RSC Lot 60–D 224. Box 99: UNCIO Cons Five Min 9
Minutes of the Ninth Five-Power Informal Consultative Meeting on Proposed Amendments, Held at San Francisco, Saturday, May 26, 1945, 9:15 p.m.
[Here follows list of names of participants, including members of delegations of the United States (15); United Kingdom (4); Soviet Union (4); and China (4).]
Mr. Stettinius opened the meeting and stated that attempts to reach Monsieur Boncour and the members of his staff to tell them of this meeting had been unsuccessful. He noted that, since the topic of discussion was the statement on voting procedure by the Big Four, the presence of the French was not required, although of course they had been invited.
Mr. Stettinius stated that the purpose of the meeting was to consider the report of the Subcommittee of Five on its discussions on the voting problem. He called on Mr. Pasvolsky to outline what had taken place on this question in the meetings of the Subcommittee of Five.
Mr. Pasvolsky presented proposed texts which members of the Subcommittee had agreed should be laid before the heads of the delegations for their consideration (Statement by the Delegations of the Four Sponsoring Governments on Voting Procedure in the Security Council, May 26, 1945; Draft Replies to the Questions, May 26, 1945; copies attached).38 Mr. Pasvolsky stated that the proposed statement was the result of strenuous work in the Subcommittee and had come through a number of drafting revisions. Mr. Stettinius [Page 927] suggested that Mr. Pasvolsky explain the specific changes made in the draft at the afternoon meeting of the Subcommittee. Mr. Pasvolsky replied that only a few changes had been made following the consultations in the respective delegations.
Mr. Stettinius asked whether this statement represented the unanimous recommendation of the representatives of the Five Powers. Mr. Sobolev indicated that the statement was recommended by the representatives of the Four Powers only and that France was not associating herself with the statement. Mr. Stettinius said he would like to determine whether the Subcommittee was unanimous in recommending this statement to this meeting. Mr. Jebb replied in the affirmative, indicating that the statement was of course subject to the approval of the heads of the delegations.
Ambassador Gromyko said he had received a [the?] statement just that afternoon, and that his first impression of it was favorable. However, he felt that he should be frank and say that he would have to study it further.
Mr. Stettinius said that the statement appeared adequate to the United States Delegation. Dr. Soong said this was also the position of the Chinese Delegation.
Mr. Stettinius noted that when the consultations among the Four Powers were completed it would be important to submit the statement as promptly as possible to Committee III/1. Senator Connally suggested that the statement should go first to the Subcommittee. He thought it would form a basis for the discussion in the Subcommittee and might be useful in the preparation by the Subcommittee of answers to the questions on voting.
Mr. Stettinius asked whether the proposed statement would take the place of the answers to the questionnaire on the exercise of the veto in the Security Council (copy attached39). Senator Connally replied in the affirmative, indicating that the proposed statement would be submitted to the Subcommittee with the statement that it constituted our answer to the questionnaire.
Mr. Pasvolsky said that the Subcommittee had tried its hand at tentatively answering the questions included in the questionnaire, and that a great deal of difficulty had been encountered in the attempt to answer specific questions. He recommended that we present the proposed statement and stand on that. He felt that this statement was adequate, and that specific answers did not need to be given to the questions. Mr. Stettinius asked what countries would be offended if the course of action recommended by Mr. Pasvolsky was taken. Sir Alexander Cadogan questioned whether any countries [Page 928] would be offended, but he thought that there would be a request for elucidation of our position on the specific questions. Ambassador Gromyko asked whether the answers were not already included in the statement.
Sir Alexander Cadogan then referred to paragraph 3, page 2 of the proposed statement, reading the first sentence as follows: “Since the Council has the right by a procedural vote to decide its own rules of procedure, it follows that no individual member of the Council can alone prevent a consideration and discussion by the Council of a dispute or situation brought to its attention”. Sir Alexander pointed out that the reason given in this sentence that no one power could stop the Council from considering and discussing a dispute brought before it was that the Council had the right by a procedural vote to decide its own rules of procedure. He pointed out, however, that the question as to the character of the vote required in deciding whether a matter was procedural or not had been left open with no answer suggested to question 19. With this question left unanswered by the Committee, the whole matter was left up-in-the-air. He suggested that a state might bring a matter to the Council’s attention. The Council would then be faced with the question whether or not it would consider the matter. One power on the Council might say that this question was a procedural one, another might say that this was not a procedural one. A decision would have to be made. When put to the vote, if the rule applied that the great powers retained a veto in determining what constituted a procedural question, then it would not be true that no member of the Council could prevent consideration and discussion by the Council of a dispute. Sir Alexander stated that the proposals in paragraph 3 would be true only if the decision on whether matters were procedural or not was taken by a vote of 7 out of 11. He felt this was the crucial point, and that it was on this question of the right of the Council to consider and discuss disputes or situations, without a single state being able to prevent it, that the smaller states would continue to put up their fight.
Mr. Dulles remarked that what Sir Alexander had said with respect to paragraph 3 did not fully fit the case.
Sir Alexander replied that it would fit the case if a major power had a veto over what constituted a procedural matter. Mr. Dulles felt that Sir Alexander’s statement would not be true if it was agreed that the Security Council had a right to determine its rules of procedure by a procedural vote.
Mr. Pasvolsky said that the intention was to state clearly in the Charter that a decision with respect to discussion and consideration of a dispute by the Security Council under paragraph 3 would take place by a procedural vote under paragraph 2 of the voting formula.
[Page 929]Mr. Jebb indicated that, if this was stated clearly in the Charter, then the matter would be satisfactorily taken care of.
Mr. Pasvolsky said that it would have to be stated in the Charter. An indication would be given that the procedural vote governs this part of the Council’s procedure. The problem would still remain, however, of indicating a procedural vote for a number of other items. He indicated that there were approximately nine other functions of the Council derived from Chapter VI, Chapter VIII, and the Four-Power amendments on which a decision would have to be made as to the character of the vote. Some of these would presumably be by a procedural vote, others by a qualified vote. Those decisions to be taken by a procedural vote that we can decide upon at this time would be stated in the Charter and we would have to provide also in the Charter the method for deciding how other questions would be settled that would arise in the course of the life of the Organization.
Sir Alexander Cadogan stated that he thought it would be satisfactory if it vas perfectly clear from the Charter what vote was required in the decision to consider or discuss a dispute. He was sure the question would be asked whether paragraph 3 as now drafted meant that the decision to discuss and consider a dispute would be taken by a vote of seven out of eleven. If that was definitely stated then he would be satisfied.
Mr. Pasvolsky indicated that that is what we had said, and added that the point where the non-procedural vote begins was quite clearly established.
Sir Alexander Cadogan suggested that one way of handling the matter, which however would involve a change in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, would be to revise slightly the language of Chapter VIII, Section A, paragraph 1. That paragraph could; begin “The Security Council shall consider or discuss … and then nothing more need be said.
Mr. Sobolev that we could now foresee that some questions were clearly procedural and could give affirmative answers to them in response to the questionnaire, When we answer the question of the right of the Council to consider or discuss a dispute we would give a definite answer. We must, however, foresee certain questions, certain types of decisions, with respect to which we cannot now define the vote. Therefore, some provision must be made for the vote which the Council would take in deciding the preliminary question as to whether a matter required a procedural or a substantive vote. This was the problem of question 19, which in the document before the committee (Draft Replies to the Questions, May 26, 1945) was left blank. We should, he said, make a statement in answer to this question that left no doubt but that this question was one of substance [Page 930] and that it required a vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members.
Sir Alexander Cadogan commented that the first sentence of paragraph 3 of the statement of May 26, 1945, was then untrue. Mr. Sobolev indicated that the vote on consideration or discussion of a dispute could be decided now.
Sir Alexander Cadogan asked what would happen if a state said that this matter was not a procedural question. By its veto it could prevent consideration of a dispute from the very outset.
Mr. Pasvolsky asked Mr. Sobolev if he did not agree with him that it was perfectly clear the procedure that we were following. There would be one group of questions which would be settled by a procedural vote and these would be specified in the Charter. Also specified in the Charter would be those questions requiring a nonprocedural vote. In the third category would be the unforeseen questions. With respect to the question whether the Council could consider and discuss a dispute, our interpretation would be written into the Charter and we would not leave this matter to the future
Sir Alexander Cadogan said it was simply a matter of knowing what we were trying to say in paragraph 3. If we agreed that the discussion and consideration of a dispute should not be subject to the veto power, then we should not complicate the statement by reference to the right of the Council to “decide its own rules of procedure”. By changing three words in the Dumbarton Oaks text as he had suggested earlier the matter would be clear and all abstruse argument could be avoided.
Mr. Stettinius indicated that we do mean that discussion of a dispute is not subject to the veto power. This, he said, was clear from the discussions at Dumbarton Oaks and at Yalta. It was always held that any matter could be discussed by the Security Council. Sir Alexander Cadogan agreed that, while the permanent members retained the right of veto on enforcement action, it was understood that they could not shut the door on discussion.
Ambassador Gromyko said that there were two very important questions that remained to be answered. The first was whether the decision of the Council relating to the question of discussing such and such a matter brought to its attention by a state or group of states would be adopted by a vote of seven, including the five permanent members, or by a procedural vote. He said the Soviet Delegation was thinking over and studying this whole question. The second problem was whether the Council would act by a procedural vote or a substantive vote in deciding whether a question brought before it was of a procedural character. His answer to that, he said, was that the Soviet Delegation believed that such a decision should be made by a vote of seven, including the five permanent members.
[Page 931]Mr. Stettinius commented that it looked as though the Subcommittee of Five had after all not reached complete agreement.
Mr. Pasvolsky; indicated that as far as paragraph 3 of the statement went it Was clear that the question of the consideration and discussion of a dispute would be settled by a procedural vote. The real decisions of the Council started after discussion had begun, or took place during the discussion, and these decisions of course would require a qualified majority. Mr. Pasvolsky said he would like to see his understanding of the matter either confirmed or not.
Ambassador Halifax said that his mind was less versed in these matters than Sir Alexander’s. One point, however, was clear to him, that it would be difficult to make progress until the question was settled whether or not it was agreed that the. Security Council should have the right of considering or discussing a matter by an unqualified majority vote. He vindicated that this matter was apparently perfectly clear to Mr. Pasvolsky, but was not equally clear to his Soviet colleagues. Ambassador Halifax said he had riot been at Yalta but that his understating Was that the Security Council could not be debarred from considering a dispute. He thought that, if this group was divided on this question, we were going to be in for some trouble.
Ambassador Gromyko stated that at Dumbarton Oaks it had teen agreed that the Council could discuss all matters, but that the character of the vote had not been discussed. At Yalta, when the categories of procedural and qualified votes were established, no listing was prepared of matters requiring a procedural vote or requiring a qualified vote. The decision, he said, had been entirely of a general Character, that the Security Council could discuss all matters brought to its attention.
Mr. Stettinius asked whether it had not been agreed that no country would have a veto on discussion. Ambassador Gromyko replied that the question of a veto had not been discussed in this connection. Ambassador Halifax noted that if the Yalta formula said that no party had a right to block discussion of a dispute, it would seem to follow that one could not block the discussion of a dispute to which one was not a party. Mr. Stettinius agreed that that was the interpretation of the United States Delegation also.
Mr. Dulles states that he did not think the circumstances warranted such a serious and grave view of the situation. What we want, he said, flows from the text of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. There was no doubt about it, and in his view there was no need to alter either the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals or the Yalta agreement. He did not think it was necessary to go into all the abstruse questions Raised in this questionnaire and quoted the saying: “A fool can ask more questions than ten wise men can answer”. If all these questions were [Page 932] discussed, he said we would be here way beyond the date on which it was scheduled that the President would join us.
Mr. Dulles explained that the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals provide that a state may bring any dispute to the Council. The Council would have to listen to it. There would be no way of stopping discussion. Perhaps the wording raised the question unnecessarily, but, since any state had the right to bring a matter before the Council, there was no legal way in which the Council could be stopped from discussing it or hearing observations ion it. He thought the matter was a perfectly simple one and that the essential point was the right of states to present their views to the Council. After a dispute was talked over, of course, any decision to investigate it or to call upon the parties would require a qualified majority. Senator Vandenberg questioned whether any vote was needed on the question of discussing or considering any dispute. Mr. Stettinius commented that Mr. Dulles statement had been most clarifying.
Sir Alexander Cadogan said he did not mean to cause any trouble but he was sure that others would raise this matter. He said it seemed to have been assumed that a decision was necessary for discussion to take place in the Council. There was some danger that, unless this matter was clarified, we would be accused of gross deception. From his point of view there was no intellectual difficulty involved, only a practical one.
Mr. Jebb suggested that a slight alteration in Section A would really take care of the question. It could be provided that “The Security Council shall consider …”
Mr. Stettinius asked whether this would affect the Yalta formula and Mr. Jebb replied in the negative. Mr. Stassen indicated that the matter boiled down to the fact that a procedural vote was needed to get a question onto the Council’s agenda. Mr. Pasvolsky said that this was all that paragraph 3 in the statement provided. He thought that paragraph 3 was perfectly clear and meant simply that no action would be taken by a qualified vote to prevent discussion of a question brought before the Council. This, he said; would be indicated in the Charter. At the next step in the chain of events, when a decision was taken, the qualified vote would begin to operate. Mr. Pasvolsky urged that we air this matter out at the present time.
Sir Alexander Cadogan asked whether the Soviet Delegation accepted paragraph 3.
Ambassador Gromyko remarked that he did not understand what it meant. He would prefer personally and from a drafting point of view that the sentence begin with the words: “No individual member of the Council can alone prevent a consideration and discussion …” He said, however, he would have to refrain from taking any final position [Page 933] on this question, and would have to ask that time be given to him to study it.
Mr. Jebb commented that some fool had already put the question and that the joker question was number 19 (Memorandum on Questionnaire on Exercise of Veto in Security Council, UNCIO, May 22, 194542). That question was: “In case a decision has to be taken as to whether a certain point is a procedural matter, is that preliminary question to be considered in itself as a procedural matter or is the veto applicable to such preliminary question?” Mr. Jebb said that he had replied that the veto was not applicable, whereas the Soviet Government had said the veto was applicable.
Mr. Stettinius asked whether Ambassador Halifax would like to discuss this matter further with his Delegation. Ambassador Halifax replied that he would like a further opportunity to consider it and particularly the statement made by Mr. Dulles. He thought it might be possible to redraft paragraph 3. Mr. Stettinius felt that a decision must be reached by Monday and suggested that the group meet again the following afternoon. Ambassador Gromyko suggested that he might not have anything to say on this question before Tuesday. Ambassador Halifax suggested that the Subcommittee meet the following day and that this group provisionally agree to meet at 9:30 in the evening.
Ambassador Gromyko indicated that the question was now properly before the heads of the delegations. There had been no disagreement in the Subcommittee, but now it was up to this group to discuss the question thoroughly.
Ambassador Halifax stated that this group had had particular difficulty with paragraph 3 and that it might be well to see whether this paragraph could not be clarified by some redrafting. We could then discuss the work of the Subcommittee on this paragraph. Dr. Soong suggested a Monday morning meeting for this group with prior discussion in the Subcommittee. Mr. Stettinius said he would like to appeal to the members of the group to reach a decision on this question. Senator Connally agreed that it was of the highest importance to reach a decision or otherwise we could expect an uprising and a rebellion of the smaller states.
Senator Vandenberg urged that a meeting be held promptly to settle the question of the French amendment to paragraph 2, Section C, Chapter VIII. Mr. Stettinius agreed that this question should be brought up and that another meeting should be held promptly.
Ambassador Halifax suggested that Mr. Dulles had presented a most coherent argument, and that, if the Subcommittee could meet and clarify paragraph 3, it might be possible to reach agreement in [Page 934] this group. Senator Connally indicated that paragraph, 3 could be redrafted to make it perfectly clear that a state can present its case and be heard. Mr. Stassen agreed that paragraph 3 Could be greatly clarified. Mr. Pasvolsky suggested that the sentence might very well begin: “No individual member Of the Council can alone prevent …” He wondered whether we could not agree on this formula now.
Ambassador Gromyko replied that it would be difficult since he did not understand the meaning of the first lines in paragraph 3.
Ambassador Halifax indicated that he had been impressed by Mr. Dulles’ argument and he wondered whether paragraph 3 might not be revised to bring in the point made by Mr. Dulles. It might read: “Since any state may bring any dispute to the attention of the Security Council, it follows that no individual member can alone prevent a consideration and discussion by the Council of a dispute or situation brought to its attention.” He thought something along this line would serve our purpose.
Mr. Pasvolsky thought the meaning of paragraph 3 was clear as it stood. He questioned whether it was necessary to take the matter sip with the Subcommittee again and thought agreement could be reached upon a draft now.
Sir Alexander Cadogan suggested that the Subcommittee consider making the draft clearer. Mr. Pasvolsky commented that the simple statement could be made that: “It is our understanding of the voting formula that no individual state can prevent a matter from being brought before the Security Council and that no individual state can prevent consideration and discussion of that matter.”
Mr. Stettinius suggested that the Subcommittee could meet on this problem and that this group could reconvene during the afternoon or evening.
Mr. Sobolev asked what answer was going to be given to question 19. Sir Alexander Cadogan replied that this question could wait since it was not so urgent.
Mr. Pasvolsky thought that the two questions should be separated. On the one hand, we needed to clarify our minds as to the functions to be specified in the Charter that would require a procedural vote. There would still, however, be question 19 to which an answer would have to be given. Ambassador. Gromyko asked when an answer would be forthcoming to this question. Sir Alexander Cadogan did not think the two questions were bound together. Ambassador Gromyko asked when, it would be possible to reach agreement on question 19.
Mr. Pasvolsky replied that the American Delegation had not yet considered this problem and that he felt it was not as serious a question as it would be if it was not possible to specify in the Charter the questions requiring a procedural Vote. The Subcommittee had talked [Page 935] about this question but was not yet prepared to report on it. In the course of these discussions it had been pointed out that the League of Nations had never really answered this question. Mr. Pasvolsky suggested that it would be possible for the Subcommittee to meet at eleven o’clock the next day. Mr. Stettinius suggested that the heads of the delegations could then meet in the evening.
Mr. Stettinius asked whether any statement could be made to the press on this matter. Ambassador Gromyko replied that he wished to study the question of paragraph 3 but that he had already said he was ready to talk on question 19. Ambassador Halifax thought there would be a bad effect if the discussions were in any way made public property. Mr. Stettinius felt, however, that the delay was causing considerable confusion and that some statement would have to be made soon. Mr. Dunn commented that it was more important to have agreement on this question and that we would have to take the time: that was necessary to get agreement. He did not think we should set any particular time for a statement, but should see what the Subcommittee could accomplish and then decide the next step. Mr. Stettinius agreed that no time would be set, but he did feel that something should be said to the press over the weekend to avoid harmful speculation. Mr. Sobolev thought it was best to say nothing. Mr. Stettinius thought it was better to say something in order to avoid confusion. Ambassador Gromyko said that a statement could be made that we were discussing these questions, but he did not feel that anything should be said on the substance of the questions. Mr. Stettinius said it was essential that he be authorized to say something after this meeting.
Ambassador Halifax suggested that the Chairman should say that we had met and had a full discussion and that there was a large measure of agreement. Other points were still under discussion, and this discussion would be continued. The Ambassador said that, if this brief statement satisfied the press, the press was very easily satisfied.
Mr. Stettinius suggested that at the next meeting the members should be prepared to discuss the French treaty amendment.
The meeting was adjourned by the Chairman at 10:30 p.m.