Stockholm Legation Files
Memorandum by the Minister in Sioeden (Johnson)
On July 27, on my return from London, I called to see Mr. Stig Sahlin, Secretary General of the Swedish Foreign Office, and acquainted him with the substance of the draft instructions which I had received jointly from the United States and United Kingdom Governments as set forth in a document dated July 20, 1945, a copy of which I brought with me. Mr. Sahlin said that he realised the great importance of the suggestions and requests of the two Governments, that he would immediately acquaint the Prime Minister, and that our desire for utmost secrecy would be fully preserved. He said that Mr. Undén, who would assume office as Foreign Minister on August 1, would be informed and that in addition to him and the Prime Minister it would be necessary to advise Mr. Gjores, the Minister of Supply. Mr. Sahlin said that he was leaving Stockholm on August 4 for a holiday of two or three weeks; that during his absence his position would be occupied by Mr. Vilhelm Assarsson, the Deputy Secretary General; and that I would probably agree that it would be advisable to inform Mr. Assarsson as it would be through Mr. Assarsson that the matter would have to be treated until his return. I agreed.
I saw Mr. Assarsson on the evening of July 28 and mentioned the matter to him briefly. We did not discuss it in detail as he had already been informed of the nature of the approach by Mr. Sahlin.
[Page 38]On August 21 called to see Mr. Sahlin to inform him that I had an appointment with the new Foreign Minister, Mr. Undén, for the following day and to inquire if he could make any suggestions which might be helpful in bringing up our business with the Foreign Minister. Mr. Sahlin informed me that the Foreign Minister had been fully acquainted with which [what] I had told him at our previous meeting and that Mr. Undén had discussed the matter with the Prime Minister. Mr. Sahlin said with respect to the American and British desire for the Swedish Government to agree to effective control of its uranium bearing materials that there would be no difficulty on this point as under Swedish law effective and complete control can be attained through withholding of licenses for export. He expressed some misgivings that the Government would agree to committing itself to American and British control of the uranium supply for a long period of years and suggested also that Swedish scientists might find uses for the material for peaceful purposes.
On August 3 I called to see Mr. Undén and gave him orally in considerable detail the substance of the draft instructions of July 20. Mr. Undén did not make any commitment but said that there would be no difficulty on the point of control as the Swedish Government was prepared to put that into effect immediately. He said he would welcome the visit to Stockholm of the American experts who had been dealing with this question and that our proposals might be discussed by those experts and myself with Mr. Assarsson and Mr. Sahlin. He also suggested that the Swedish Government would probably add one or two other people to the talks. The only name he mentioned was that of Professor Siegbahn, the noted scientist who has specialised in experiments with uranium. On the same day I sent a telegram to Ambassador Winant suggesting that Col. Lansdale and Major Vance come to Stockholm at once.
Col. Lansdale and Major Vance arrived in Stockholm on August 5.
On August 7 the new British Minister, Mr. Jerram, accompanied by Mr. Labouchere, the Counsellor of the British Legation, called to advise me that he had been instructed by his Government to associate himself with me in the present undertaking. He also advised me that Mr. Sayers71 from the Cabinet Office in London had arrived in Stockholm to assist him (Mr. Sayers had worked on the matter in London with Col. Lansdale and Major Vance).
On August 3 the British Minister and I called on the Foreign Minister, Mr. Undén, at noon and left with him a draft memorandum prepared by Col. Lansdale and Major Vance with the collaboration of Mr. Sayers, setting forth in detail the American and British objectives. [Page 39] We made clear to Mr. Undén that this draft was designed to furnish him and his associates with a definite statement in writing of our proposals, which they could examine and study and that it was not offered as a suggested form of the agreement which we hoped would be concluded with his Government. Mr. Undén then read the draft agreement carefully and commented that it went “a long way”. He said that it would be given very careful study and that he would indicate to me as soon as possible when there might be a meeting of our experts with his own. From Mr. Undén’s remarks it was clear that the Swedish Government will put the uranium supplies in this country under strict control but he did not suggest that it is ready to assume a definite obligation to the American and British Governments in this connection. I urged upon him the importance which we attach to having Sweden’s agreement that none of this material will be exported without the prior consent of the American and British Governments; that the matter was of such vital importance that we could not feel satisfied by the institution of a system of control on the part of the Swedish Government which might at a later date, in the absence of any contrary obligation, be modified to permit of export. We danced warily around the subject of Russia but Mr. Undén and I had a perfect understanding on this matter. He suggested I was afraid that the Swedish Government might not be able later to resist pressure for granting at some time in the future export licenses for this material. I replied that I was not suggesting that, but that I was apprehensive lest the known existence of such material in Sweden might constitute a great temptation to exert extreme pres-development for important peacetime uses.
There appears little doubt that the political implications involved in agreeing to our requests are the considerations uppermost in the mind of Mr. Undén. In this respect he doubtless reflects the thinking of the Prime Minister and of others whom he has had to consult. Mr. Undén mentioned in passing that Swedish scientists might find uranium bearing material in this country could offer a large field for development for important peacetime uses.
It is difficult to assess at the present moment the strength of what may be Swedish opposition to committing themselves to the U.S. and Great Britain for a long period of years on this matter, or to assuming a concrete obligation to us with respect to institution of a monopoly on uranium bearing material. This point should become clearer at our next meeting after Mr. Undén and his collaborators have been able to examine our proposals in detail. I hope before this meeting with Mr. Undén takes place that Col. Lansdale and Major Vance and I, together with the British Minister and Mr. Sayers, may have an opportunity for an informal discussion with Mr. Assarsson. I have [Page 40] suggested this and Mr. Assarsson has agreed. Professor Siegbahn would probably be present at the meeting.
- James Sayers, member of the British group of atomic scientists transferred to work on the United States Manhattan District Project.↩