740.00119 Council/9–2345: Telegram
The British Prime Minister (Attlee) to President Truman
11. Following is repetition of message from the Prime Minister to. Marshal Stalin dated September 23rd.80
A difference of opinion arose yesterday over the composition of the Council of Foreign Ministers for the purpose of its work on the preparation of Peace Treaties. Discussion centred round the interpretation of the Berlin protocol.
Mr. Bevin maintained that the overriding provision was the decision to establish the Council composed of the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, U.S.S.R., China, France and the United States to-do the necessary preparatory work for the peace settlements (paragraphs A and A(1) of Part 1 of the Protocol of the Berlin Conference), and that the Council as a whole is thus responsible for discharging all the tasks remitted to it. He therefore maintained that the following decision reached by the Council on September 11th is correct:— [Page 332]
“It was agreed that all five members of the Council should have the right to attend all meetings and take part in all discussions, but that in matters concerning peace settlements members whose Governments had not been signatories to the relevant terms of surrender should not be entitled to vote.”
I also share this view. I have spoken to Mr. Eden81 who tells me that his understanding at the Potsdam Conference was that the Council was free to arrange its own procedure and that it was not bound within the limits of the exact terms of the Potsdam agreement.
M. Molotov considers that the decision of the Council on September 11th was a violation of the Potsdam agreement, that it should be rescinded and that in future the Council, for the work on the Peace Treaties, should be composed only of the Foreign Ministers of the States signatory to the armistices and that whilst the United States would be added in the case of Finland, China would be excluded altogether and France from all the Treaties except the Italian. This does not accord with my understanding of the spirit and intention of the decision arrived at in Potsdam.
The decision of the Council on September 11th was agreed to by the five Ministers present, including M. Molotov, and it accords with the understanding held in good faith by the United States and British Foreign Secretaries. It seems to me beyond question that the Council was entitled to adopt the above resolution (see paragraph A(4) (II) Part 1 of the Berlin protocol). Moreover, it cannot be held to depart in any way from the Potsdam decision as the restriction of vote means in effect that the Council will be composed for taking decisions as proposed. Since this question has been referred to me I should like to touch on a broader aspect of the matter. The decision of September 11th was adopted unanimously after discussion and I should view with grave misgiving the institution of a precedent for calling in question decisions so taken and seeking to reverse them and therefore rejecting the conclusion arrived at by the British Foreign Minister acting in faithful concert with the other Foreign Ministers. That I should fear would change altogether in an adverse sense the nature and indeed the value of the Council of Foreign Ministers and introduce an element of confusion into their proceedings. Indeed I doubt whether it would be possible to gain unanimous consent of the Council to a reversal of its earlier decision and any attempt to do so would clearly cause grave offence to France and China and be completely misunderstood here by the public and Parliament to whom we reported [Page 333] in good faith that the Council would act as a Council of five, a statement which was received with a sense of relief in this country. M. Molotov argues that under his proposals the work of the Council would be greatly accelerated. Even if this were so, which is by no means proved by the course of the discussions, it would certainly not counter-balance the damage to harmonious collaboration caused by the offence given. To my mind the success of the present Conference and indeed the whole future of the Council and confidence in a just peace is at stake. Therefore I earnestly hope that you will agree to authorise your Delegation to adhere to the decision taken on September 11th. After all it is peace we are endeavouring to establish, which is more important than procedure.
- Prime Minister Attlee’s immediately preceding telegram to the President, No. 10 of September 23, read as follows: “My immediately following telegram contains repetition of message to Marshal Stalin dated September 23rd regarding the difference of opinion over the composition of the Council of Foreign Ministers. I much hope that you find yourself in agreement with the views expressed in that message.” (740.00119 Council/9–2345)↩
- Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs until July 28, 1945.↩