Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: Political and Economic Matters, Volume II

740.00119 Council/9–1145

United States Delegation Minutes of the Twenty-Third Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, London, September 26, 1945, 5:00–7:25 p.m.

London, September 26, 1945, 7:25 p.m.

Present

U.K.	U.S.A	U.S.S.R
Mr. Bevin	James F. Byrnes	M. Molotov (Chairman)
Sir R. I. Campbell	J. Dunn	F. T. Gousev
Sir A. Clark Kerr	B. V. Cohen	K. V. Novikov
A. Duff Cooper	J. F. Dulles	S. A. Golunski
	C. E. Bohlen	V. N. Pavlov

France	China
M. Bidault	Dr. Wang Shih Chieh
M. Couve de Murville	Dr. Wellington Koo
General Catroux	Dr. Hollington Tong
M. Alphand	Mr. Yang Yun Chu
M. Fouques Duparc	Mr. Hsich Kwang-Tsien

Dr. Wang presiding

Control of Germany

Wang The French Delegation has presented a memorandum on this subject.⁴³

Bidault As my colleagues have read the text of the memorandum which has been distributed by the French Delegation, the Provisional Government of France finds itself confronted with a number of arrangements which, for myself, were not full decisions. It is not the idea of the French Delegation to raise again now, for reasons of form, matters which may have been decided upon in its absence, or which may seem legitimate to it.

We are here in the presence of questions which are of importance to Europe, and are also of the greatest importance to the whole world, and if for the world as a whole, or for Europe particularly, we were to draw up the statistics of German aggression, France would not complain in the share she has had in the matter. That is why I cannot conceal from you the fact that in the circumstances of Berlin, the problems of Germany were examined without consultation with countries such as France who has been at grips with them for centuries, and we feel that very deeply in my country, so naturally we cannot be bound for any acts like this.

We have never contracted any alliance with Germany, and it is only natural we should decide that nothing should be finally concluded to which we have not had an opportunity of giving our consent. Therefore, I would like to say that I do not think, in German affairs, that it is possible or conceivable without France taking its share therewith. Also, I cannot imagine any decisions taking place which should be regarded as committing France. My Government was not consulted in any regard in the matter of texts drawn up and agreed upon, but it has been placed in a position freely to accept. I shouldn’t wish it to be understood that the general reservations which I have been making apply in principle to everything which has been decided upon without our participation. I regard some of these as sound but others we cannot accept without reservations. I will indicate later on what reservations I wish to make.

You have had before you almost since the beginning of the Conference, the paper on the French proposals, and I will not dwell on the reservations we are making, but I would like to say that the reservations which we make have reference to the contemplated reconstitution of the Central Government, and also to the creation of a Secretary of State, or by whatever name they may be called, and whose jurisdiction extends to Germany and territories, and I am not, so far, in accord with this.

What is there for the situation confronting us? It was agreed among the three powers present at this Council, that a certain system of administration of Germany could be set in operation.⁴⁴ There are now four of us administering Germany, and I think that is a good thing, and I think we should go on.

So far as the French Delegation is concerned, it agrees with the principles in Paragraph 9 on the Control of Germany; namely that the administration of Germany should be directly toward the decentralization of political structure and the development of local responsibility. This way the French Delegation regards that the paragraph which follows thereon, provides for the constitution at once of a central government of Germany. I would remind you that Germany is now governed by a Control Commission of the Commanders in Chief of the four powers, and this was agreed upon in the absence of the fourth power—France, which I would like to point out without further comment.

Therefore, the French Delegation also regards that the following paragraph not only contemplates but provides for a central German organization before we know what Germany and the German people are being. And it is also provided that there should be created central administrative departments under German directive.

We are all unaware of what Germany is to become in the coming days, and we think it is not necessary, we who have suffered many losses in the field and concentration camps, to proceed in the reconstitution of Germany before it becomes essential to do so. In any case, we do not think the first act of the Control Commission should be to reconstitute in Berlin under German direction a central German administration.

As it appears at present to be determined by the findings of the Conference when we were not present, is that there will be a German administration, but that there will be withdrawn from its authority certain territories which are defined as limited in the declaration of Potsdam.

We have no objection to this directive but if Breslau and Koenigsberg are withdrawn from this central German authority, on which we will agree, then it appears to the French Government and its people, that, if possible, towns like Mainz and Stettin should remain under the authority of responsible German officers, perhaps called Secretaries of State, who would take advantage of the fact that he was alone to administer the railways, for instance, without the Commander in Chief having had in this matter the rights which have been granted for him in other places.⁴⁵

The Provisional Government of the French Republic has said on several occasions, and I think that anyone could have anticipated this, that it attaches essential importance to the areas of the Rhineland and the Ruhr.

What is important to us is that the area which has been the starting point for aggressions, and from which my country has suffered generation after generation, should be withdrawn from the aggressive power. The “European Treasure House,” as the Ruhr Basin is known, should no longer be the base for launching and for the continuing of wars, and it should be made into something to cement the amity of peoples in the common construction of peace.

As for the Ruhr Basin, of which I said was a “European Treasure House”, we must remove it from among the war potentialities which can be wielded by a people from whose aggression we have suffered immeasurably.

As for the agricultural and forest zone south of Cologne, which is mountainous, and which has often been called the “Springboard of Aggression”—my country feels that it should be placed in a position where it is able to watch over the integrity of this section.

I may add that since things have been published that France has no intention of extending its territories, what it does wish to do is to be placed in a position in which it can, once and for all, close the door on aggression. There is a house on the territory of France which has been reconstructed seven times after having been destroyed, and we do not wish that it be constructed again. We wish this so. And, if I am asked where the house is, I will give the address.

Therefore, I think the problem which arises is essentially a problem of Germany. That is the essential problem. But if there had not been a Germany, the consequences which would follow to all of us, and the Soviets with their long ordeal, and Britain holding out so long alone, and America which had to come with us, together with China which had to resist its aggressor, the problem of peace would have been much easier to solve.

That is why France would have wished that the first question to come before the Council of Foreign Ministers be the question which was, in fact, first in importance. This has been in consideration of what has been decided at earlier meetings and out of our desire to promote cooperation with the great Allies, we have been ready to agree that there should be placed in Chapter VIII what should be placed in Chapter I.⁴⁶

As earnest as I am, and as we all are, to arrive at a real government of Germany between four powers who are at present in charge of its controlled areas, there is no objection to another examination of this matter.

In conclusion, I would like to say that the question before us is so serious for the life and survival of the country I represent at this table, I feel it my duty to read over the sentence which concludes the French memorandum: “They are however obliged to state that the French representative on the Allied Control Commission in Berlin will not be empowered to agree to any action prejudging that area’s future until the question here raised has been discussed by the five ministers and decided by the Council.”

Finally, I would like to say that there is no problem which is more serious for all of us, and France as well, and I should be glad to hear any observations that may be made on the position I have taken, so that we may be able in this way, by common act, remove this peril which has in turn threatened all the frontiers of Europe and which will in turn threaten the future.

Wang Are there any observations? If there are no observations, I would like to ask my colleagues how to dispose of this memorandum?

Bidault Mr. Chairman, there are no limits regarding the importance of the problems raised by this memorandum, and I also feel that our ability to settle this technical problem, and indeed some of the general problems, is small here, and that is why I should have no objection to have it referred to an appropriate party. If it is desired to refer it to a meeting of the Deputies, I have no objection. I also have no objection to referring it to any other body. I am, however, most anxious that work should be done on this problem because it is such an essential one.

Molotov The Soviet Delegation feels that the decisions of the Berlin Conference were formed to the wishes expressed by M. Bidault. The Soviet Delegation views with full sympathy the desires expressed by the representative of France, and feels that they should meet with all sympathy on the part of all of us.

I must add that the Soviet Delegation submitted at the Berlin Conference an additional proposal—one concerning the Ruhr area.⁴⁷ I want to recall the main points of this proposal. Here they are:

“Regarding the Ruhr area (industrial) as a part of Germany, and having in view the necessity for reducing in every way the war potential of Germany, the Conference found it advisable first, to lay down that the Ruhr industrial area, in the way of administration, should be under the joint control of the United States, Great Britain, the USSR and France; second, the administration of the Ruhr industrial area should be carried on by the Allied Council composed of representatives of Great Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union and France.”

At the Berlin Conference it was said that the British could not discuss this question without France, and we did not insist on this, but we are ready to devote ourselves to this question if my colleagues agree to do so.

Bevin I looked up the English text of discussion and

“Premier Stalin said that the Soviet Delegation had brought this up because at earlier conferences the suggestion had been put forward that the Ruhr should be separate from Germany and placed under some form of international control. On earlier occasions this suggestion had met with some approval. It flowed from the idea, which had previously been favoured by the heads of the three Governments, that Germany might be dismembered after the war. More recently, however, the views of the three Governments on the dismemberment of Germany had been modified; and at the present time the general feeling seemed to be in favour of treating Germany as a unit for economic purposes. For this reason he was anxious to know whether the British and United States Governments were now of opinion that the Ruhr should be treated as a part of Germany. If Mr. Bevin felt unable to discuss the further proposals for Allied control which were outlined in the remainder of the memorandum by the Soviet Delegation, could not the Conference at least consider whether they accepted the opening words of the memorandum which expressed the view that the industrial district of the Ruhr should be treated as part of Germany. If this were the view of the three Governments he would be glad if a statement to that effect could be included among the decisions of the present Conference.

“Mr. Bevin said that he would not wish to express any firm opinion on this question without further examination of the records of earlier discussions and of the relevant facts bearing on the question. He was content that for the present the Ruhr should remain within the jurisdiction of the Control Council for Germany; but he would prefer to have an opportunity for consultation with his colleagues in the British Government before committing himself to any view about the long-term arrangements for control over the industrial district of the Ruhr. Meanwhile, he was willing to agree that this long-term problem should be referred for consideration by the Council of Foreign Ministers.…”⁴⁸

I also said in the opening statement that this concerned France so much I could not discuss it without France.

I cannot see the need of the Soviet Delegation’s proposal now. It is in the British American and French zone, and they are making exactly the same decisions as the Soviet Government. On the other hand, I believe the Soviet Union should agree that over the interim period, Germany is subject to the Allied Control Commission.

Therefore, if the French Government sees its way to serve on the Allied Control Council, as in the Potsdam understanding, it should be done without prejudice during the discussion of the long term settlement of the Ruhr, and it should be brought about later. I could not agree to a different treatment of the zone we are responsible for. Yesterday, in the case of the waterways, I think it was declined.

I would say before I finish, that nobody realizes the importance to France of the question raised in the memorandum more than Great Britain. We have been involved in two wars in twenty-five years, and the cemeteries along that frontier are the greatest memorials of what the price was. We are very anxious to do all we can to associate ourselves with France in some way to prevent another act of aggression. On the other hand, it is very vital, and I think the countries should discuss it very fully.

When the further examination takes place and we are dealing with the settlement of Germany as a whole, then I think some control for it and final adjustments can be made, but I don’t think it can be made now.

If the French Delegation would agree that the exercise of the Allied Control, with the decisions made at Potsdam, could be operated, then it could be without prejudice to the final settlement of this territory.

The British Delegation regards the Ruhr and the whole of the Rhine area almost as vital a point of affecting our security as the French.

In the meantime, the argument of the Control Council operating without prejudice would, I think, assist reparations and other things to be dealt with, and would not prejudice the discussions and exchange of views.

Bidault I would like to thank Mr. Bevin for what he has said about France. It is in line with the experience of history. All of us know that the Ruhr has fostered the greatest war in history, and has done so before against us both.

In view of the fact that this problem is one which is of vital importance to this country, I cannot make any decisions lightly. I have to consider that Germany has been reduced on the eastern frontier, and have no objection to this being done. We are concerned with the protection of our own territory.

We do have to guard ourselves like the Soviet Union, and that is why it is not possible for us to accept that a central German administration should be able to give orders on the very threshold of our territory.

I realize of course that this is an immense problem. It is in fact the essential problem and perhaps, if I may speak frankly, that is why we put it at the end. I would like to settle the matter now, but I do realize that there are here a number of major problems on which my colleagues have not had time to think, and I will agree that the Conference should take the matter in hand and refer it to the meeting of Deputies, who would then, under the control and with the information supplied to them by their Governments, promote a settlement in this extremely serious matter, so that a report on the basis of the five Governments concerned could be presented to this Council of Foreign Ministers at its next session.

Bevin I have no objection that this matter be studied by the Deputies.

Byrnes I agree.

Molotov I don’t know what the Deputies will discuss. It is not a matter for them.

Bidault I agree of course that it should be settled at once.

Molotov But it is not a question for the Deputies. It will be very hard on them and we should have pity on them.

Bidault Mr. Chairman, perhaps I took a wrong view of what our Deputies are. I understood that they were men who met together to consider the various positions to be taken up and to receive the necessary instructions from our principals, and would be men behind each of whom there would be the respective minister. Men, therefore, who could not take any final position unless they were authorized by the minister who is responsible. In no circumstance do I regard this as a form of procedure, but only to save time and prepare the way for this very urgent problem.

Molotov I suggest that in view of the complexity of this question, it should be taken up through diplomatic channels at the present stage.

Bidault I would like to say this: All that matters to the French Government is that a decision should not be taken at once, although several months have elapsed since the capitulation. But the position is this: We find ourselves, who were not at Potsdam although we regret it—we find ourselves before this problem of Germany, which is one we have had to confront with for a thousand years, and we feel nothing should be done with the German problem without the participation of France, and something should be done with us, and quickly.

Regarding the diplomatic method of proceeding, if this should show the same speed as those who are accustomed to this method know, then I will say that I will probably have to read again the last sentence of the French memorandum.

May I say this: This is not merely for ourselves, but also for all of us. Unlike others around this table, we find ourselves confronted with decisions on which we cannot agree except where our views tally. Thus it is not strange that I suggest that the preliminary work should be done by men whose consideration of the matter would not be limited to their own views on the subject, but who would be representatives of the ministers of foreign affairs, and who would be more fortunate in having a little more time to devote to the settlement of this problem.

No one would be happier than the French Delegation if it were possible to settle this problem today, tomorrow or the day after tomorrow. My attendance at these meetings shows me that international problems are very difficult, and this one is so very serious that we should entrust this to men who have the responsibility of the several Governments here.

What will happen, or what may happen, is that we shall say nothing about it, and each Government will take whatever responsibility it sees fit within its own particular zone. That, gentlemen, should not happen when we are dealing with this great territory, the care of which victory has entrusted us with jointly.

If there are any other proposals to be made on this subject, I should be glad to consider them.

Byrnes I only wish to say that I appreciate of course the seriousness of this problem, particularly to the people of France. We will have to give careful and serious consideration to the question of what final disposition shall be made of the Rhineland and Westphalia. But it is clear that the future of that area cannot be settled here at this meeting.

Therefore, the question is as to what disposition we can make of it at this time. As far as I am concerned, I am entirely willing that the matter should be referred to the Deputies. I know that they cannot determine the final disposition of it, but they could give thought to it and could make a report to a future meeting which would be of service to the Foreign Ministers when that finally comes to the consideration of the problem.

If we agree that consideration should be given to the problem, I do not think it is very important whether it be done through the Deputies or through diplomatic channels. I prefer the Deputies because then it will be made the business of one group of men who are appointed by us, because they are familiar with the views of our respective foreign offices, and are charged with that duty and they may devise some plan for our future consideration which would be helpful. And I think we can all agree that it is to be understood that if representatives of France and the Allied Control Commission take any action with reference to matters pending, that action will be taken without prejudice that France has for the future disposition of this area.

Molotov Mr. Byrnes has suggested that this French memorandum be referred to the Deputies. The question then is whether Mr. Byrnes agrees that this memorandum is a basis.

Byrnes I must say now that there is a great difference, I find, between us in the words “as a basis.” In all good humor, I say that I learn there is a difference in Russian language and in English as to the words, “as a basis.”

Molotov Let us say the Latin word then.

Byrnes I realize you didn’t know the word and turned around and asked someone for it!

As the basis for discussion or consideration, I have no objection to it, but that does not mean I am committed at all to anything that is in the paper except as furnishing a memorandum upon which the Deputies could discuss it.

I am told that when you use the words, “as a basis” you understand it to mean “acceptance in principle.”

Molotov That is the same thing.

Byrnes And we don’t understand it that way. Therefore, in order to avoid misunderstanding, I have made that statement so that there will be no misunderstanding in the future.

Bidault I have prepared a text here which will remove, I think, any difficulty concerning this term, “as a basis for discussion.” It reads as follows: “The Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs decides that the questions raised by the memorandum of the French Delegation on matters concerning the control and administration of Germany and shall be the subject of the study and of the report by the Deputies. This report shall be discussed at the next session of the Council.”

Molotov My suggestion is as follows: I think we have no right to wave away such questions as these and to refer them to other men. We have given very little consideration to this question, and, therefore, before we pass it on to our Deputies, let us discuss it here more fully.

Byrnes If my friend wants to discuss it more, I would not object.

Bidault As I have pressed for a long time to have this matter put on the agenda, I am prepared to discuss it night and day or as long as you wish.

Molotov Very good.

Wang Can we discuss this tomorrow morning?

Bidault Very good.

Byrnes Yes, I have no objections.

Molotov I suggest that the morning be reserved for reparations.

Byrnes Yes, I agree.

Molotov And if we have no time to discuss this tomorrow, then the day after tomorrow.

Byrnes I like your first statement.

Molotov Provided we have time to get ready.

Byrnes I agree to discuss this at 3:00 o’clock tomorrow afternoon.

Molotov Provided we have time. If we have not, the day after tomorrow. I suggest that we reach agreement as to when we shall discuss this question. We shall set a special meeting. It is an important one.

Bidault I agree.

Molotov The question could not be simply referred to a commission of Deputies. We have to express our views on the French memorandum. That is very important. We are not yet aware of the opinions held by our other colleagues. They have not had time to state them. It is too short a time.

Byrnes Let us then recess until 4:00 o’clock tomorrow. We can think about it then.

Molotov We are grateful to M. Bidault for this, but everyone has not had a chance to express his views.

Byrnes In order that everybody may have time to think about it, I suggest that we recess until 4:00 o’clock tomorrow afternoon.

Molotov I have no objection if we are ready by that time.

Bevin I want to raise one point. I do think the press communiqué⁴⁹ tonight ought to say this matter is being discussed.

Byrnes I agree.

Molotov I agree.

Bidault I agree.

Wang There will be no meeting in the morning?

Bidault We will adjourn then until tomorrow at 4:00.

Molotov If we get ready tomorrow; if not, then the day after tomorrow.

The meeting adjourned at 7:25 p.m.

43. C.F.M.(45) 17, September 13, “Control and Administration of Germany”, p. 177.
44. For the agreement reached at the Berlin Conference regarding the political and economic principles to govern the treatment of Germany in the initial control period, see Part III of the Report of Tripartite Conference of Berlin, August 2, 1945, Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), vol. ii, pp. 1501–1505.
45. The British record of this meeting (not printed) quotes this portion of Bidault’s statement in the following manner: “The Berlin Conference had agreed that certain parts of German territory should be removed from the control of this central German authority. The French Government did not object a priori to this arrangement; but, if the cities of Breslau, Stettin and Koenigsberg were to be so removed, why should the cities of Mainz and Saarbrucken remain under German authority? The French Government had on many occasions expressed their views with regard to the future of the Rhineland and Westphalia. This area, which had been the spring-board for German aggression for many generations, should be finally withdrawn from the control of Germany. The Ruhr, with its coal and blast-furnaces, should no longer be a base for launching and sustaining aggression against western Europe: its resources should rather be used in support of a peaceful economy for western Europe. France did not claim the great productive capacity of the Ruhr for herself alone, but she did ask that this war potential should be removed from the control of the people from whose aggressions she had suffered so much in the past.” (CFM Files: Lot M–88: CFM London Minutes)
46. Apparently reference is to C.F.M. (45) 23, September 17, “Agenda for the Present Plenary Conference”, p. 223.
47. For text of the Proposal by the Soviet Delegation, dated July 30, 1945, and entitled “On Ruhr Industrial District”, see Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), vol. ii, p. 1000.
48. For American records of the Stalin-Bevin exchange regarding the Soviet proposal for internationalization of the Ruhr, made at the 11th Plenary Meeting of the Berlin Conference, July 31, 1945, see Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), vol. ii, pp. 521–522 and 535–536.
49. For text of the communiqué released to the press by the Council of Foreign Ministers on the evening of September 26, see Department of State Bulletin, October 14, 1945, p. 566.