Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: Political and Economic Matters, Volume II

740.00119 Council/9–1145

United States Delegation Minutes of the Eighteenth Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, London, September 1945, 11 a.m.

London, September 24, 1945, 11 a.m.

Mr. Wang in the chair

Wang said at the last meeting they had discussed two questions concerning Austria, one of which had been referred to the Deputies and he would now ask the Chairman of the Deputies meeting to report.

Molotov said he wished to make a statement which he proceeded to read:

[Here follows the Soviet statement subsequently circulated in the Council as a memorandum by the Soviet Delegation, C.F.M.(45) 49, September 24, “Allied Control Machinery in Japan”, printed on page 357.]

Byrnes said he supposed that Mr. Molotov’s request was to add this item to the agenda.

Molotov said this was correct. He considered this to be an urgent question. They could discuss it tonight if desired and not necessarily at the moment.

Byrnes said there were many matters he considered urgent referred to them by the Heads of State at Potsdam. They had been instructed to consider the question of inland waterways which had been put on the agenda the first days of their session but they had not yet been able to discuss it. There were many questions the U.S. Delegation deemed of great urgency but they had not thought of asking that they be put on the agenda because they thought the Council should first dispose of questions referred to them. However, he would be very glad to study the Soviet proposal and whenever they had disposed of matters referred to them by the Heads of State they could consider whether it should be placed on the agenda.

Molotov said he wished to explain why they had asked that this matter be placed on the agenda and why he had raised the question at this meeting of the Foreign Ministers. Already they had been meeting for several weeks and events had continued on their course and the Council was somewhat behind on developments. The surrender of Japan was a very important development to all of their countries. At present in Japan an Allied Commander-in-Chief⁸⁶ was acting without consulting anyone and for its part the Soviet Government could not assume responsibility for a situation which was fraught with the possibility of a new aggression by Japan. The Soviet Government felt it could not take responsibility for the policy being pursued. He wondered if the following corresponded with Allied policy in regard to Japan. Japanese munition dumps, clothing depots etc. were being guarded by Japanese. Japanese soldiers on being demobilized were being issued two suits of clothing and had arms which they carried off secretly to the mountains. American authorities connived with this and would not oppose it in any way. He had mentioned this because it showed that the policy of the Americans in Japan hardly agreed with the policy of other Governments.

He wanted to draw attention to another matter. Prior to the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers the Soviet Government had received a proposal from the U.K. Government in regard to the establishment of a Control Council in Japan.⁸⁷ They had received also a proposal from the American Government in regard to an Advisory Commission in Washington. Despite Soviet agreement this had not been done. It was not just a question of setting up a commission about Japan but of setting up a commission in Japan. The British proposal to set up a control commission in Japan deserved as much attention as the Soviet proposal to this end and Mr. Molotov asked that these proposals be discussed.

Byrnes said that the policy of the Supreme Commander in Japan was in unity with the policies of the Allies.⁸⁹ A copy had been sent to Marshal Stalin. It was directly contrary to the information sent to Mr. Molotov and he was sure that on investigation Mr. Molotov’s information would be found to be incorrect. That policy provided that the Japanese Air and Naval forces be disarmed and that the general staff and secret police organization be disbanded and that military and naval installations be surrendered. That policy would be carried out. Next to China the United States had suffered more than anyone else from Japanese aggression and the Commander-in-Chief could be relied upon to carry out that policy. There was much more he could say to make Mr. Molotov feel more assured in regard to the situation but he did not want to delay consideration of the questions that had been referred to them and he pointed out that this question was one that had not been referred to them. He had a copy of the statement⁹⁰ made by the President in regard to the instructions that had been issued to General MacArthur and he would be glad to give Mr. Molotov a copy. He suggested that they resume discussion of the agenda.

Bevin said he only wished to say that when the British Government had sent out their letter, this action had been no reflection on the Commander-in-Chief in whom they had complete confidence. The British had only thought the questions might come up which would require consultation. He agreed with Mr. Byrnes that they must continue to deal with their agenda before they took up new questions. He would also like to study instructions from the President of the United States which he had not seen. Obviously having sent out the letter which he did he could not object to the matter being discussed but he thought they should first clear up the items which had been adjourned.

Molotov said he agreed with Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Bevin to postpone the question until later and discuss it at their meeting that morning but his request was that they place on the agenda the Soviet and British documents in regard to the establishment of a control commission in Japan.

Wang said the Chinese would like to have more time to consider before he stated their views.

Bidault said that the Council of Foreign Ministers had full control of its agenda. He thought that the Council should follow its agenda but should not exclude anything from it which it desired to discuss. The French Delegation needed time to get instructions. They had no knowledge of the British letter referred to but they would welcome an opportunity to read it.

Bevin said his understanding was that before this matter was discussed again the agenda would be completed.

Molotov said he had no objection to Mr. Bevin’s suggestion but he asked that the question be included in the agenda.

Byrnes said he had stated that he objected to its being included in the agenda at this time. The Soviet paper had just been handed to him. He had stated several days ago that he had come here relying on the agenda which contained questions referred to them at Potsdam and that he was not in a position to discuss Far Eastern matters. He had no military advisor here and he would certainly not want to undertake to discuss the question until he had the necessary advice and information. He would be happy to have the views of his colleagues and to give serious consideration to them but in the absence of any members of his Government charged with these matters he could not at this time say whether or not he could agree to the question being placed on the agenda for action.

Molotov said the Soviet Delegation agreed that they should not discuss the question today. The Soviet Delegation proposed that they revert to the matter the next morning in order to decide whether they should place the matter on their agenda. If Mr. Byrnes was ready they could discuss it that afternoon.

Byrnes said that he had stated his position. He had no objection to the question being discussed. He would object to any understanding that it would be placed on the agenda after it was discussed. He simply wanted to make clear that he was not committing himself to this action.

Molotov asked what had they decided.

Wang said the decision was that they proceed and that Mr. Molotov’s proposal that the question as to whether the matter he had raised be placed on the agenda be discussed at a later meeting.

This was agreed to.

Supplies for Austria

Wang said he would ask the Chairman of the Deputies meeting to report on this matter.

Wellington Koo said the Deputies had met and discussed the question but that their examination had not been completed.⁹¹

Austrian Central Government

Wang said the second question was that of the Austrian central government.

Bevin said he had circulated a paper on this matter⁹² and that if it were adopted the matter could be considered as finished. He wished to add that in the paper the use of the word “sovereignty” was not intended to infringe on the power of the Control Council so long as the participating powers considered the Control Council necessary. He had received a telegram which indicated that the question could quickly be settled.

Byrnes said he agreed and he thought that if they could dispose of any questions they should do so.

Molotov said the Soviet Delegation was grateful to Mr. Bevin for his having communicated the decision adopted on September 20 by the Allied Council. The Soviet Delegation had not received its report on this nor the memorandum of Dr. Renner referred to. It was therefore difficult for him to discuss the matter now. He hoped to receive these reports today or tomorrow.

Bidault said the French Delegation was in the same situation but added that the British scheme seemed reasonable.

Byrnes said he wished to ask a question in regard to the British memorandum on food supplies.⁹³ He was advised by the U.S. Deputy that in the consideration of the British paper the first British proposal was deferred and the discussion of the second proposal had not proceeded very far. He wondered whether the British Delegation believed it practical to reach a conclusion in the Deputies’ meeting on the 7 proposals or whether the British Delegation could draft a directive to the Allied Control Council in Austria without the Council of Foreign Ministers having to consider the details.

Bevin said the difficulty was that Austria was a deficient area. Whatever was done in Austria could not solve this question. Yugoslavia had been in the habit of feeding Austria as well as countries of the Danubian Basin. Then there were other difficulties as to what was a standard number of calories. Looking at the report they had received they would see that there were differences in the Allied Council. He had been told that Austria was a pretty bad spot from the point of view of living conditions of the people. The British had taken some military supplies and made them available to deal with the situation for a short time. He did not think the sphere of action of the Allied Council was such that it could solve the question. It had been heard up to now that the Allied Council was not competent in this matter. No one wanted a lot of commissions. If it were agreed to extend the power of the Allied Council to deal with this question he thought the difficulty could be overcome. In this case four of the British proposals would be dropped. If this were agreed to in principle the Deputies could be directed to take up the matter.

Byrnes said he was advised that the Soviet representative in the Deputies had said that the Allied Control Commissions in Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary had information on this matter and that there was no need to set up a new commission. It seemed to Mr. Byrnes that as all were interested in the same object they might consider having the Council call on the Allied Control Commissions in Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary to furnish the information and they might ask the Yugoslav and Czechoslovak Governments to furnish information and then they would have all information centered in one body.

In this way they would avoid the appointment of a commission and get the information centered in the Control Council of Austria.

Molotov thought the creation of a new commission would not increase foodstuffs but would delay necessary decisions. He thought they should ask the Control Commission and the respective governments whether they had any surplus foodstuffs and he was therefore more inclined toward the proposal made by Mr. Byrnes. In regard to calories perhaps it was possible to receive information whether the necessary amounts had been secured by the American and British Governments for Greece. They should not be less interested in Greece which was an Allied country than in Austria.

Byrnes said he did not know anything in regard to calories in Greece. He assumed the British Delegation had more information than he. The difference in the situations was that they were responsible for the Austrian situation and he thought that if the Soviet Delegation agreed with the suggestion he had made the Deputies might consider something along that line.

Bevin said he had no objection to the Deputies trying their hand at a directive along these lines but he was not going to revert again to the question of Greece. He wished to make one important point, namely, Allied supplies were guaranteed to the end of October. UNRRA eventually would come in when it was ready but there would be a gap. The Allied Council itself could not decide how that gap was to be covered and supplies assured. He agreed to refer the matter to the Deputies to see what could be recommended.

Byrnes asked if it was agreed that the Deputies should study the question of a directive and what could be done to fill this gap.

This was agreed to.

International Waterways

Bevin said he had studied Mr. Molotov’s paper⁹⁴ and wished to make a statement. The British Delegation was concerned in this matter with the question of a temporary regime and that of a permanent regime. He had no objection to discussing the matter on the basis of a temporary regime in view of the disorganization which had been brought about by the war. The American proposal⁹⁵ provided for coordination of effort. The Soviet proposal really left things just as they were. If the matter were left under the Allied commander he did not see any reason for them to take any decision at all. To take the position on the Elbe, part of this river was in the British zone and part in the Soviet zone. The situation of the Rhine was even more complex. It seemed therefore that with respect to a temporary regime the American draft offered the best basis for real action. The Soviet proposal would leave Great Britain out of the picture on the Danube entirely whereas the Kiel Canal which was in the British zone would be put under the Allied Council. The quickest way to help their allies in Europe was to get waterways and other means of transportation going as quickly as possible. He must emphasize that Great Britain had enjoyed certain rights and that whatever was done temporarily must not prejudice those rights.

There was one grave point which he thought he should put before the Council. By adopting the Soviet proposal it would look almost as though in the temporary period they were establishing frontiers. He would like to propose that the American proposal with certain modifications be adopted. He therefore urged that they try to find a settlement on the question of a temporary regime on the basis of the American proposal without prejudice to their rights. With regard to the question of time mentioned in the Soviet proposals he would point out that Allied control might go on for a long time. Some other time should be fixed for ending the temporary regime. The time might be different for different parts, some of which might settle down earlier than others.

Byrnes said the U.S. Delegation had examined the Soviet proposals with interest in the hope that they might give some ray of light on how they might achieve the object which they had in mind. He wished to submit to his good friend of the Soviet Delegation that the difficulty of the Soviet proposals was that it would make possible different sets of regulations on different sections of the rivers and even on different sides of the same river and that it would allow military commanders to stop navigation at any time. A local commander might interfere with navigation in the name of his commander in chief and a navigator, when he started out on a trip, would never know what conditions he might find in the different zones. It was to avoid such conditions that the U.S. Delegation proposed an international commission including all interested powers. He had no objection to fixing a time limit and to provide for the participation of various governments. He would also agree that the temporary character of the arrangement would not prejudice any rights. The objective of the President of the United States in presenting the matter at Potsdam was to see if they could not cooperate in this matter and restore navigation on these important rivers. Because of their sincere belief that it would contribute to relief of those devastated countries the United States had submitted this paper on the first day of the Council meeting with the hope that his colleagues would agree to take it as a basis. They could examine any amendments that they wished seriously to put forward.

Molotov said the Soviet proposals covered only a short period, that of the occupation. In regard to the Balkan countries through which the greater part of the Danube flowed, the time was not far off when they would conclude peace treaties with those countries and pass from temporary to permanent regimes. In regard to Germany and the Rhine, Elbe, and Oder rivers, they could have a special discussion to fix the period. He did not think they should deal with the question of a permanent regime now as it was very complicated. If they undertook to examine the question of a permanent regime they would be confronted with problems such as that of the Danube and would need to invite Yugoslavia to be represented. It would be incorrect to examine this question without inviting the riparian states. What was the meaning of the Soviet Delegation? With regard to the Rhine and the Elbe the regime of these rivers would be determined by the respective commanders in chief who were in charge of troops adjacent to them. The area of the Rhine was not in the Soviet zone but came under the Control Council activities. Part of the Elbe was in the Soviet zone. He hoped that in case of necessity they could reach agreement. The Danube would temporarily remain under the control of the Soviet commander in chief but not fully as Allied representatives were stationed on parts of the river and would have a share in its control. They must bear in mind the fact that there were troops in the areas in question whose lines of communication must be secured by their commanders in chief. Otherwise there would be dual authority and much undesirable friction. He asked Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Bevin to consider the undesirability of friction and complications. That was why the Soviets confined themselves to the proposals they had put forward. The Kiel Canal was different as it connected two seas and the British would hardly want to take the whole responsibility for this Canal. The other powers had rights arising from the peculiar position of the Kiel Canal but it was natural that the British commander in chief would have supreme authority on this Canal.

Byrnes wanted to suggest that the American proposal was temporary. They could fix a time and say that the regime would cease to exist at the end of two years or say that it would cease unless after review it was decided not to end it. It provided for a conference of all interested states within three months showing that it was entirely different from a permanent regime. Article 8 provided that the commission maintain close contact with the Control Council. It was possible that the Control Council would name the representatives on these commissions. In article 2 that was specifically provided for in the occupied countries. He referred to conditions existing before the war and said that they did not want to take a backward step by forcing navigation to be subject to the regulations of individuals. This would mean different regulations on different sides and on different parts of the rivers. He suggested that they say the temporary regime would expire at the end of two years unless it were decided after review to extend it for a short or for a long period.

Molotov said that they had had no trouble on these rivers and he did not see why they should establish any new regime.

The meeting was adjourned.

86. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur.
87. For documentation on American participation in the occupation of Japan, see vol. vi , section under Japan entitled “Surrender of Japan …”.
89. For text of General MacArthur’s General Order No. 1 covering the details of the surrender of Japanese forces, see the Report of Government Section, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948 (Washington, Government Printing Office, n. d.), p. 442. For documentation regarding the preparation of this order, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. vi , section under Japan entitled “Postwar policy planning in regard to Japan and areas under Japanese control”. The text of this general order was transmitted by President Truman to Stalin in a message dated August 15, 1945.
90. Apparently reference is to the statement by President Truman regarding the authority of General MacArthur as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, released to the press on September 24, 1945; for the text, see Department of State Bulletin, September 30, 1945, p. 480. The text of the United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan was released to the press by the White House on September 22, 1945, ibid., September 23, 1945, p. 423.
91. The Deputies held their third meeting at Lancaster House, London, September 24, 1945, at 9:30 a.m., and conducted a discussion of the memorandum by the United Kingdom delegation (C.F.M.(45) 42, September 22, p. 323) regarding Austrian food supplies. The Deputies concluded their meeting by agreeing to report to the Council that they had not yet completed their examination of the question. (Council of Foreign Ministers Files: Lot M–88: CFM London Deputies Minutes)
92. Memorandum by the United Kingdom delegation, C.F.M.(45) 48, September 23, “Austrian Government”, p. 333.
93. C.F.M.(45) 42, September 22, “Austrian Food Supplies”, p. 323.
94. C.F.M.(45) 43, September 22, “Provisional Navigation Regime for European Inland Waterways”, p. 324.
95. C.F.M.(45)1, September 12, “Draft Agreement Establishing Emergency Regime for European Inland Waterways”, p. 132.