procedure50 should be reversed, and the question of the peace treaties should be considered as provided for in the appropriate section of the Berlin decision.
The Secretary replied that he had hoped that their proposal, which he felt was in accord with the Berlin Conference, would satisfy Mr. Molotov, since it excluded from consideration of these treaties the Deputies of any but the powers which had signed the armistice.
Mr. Molotov said that he felt that Mr. Byrnes’ proposal was not in conformity with the Berlin decision. He pointed out that paragraph 1 let the Council of Five handle the matter of the Hungarian treaty.
[Page 411]The Secretary said that he did not see this, since his proposal was that the Council would have no discussion, nor vote, nor take any action on these treaties, but merely refer them to special committees of deputies composed of the countries signatory to the armistice. He added that if the first sentence bothered Mr. Molotov, he was prepared to strike it out.
There was some discussion as to what body would take the decision, remit these treaties to the appropriate deputies, at the end of which Mr. Molotov said he must make it plain that he could not even consider that point in a Council of Five. He said that what he had in mind was that the Council itself should be composed only of the countries signatory to the armistice to consider or refer any matter affecting these treaties.
Mr. Bevin said that we were in a case where the three Heads of State were not agreed, and he did not see why he should be asked to swallow Marshal Stalin’s interpretation and go back on that of his Prime Minister. He said he could not be expected to throw over Mr. Attlee any more than Mr. Molotov could be expected to throw over Marshal Stalin.
Mr. Molotov pointed out that Mr. Byrnes agreed with his interpretation, although he referred to some different understanding during the discussions at Potsdam, which had not, however, been reflected in the agreed text.
The Secretary replied that this was correct, and that he felt that we could try to find some compromise in the light of the discussion.
Mr. Bevin said that he was afraid that if we changed the procedure now, it would invalidate all the decisions that had been taken in regard to these satellite treaties.
Mr. Molotov said this would not be the case since even under the September 11 formula China and France had had no power of decision, and therefore the decisions were only those of the three of us. He added that he must repeat that he could not participate in any meeting concerning these peace treaties in which the representatives of countries not signatory to the armistice terms were present.
The Secretary then asked Mr. Molotov’s opinion concerning paragraph 5 of his proposal,51 namely, that a conference of states at war with these satellite countries be called for the next session of the Council.
Mr. Molotov replied that he could not discuss that question in London as he would have to talk to his Government. He pointed out that it was a very serious question and required considerable study.
[Page 412]Mr. Bevin then said that although he could not speak for his Government, he wondered if Mr. Molotov would accept some statement to the effect that notwithstanding the decision of September 11, in future the Council would consider these peace treaties in conformity with the Potsdam decision.
Mr. Molotov replied that he thought that that seemed to be very much in line with his own proposal.
It was then decided to meet again at 11 o’clock the next morning since there was no morning session of the Council, to consider further the question of procedure and also at the Secretary’s suggestion to have a full discussion in regard to Japan.