Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: The United Nations, Volume I

RSC Lot 60–D 224. Box 96: U.S. Cr Min 55 (Exec)

Minutes of the Fifty-Fifth Meeting (Executive Session) of the United States Delegation, Held at San Francisco, Saturday, May 26, 1945, 2:30 p.m.

San Francisco, May 26, 1945, 2:30 p.m.

[Informal Notes]

[Here follows list of persons (27) present at meeting.]

The Secretary convened the meeting at 2:30 p.m. and called on Mr. Pasvolsky to present the statement prepared at the morning meeting of the Deputies of Five.

Voting Procedure

Mr. Pasvolsky presented to the Delegation the proposed statement of May 26, 1945.²¹ He read for the Delegation the various changes that had been made. The first one occurred in paragraph 1 where the words “the fact” were dropped out and “responsibility” was substituted for “responsibilities”. The second sentence was changed by dropping out the words “the provisions of” and by substituting “will have to make decisions” for “will be confronted with the need of making decisions”. This last substitution was also made in the third sentence. In the third line from the end of the paragraph as it stood originally, the words “involved in” were deleted and “under” was substituted. The original second paragraph of the first numbered section was added to the first paragraph with the result that there was only one paragraph in the section. The next to the last sentence in the section was revised to read: “The Security Council will also be charged with many other functions”.

The second section of the draft was revised as follows: The words “for example” were inserted at the beginning of the paragraph, and the words “and under several other provisions of the Charter” were dropped at the end of the sentence. Everything that followed the semi-colon at the top of page 2 was deleted and a new sentence: “It is likely that several other important decisions of the Council will also be governed by a procedural vote” was inserted.

The second sentence of the third paragraph was revised to read: “Nor can parties to such disputes be prevented by these means from being heard by the Council”. In paragraph 4, the words “with respect” were deleted from the last sentence. Mr. Pasvolsky reported that there had been strong objection from all the other members of the Committee to omitting paragraph 5, as had been suggested by Commander Stassen at the morning’s meeting of the Delegation. All he had been able to do was to cutout the last sentence, and to add in the next to the last sentence “or to call upon parties to a dispute to fulfill their obligations under the Charter”.

Paragraph 6 had been changed to give a more accurate statement; of the voting requirements under the League of Nations.

Paragraph 7 had been changed at the request of the Chinese, who had asked that the second sentence be revised to read: “Under this system, non-permanent members of the Security Council individually would have no ‘veto’”. The Chinese revision went on in the following sentence as follows: “As regards the permanent members, there is no question under the Yalta formula of investing them with a new right, namely, the right to veto, a right which the permanent members of the League Covenant always had”. Mr. Pasvolsky indicated that no substantial change was involved here.

Mr. Pasvolsky added that the addition in paragraph 8 had also been proposed by the Chinese and was merely a verbose expression of the original phraseology. The change, in paragraph 9 had also been the result of Chinese insistence. “Concurred” was substituted for “approved”, and “in respect of non-procedural decisions” had been inserted in the last sentence. The Chinese had also proposed that “at least two” be substituted for “some” in the last sentence.

Mr. Pasvolsky declared that he had attempted to delete paragraph 10. At first the British had agreed to this, but then had reversed their position. The French and the Chinese had indicated that they favored strengthening the paragraph. It would, Mr. Pasvolsky thought, be possible to accept a new wording which he thought met Commander Stassen’s objections raised during the morning meeting. The British and the Chinese, he declared, had accepted for their Delegations. The French were not parties to the statement. At the meeting Mr. Pasvolsky said he had made it clear that the declaration would not emerge from a meeting of the Deputies to the Heads of Delegations, but would have to be presented by a Big Five statement.

During the course of the meeting a question had arisen on the question of making specific answers to the questionnaire²² which had been prepared by the sub-Committee. The Secretary asked what was the source of this questionnaire. Mr. Pasvolsky replied that the demand for a questionnaire had arisen out of a badly considered remark of the Russian Delegation.²³ The Russians had reversed their position and were now willing to present only the broad statement under consideration. It had been, Mr. Pasvolsky thought, a device to postpone discussion of the voting formula. However, the British were unwilling to refuse to answer the questions in as much as they felt themselves to be committed to answering the questionnaire specifically. As a result, Mr. Pasvolsky declared, his committee had decided that the British should draft a summary of answers. Some of the questions, it had been decided, would not be answered and there would be presented, in each case, a reason for that decision. The others, however, should be answered in the British draft. The draft, he declared, would become a joint statement. The Committee was to meet again at four o’clock and at that time both the answers to the questionnaire and the Four-Power statement would be considered. Both papers would eventually go to the Heads of Delegations. That meeting, he declared, could not be held at six, o’clock as had been hoped, because of the fact that Lord Halifax was giving a reception. He urged that this meeting be held later in the evening because the British were anxious to clear up this question today. His Committee, he declared, could go no further. The matter was now up to the Heads of the Delegations.

The Secretary asked if there were any questions on the new draft statement. Commander Stassen asked if Mr. Pasvolsky could acquaint the Delegation with the background underlying the decision to drop the provision concerning the power of the Council to call a special session of the General Assembly. Mr. Pasvolsky replied that this question had not yet come up before the Conference. There were nine questions altogether, which had been postponed, and the Soviet Delegation wanted them all to be considered at one time. Mr. Pasvolsky voiced the opinion that if the recent decisions of Chapter VI of Section B were adhered to there would be no need for any further statement.

Representative Bloom asked if this statement were to be accepted what would be its power—would it, he wanted to know, bind the United States for all times? Secretary Stettinius replied that that was the case. Representative Bloom replied that this was merely a Four-Power statement. There could still be a majority vote over-riding them. What, he wanted to know, was the strength of this document? Mr. Pasvolsky replied that presumably the statement would be incorporated in the report of the Committee dealing with the question, and would serve to indicate the interpretation of the Committee. However, the Committee might decide to use the statement in some other way or to adopt some other procedure. However, the immediate objective of this Four-Power statement was to answer the questionnaire presented by the sub-Committee.

Representative Bloom adhered to the opinion that the document would only be binding on the Four Powers. The value of the decisions made here, he thought, lay in the fact that the Organization could decide against the Four Powers, despite the fact the United States was rendering a decision which was binding on us. Mr. Pasvolsky said that he imagined the consequences of this paper might be incorporated in the Charter as a definition of procedural matters.

Representative Bloom declared that he would like to analyze what the United States had to gain, and what it had to lose by this Statement, and that he would like to base his vote on this analysis. Mr. Pasvolsky declared that by this statement the four major powers were taking the position that the Yalta formula ought to be incorporated in the Charter of the proposed Organization. This paper explains our reasons for this decision. It was an attempt to answer the challenge made by some of the other Delegations. It was necessary in the paper to reveal the whole picture. The statement, he said, indicated that the Yalta formula implied certain assumptions which were taken into account here. The statement pointed out the three possible voting arrangements:

(1) Unanimity, as under the League of Nations,

(2) Majority vote, and

(3) A qualified majority which would safeguard the interest of the Big Powers which would have the primary responsibility for enforcing the peace.

As a matter of practical politics, the only alternative to the third alternative, embodied in the Yalta formula, would be alternative (1) a unanimity requirement. This, Mr. Pasvolsky declared, would stymie the Organization.

Representative Eaton asked whether Mr. Pasvolsky was satisfied to accept the Yalta formula, and Mr. Pasvolsky replied that he was “thoroughly satisfied”. Senator Vandenberg declared that he would accept Yalta only because he was forced to accept it.

The Chairman asked whether any of the advisers had any comments to make. Dr. Bowman said he thought that the issues had been clearly stated in the morning meeting, especially in Senator Connally’s remarks. It was important, he said, to distinguish the parliamentary question from the substantive issue. Dr. Bowman suggested that equal weight be given to the parliamentary situation. We would have to take some action in the matter. It was an insoluble problem, but the decision had been taken for us. We would soon be forced to take a position in the Committee. Dr. Bowman asked whether a better argument could be made for the other two alternatives. Senator Vandenberg replied that they were not the only alternatives. But Dr. Bowman observed that the door was locked in that regard. Mr. Pasvolsky agreed with Dr. Bowman that there were only three alternatives possible. One of the members of the Delegation, however, remarked that there were several other combinations.

Senator Vandenberg asked why it was necessary to make the unanimity rule applicable to the investigatory functions of the Security Council. Mr. Pasvolsky replied that this had been answered by the three other sponsoring nations and France. Senator Vandenberg remarked that we were not free to do as we wished.

Commander Stassen declared that he had given this question considerable study after this morning’s meeting, and he had prepared a memorandum entitled Suggested Changes to Yalta Voting Formula Interpretation, draft of May 26, 1945,²⁴ which he presented for distribution among the members of the Delegation. He was of the opinion that a great deal of progress had been made between yesterday and today. His greatest difficulty lay, Commander Stassen declared, in accepting those parts of the statement which were argumentative rather than interpretative. Commander Stassen indicated that he was largely satisfied with the changes that had been made since this morning. We had lost ground on some issues which remained unsettled, but he was of the opinion that it was best to leave these questions open if we were going to lose anyhow.

Commander Stassen regretted that paragraph 3 of the new draft was not as good as Under-Secretary Grew’s statement some time ago.²⁵ Mr. Pasvolsky thought that there was not very much difference, and declared that the change had been made on British insistence that the new wording was clearer. Mr. Pasvolsky asked whether Commander Stassen would accept “haying a hearing”.

Commander Stassen said he thought that paragraph 5 was an argument rather than an interpretation and he was unable to follow it very well. He also suggested a better wording for paragraph 8 as follows: “It must be assumed that neither the permanent members nor the non-permanent members will use their voting or veto power willfully or arbitrarily to obstruct the operation of the Council”.

The reason given for this proposed change appeared in Commander Stassen’s memorandum. It was that the goodwill of the great powers should be recognized as being essential to the future peace and security of the world, even if an Organization is established.

Commander Stassen also thought the first sentence of paragraph 9 was too sweeping, and suggested, in his memorandum, that the words “in so serious a matter as a dispute which threatens international peace and security” be added at the end of the first sentence. Mr. Pasvolsky commented that it might be worthwhile to have this new wording added, and Secretary Stettinius added that he thought it could be done.

Commander Stassen declared that he coijld.not agree with paragraph 10 and proposed that consideration should be given to the wording of his draft. Mr. Pasvolsky asked whether Commander Stassen would be satisfied by beginning the paragraph with the words “The sponsoring governments agree …”, and Commander Stassen indicated that he would but he also urged that the word “most” be removed.

Mr. Notter commented that the United States must be careful of making possible the accusation that the Big Powers were delivering an ultimatum to the rest of the participating governments. Mr. Pasvolsky, however, thought that this would be necessary. There seemed to be no other way out. However, he did think that the word “most” could be deleted from paragraph 10. Commander Stassen explained that he was opposed to any attempt to justify the provisions of the Yalta Agreement. He said it was possible for him to agree to something he did not believe in, but he would not say he did believe in it. Mr. Pasvolsky remarked that “agree” was a poor word because it implied that there had been disagreement. He wondered if Commander Stassen would accept instead “propose”, and Commander Stassen indicated that that was acceptable to him.

Mr. Armstrong wondered whether it would be best to attempt to complete the discussion in Mr. Pasvolsky’s Committee, or whether it should be taken up for consideration by the Big Five. To attempt the latter course, he said, might mean starting from the beginning. Mr. Armstrong was of the opinion that the United States had lost some overnight and might lose more if the question were reopened. He did not voice any opinion one way or the other and declared it was a matter of judgment.

Mr. Dulles remarked that Commander Stassen had suggested an important approach. The Yalta formula forced the Delegation to face two questions. One was the question of interpretation. The second was that of possible change in the existing agreement. The statement under consideration, he declared, had been precipitated by a request for interpretation. It did not ask for a justification of the substance of the Yalta proposal. This statement implied substantial agreement on the meaning of the Yalta formula. Apparently, however, there was disagreement on how the formula could be defended. Mr. Dulles wondered why an attempt should be made to present a joint defense. He was of the opinion that it was no matter for a joint defense, especially since some of the members of the Delegation did not believe in the Yalta formula. He suggested that the statement under consideration be confined to a presentation of the meaning of the Yalta formula as it was understood by the four powers. He thought that the defense of the formula could be made elsewhere, perhaps on the floor of the Conference. It would be difficult, he thought, to get agreement on the merits of the formula.

Commander Stassen declared that the statement was acceptable to him up to and including paragraph 4. After that point, however, it became difficult for him to accept the presentation. He declared that he wanted a statement on which he could agree sentence by sentence.

The Chairman asked how Mr. Dulles Would amend the statement. The latter declared that he could not present an amendment extemporaneously, but he thought that he would cut out about one-third of the document. He asked for Mr. Pasvolsky’s opinion on this and pointed out that it was only when an attempt was made to justify the Yalta Agreement that the Delegation would get into hot water. Mr. Pasvolsky declared that the British approach on this question was represented in a paper which had erroneously been attributed to the United States. The proposed statement, he declared, was justified by the position of the major powers, whereby it would be their responsibility to provide the forces to be used by the Organization, The other approach would be to insist that the Yalta formula represents the most that could be obtainable. But he did not think that the other members of the Big Five would accept a mere interpretation. It had been a victory, he thought, in view of the United States position to get the other powers to agree that they would not impose their will on the other delegations at the Conference. He pointed out that there was a special responsibility attaching to the United States because it was President Roosevelt who had originally proposed the Yalta formula.²⁷ He asked whether the Delegation was of the opinion that this government could refuse to present a justification for the Yalta Agreement in view of its position as the chief sponsor. Commander Stassen declared that any written defense must be big enough to leave room for all the different views. Mr. Pasvolsky agreed and pointed out that the statement would have been greatly different if it had been drafted by any one of the other Five Powers.

Mr. Rockefeller pointed put that the position of the small powers had been expressed to him by the Brazilian delegate, Señor Velloso, who had taken the position that President Roosevelt’s commitment would be supported by Brazil if the United States Delegation indicated its backing. Mr. Rockefeller was of the opinion that it was impossible to justify the application of a unanimity rule to procedures for peaceful settlement., and that the Four Powers would gain far more respect if they presented a completely honest statement. Secretary Stettinius asked whether the Latin Americans would unanimously support Yalta. Mr. Rockefeller replied that he thought he could get all the votes of the Latin American states…

Mr. Hackworth remarked that it was not an unusual procedure to adopt statements of protocol interpreting conventions. He did not, however, know whether it would be convincing merely to interpret the Yalta formula and stop at that. It was, he declared, a matter of approach, and he had no definite opinion on the matter.

Senator Connally, who was in the Chair during the Secretary’s absence to make a phone call, asked whether there was any further comment. Mr. Blaisdell said that he would like to raise a question at the appropriate time concerning the procedure to be adopted for dealing with this matter in the Committee and sub-Committee.

Senator Vandenberg observed that Mr. Rockefeller had touched the heart and core of the problem. He wondered why, in reciting the facts affecting the Delegation’s decision, there had been omitted the chief reason, the fact that the agreement had been made by the late President Roosevelt. It had been an agreement made by the Four Powers unanimously, and could be only changed unanimously. This was the major fact he declared, the controlling issue. In the last analysis, Senator Vandenberg’s answer to any question on the Yalta formula would be just that. He agreed with Mr. Rockefeller that an appeal to the Latin American countries on the basis of candor would be more effective than any other approach. Senator Connally pointed out, however, that this was to be a joint statement and that other interested parties might not be in agreement with this reasoning. Mr. Pasvolsky remarked that there was probably hot full agreement on this even in the Delegation and was of the opinion that the reason cited was not the only one.

At this point Secretary Stettinius returned and told the Delegation that he had a ray of sunshine to offer. He had just been informed in his phone call to Washington that the House of Representatives had passed the Trade Agreements Act.²⁸

Senator Vandenberg suggested, sentence be inserted in the statement along the lines of his last remarks. This statement, he said, should stress the commitment involved in the Four Power Agreement at Yalta.

Secretary Stettinius declared that he should like the Delegation to clarify one question. It had been suggested to him, he said, that one last appeal for the sake of the record be made either to Foreign Commissar Molotov or to Premier Stalin. He was of the opinion that the Delegation was committed to the existing formula. Furthermore, he remarked that any appeal to Moscow might well endanger the progress of the entire Conference.

At this point Mr. Pasvolsky remarked that he would like to meet the point raised by Senator Vandenberg and Commander Stassen by presenting a revised wording of paragraph 10. The new wording was: “For all these reasons, the four sponsoring governments agree to the Yalta formula and have presented it to the Conference as essential if an international program is to be created through which all peace-loving nations can most effectively discharge their common responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security.” This proposed draft was received very favorably by the Delegation. Commander Stassen asked whether Mr. Pasvolsky thought it would be possible to gain acceptance to further modification of the proposal for paragraph 9 and Mr. Pasvolsky replied in the affirmative.

The Secretary declared that he wanted an answer to his question concerning referral of the voting power provision to Moscow. Mr. Dulles, Mr. Pasvolsky and Senator Connally agreed that the matter should not be referred. Commander Stassen declared that if the voting procedure were the only question involved he would favor doing something strong. However under the existing circumstances he declared that he would leave it to the Secretary’s decision. The Secretary remarked that the President had left the entire matter in the hands of the Delegation. Senator Connally asked whether Secretary Stettinius thought that Stalin would not interpret the referral of the question to him as an attempt to evade the commitment undertaken at Yalta. Secretary Stettinius indicated that he had been informed by both Molotov and Ambassador Gromyko that they looked on the Yalta formula as a definite agreement on the part of our deceased President. Any attempt to alter the existing formula, he said, would be looked upon as a breach of faith. Mr. Pasvolsky agreed with this observation.

Senator Vandenberg remarked that a Venezuelan asked how long the Four Powers would be bound by the commitment made at Yalta. The Secretary replied that once the Organization is launched, all such commitments come to an end. Representative Eaton declared that he would vote for the agreement because of the fact that it had been arrived at in “solemn conclave and by solemn agreement”. Secretary Stettinius pointed out that the President had not rushed into this formula. It had been developed gradually from August until it was agreed upon in January. The President understood the question thoroughly and thought out the formula himself. The existing formula was a preferred American position in President Roosevelt’s mind. He had finally succeeded in convincing Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin. Churchill had almost agreed with the Russian desire for a complete veto. Roosevelt had won a great victory in winning over the British to the United States position. Mr. Dulles declared that Ambassador Gromyko had observed that the Yalta formula could not be touched. It was already a compromise on the part of the Russians and they would not compromise any further. Senator Connally declared that considerable work had been done on the question of voting in the Department of State and the Secretary remarked that Cordell Hull had discussed the matter with Senator Connally and other members of the Senate. Mr. Notter observed that agreement on this formula alone had made possible the present Conference. The Secretary agreed that the Conference could not have been held without this agreement and went on to say that there was nothing to be gained by submitting the question to a higher level. Representative Eaton remarked that it had already been on the highest level. Secretary Stettinius agreed and declared that he had been considering the question on the highest level for the past few days and reiterated that the President had left the matter in the hands of the Delegation. Senator Connally voiced the view that the Delegation could not recede on this matter except with national dishonor. The Secretary then formally moved the question and it was unanimously agreed that the question should not be presented on a higher level. General Fairchild agreed with what had been said. The formula now under discussion, he declared, had been recommended by the military authorities prior to the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations.

Senator Connally declared that the formula would work for the United States as well as for any other nation. The biggest difficulty faced during the fight for the League of Nations, he pointed out, was the fact that agnation could be committed, without its approval. This formula, he said, was not altogether against the interest of this country. It gave the United States some discretion in the decisions of the Organization. Mr. Johnson suggested that a statement incorporating the points made by the Secretary and General Fairchild could profitably be released to the press. … Mr. Stettinius asked Mr. Yost whether he could give an indication as to how the European countries would be expected to vote. Mr. Yost replied that he thought they would line up rather well and Mr. Blaisdell said that Norway, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia had indicated their support. Mr. Pasvolsky added that the Ukraine would undoubtedly favor the Yalta formula. The Secretary asked what the situation was with respect to Belgium and Holland and Mr. Dulles voiced the opinion that Belgium would vote with the Big Four.

Commander Stassen returned to the draft statement. He thought that the middle sentence of paragraph 4 should be deleted. If this were impossible he suggested that the word “usually” be inserted. He also favored deleting paragraph 5, and if this proved to be impossible, suggested the insertion of the words “may be” instead of “would be” in the third sentence. Secretary Stettinius asked whether Mr. Pasvolsky would go back to his Committee and suggest these changes and the latter replied that he thought any further consideration of paragraph 5 was closed. If it were brought up again he thought that the other powers would retreat along other lines. He was, however, willing to reopen paragraphs 9 and 10. Secretary Stettinius remarked that if Mr. Pasvolsky would put through the suggested change in paragraph 10 it would ease the situation. Mr. Pasvolsky declared that he thought he could get the changes in paragraphs 9 and 10 accepted if he were able to promise that the United States would accept the revised draft.

Mr. Dulles remarked that he had spoken with Prime Minister Fraser and that the latter had seemed discouraged because of the recent amendments which, he declared, relieved the Security Council of the obligation to take further steps after ordering an investigation. If this were true, Mr. Dulles said there would be good grounds for deleting paragraph 6 because of its lack of finality. Mr. Pasvolsky voiced the opinion that Mr. Fraser’s interpretation had been incorrect. The trouble was that the British and the Dominions had been introducing a number of changes without understanding the full implications.

Senator Connally asked if Commander Stassen would accept paragraph 5 if paragraphs 9 and 10 were amended. Commander Stassen reiterated that the word “usually” should be inserted in paragraph 4. Mr. Pasvolsky remarked that he thought that objection was covered by the alternative possibilities included in this sentence. Senator Vandenberg remarked that the chain may begin but does not always have to finish. Mr. Dulles remarked that the undertaking of an investigation might not always lead to force but that, on the other hand, it sometimes might. Commander Stassen reiterated his desire to have “may” substituted for “would” in paragraph 5. If paragraphs 9 and 10 were straightened out he declared he would leave it to Mr. Panofsky’s ability as a negotiator to work on paragraphs 4 and 5. Dean Gildersleeve indicated that she was very strongly in favor of Mr. Pasvolsky’s last version of paragraph 10.

French Amendments

General Fairchild Replied that the French had been trying to push through amendments to paragraphs 5, 6 and 9 of Chapter VIII, Section B.²⁹ These amendments would come up for discussion in Monday’s meeting of Committee III/3.³⁰ The military advisers of the Five Powers had wanted discussions with the idea of establishing a united position. It seemed important to get agreement on this issue because if the Five Powers were to argue in Committee about the Military Staff Committee it might make people wonder whether that body could function effectively. The United States had succeeded in knocking out one amendment to paragraph 9 and might possibly succeed in having the French withdraw the other amendment to that paragraphs However, the French were adamant in their insistence on amending paragraphs 5 and 6. He thought that the matter should be taken up in Mr. Pasvolsky’s Committee. The Secretary indicated that it seemed appropriate to him for Mr. Pasvolsky to take it up at a meeting of the Committee of Five. Mr. Pasvolsky asked whether it was necessary for him to have all the headaches and expressed the opinion that this would be very closely tied by the French to their other amendment. Mr. Pasvolsky suggested that Mr. Dulles hold a conversation with the French in order to attempt to have them withdraw their amendments.

Senator Connally asked whether the military representatives of the United States were opposed to these amendments. General Fairchild replied that the amendments seemed to be inadvisable politically. In the view of the Military, reference to the right of passage, for example, seemed undesirable because no one could tell what the future requirements might be. Secretary Stettinius said that it seemed to be wise to have Mr. Dulles take the question up with the French and the Delegation agreed with this course of action.

Expulsion and Question of Deputy Secretaries-General

Mr. Notter declared that he was faced with a similar problem with, respect to the two questions of expulsion and provision for five Deputy Secretaries-General. The problem he faced here arose out of the fact that the United States would probably be out-voted on both of these matters. The problem specifically was whether or not he should attempt to line up the necessary votes or whether the Delegation should accept the free decision of the Committee. Mr. Notter declared that on the question of the five Deputy Secretaries-General he would recommend accepting the vote as it might occur. He also favored this procedure for the expulsion provision, despite the fact that the Russians seemed to feel very strongly about it.

At this point Senator Vandenberg asked what the situation was on the French treaty question. Mr. Pasvolsky replied that this matter would be discussed at the meeting of the Big Five that evening. He had been told that if the matter were not settled by midnight the French would be in trouble with their government. Secretary Stettinius suggested that the meeting be held at nine o’clock and the Delegation agreed to this proposal.

Mr. Notter asked again what the Delegation’s view was on the two questions he had proposed a few minutes previously. He declared that the United States would be voted down the question of the five Deputy Secretaries-General. The small powers apparently did not want to give the Big Five this control over the Organization. Mr. Notter inquired whether he should try to line up the votes necessary to carry the proposal, or whether he should merely try to discharge this government’s obligation by voting for the measure. Mr. Pasvolsky remarked that the British appeared to be watering and seemed to want to duck out. Apparently they had changed their minds and favored selection of the Deputies by the Secretary General. Mr. Pasvolsky was not in complete agreement with this position because he thought the various bodies of the Organization should pass on appointments. Mr. Notter recommended that the United States vote for this provision, but go no further. The Secretary remarked that there was not much time to line up the necessary votes anyhow. The Delegation agreed that this course of action should be followed.

Mr. Notter replied that the same problem existed with respect to the expulsion provision and added that Ambassador Gromyko himself had appeared at the meeting recently.³¹ Mr. Pasvolsky declared that he thought the provision should be maintained. It was, he declared, in the original Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. Representative Eaton observed that in that case only a one-third vote was necessary. Mr. Notter, however, declared that this was hard to get because of the opposition of the Latin American countries. Secretary Stettinius suggested that Mr. Notter present a note to Mr. Rockefeller, outlining the existing alignment of powers on this question and stated that he assumed the Delegation would want everything possible attempted in order to keep the provision in the document.

Scope of General Assembly

Senator Vandenberg declared that the Australians had introduced a proposal that would empower the General Assembly to inquire into any “sphere of international relations”.³² It had been brought up as a matter of principle in the Committee and an affirmative answer had been impossible to avoid. In the drafting Committee the Australian representative had demanded a change of phraseology supporting this principle and had threatened to take the matter to the floor of a plenary session if it were not included. Senator Vandenberg declared that the Committee was stymied. Mr. Pasvolsky indicated that he thought the existing phraseology should be maintained. Mr. Gerig remarked that the other states considered the existing wording to constitute a limitation on the powers of the Assembly. The question was, Mr. Gerig thought, whether the United States should allow itself to go down to defeat with the Russians or not. Mr. Pasvolsky thought that the question could be taken through other channels if the need arose. Mr. Pasvolsky explained that it was Dr. Evatt’s intention to inject the World Organization into the internal affairs of the member states. This, he declared, was not conjecture, but had been told to him face to face by representatives of Australia and New Zealand on several occasions. The full employment argument, he said, was based on the theory that if a nation did not maintain full employment it would upset world peace. Mr. Pasvolsky indicated that he thought this was the most dangerous theory with which the United States had ever been diplomatically confronted. This Delegation should not be stampeded into accepting a vague phraseology in this connection. This was especially important, in view of the orientation of the Australian and New Zealand Delegations.

Mr. Dulles agreed with Mr. Pasvolsky and declared that a number of nations seemed to think that the United States had been the cause of the war because of its failure to maintain a sound economic structure. Mr. Fraser had indicated that the greatest thing accomplished in the Conference was the pledge of each nation to undertake to guarantee full employment. Mr. Pasvolsky remarked that the next step would probably be to have the Assembly pass a convention obligating each nation to maintain full employment and giving the Assembly full power to investigate. Mr. Pasvolsky urged that the United States stand against the suggested change and expressed the opinion that it would be possible to organize the vote.

Mr. Dulles remarked that this was much the same situation that had arisen with respect to the French treaty situation which had arisen at the Delegation’s meeting that morning. If once the door were opened to a change, no matter what it was, in the existing wording, it was possible for “everything to come in”. Senator Vandenberg asked how the Delegation would instruct him. He would be out-voted he declared, and would probably muster only five votes unless somebody “runs the convention”. Mr. Pasvolsky remarked that the Delegation had not used that sort of tactics enough. Secretary Stettinius indicated that as soon as the voting arrangements were satisfactorily settled there would be less difficulty in future deliberations. Dean Gildersleeve said that she was in agreement with the sentiment expressed thus far, but wondered what action should be taken if the United States were to be voted down. Commander Stassen suggested that the United States representative reserve the position of this Delegation in order that the matter might be taken up in the Executive Committee.

Statement to the Press

. . . . . . .

Trusteeship

Commander Stassen reported to the Committee on the Trusteeship question. Committee II/4 had taken considerable action³³ but had not been able to settle the questions of independence, composition of the Trusteeship Council, and powers of inspection, visits and petition because no word had been received from Moscow on these matters. The Five Powers had agreed on these questions in their discussions³⁴ but no confirmation had been received from the Russians and the Committee had been waiting since Tuesday. The Russians had proposed considering the other matters in Committee and reserving the question of independence until confirmation arrived, but Commander Stassen had opposed this move.

Commander Stassen declared that the Iraquis had pressed for some reference to Article 22, paragraph 4 of the League Covenant³⁵ and had given as an excuse the need to satisfy the Iraquis population. Paragraph 4 of Article 22 dealt with the A Mandates. The Egyptian representative had also expressed a desire to incorporate something to which he could point in the Chapter on Trusteeship.³⁶ Commander Stassen wanted to know whether the Delegation favored working out language that would suit these people. The Secretary inquired whether there would be any harm in taking such an action and Commander Stassen replied that the question of Palestine was involved. Secretary Stettinius said that the Palestine question was dangerous. A combination of Palestine and the Arab League was dynamite ready to explode. Commander Stassen suggested that Secretary Stettinius talk the situation over with Mr. Ailing and work out a policy.

There had been some Australian amendments³⁷ proposing an obligation to report on the part of states with responsibility for the administration of dependent territories but these did not affect the United States. Commander Stassen declared that once the Russians came through that the Committee would finish its work in one meeting.

French Treaty

Senator Vandenberg asked what the situation was with respect to the French treaty question and Mr. Pasvolsky replied that conversations were in progress. Commander Stassen advised that no change be allowed in this provision and The Secretary remarked that we might have to vote the French down.

The meeting was adjourned at 4:20 p.m.

21. Not printed.
22. Draft replies to questions, not printed (US Doc. Und. 44); see Doc. 855, III/1/B/2(a), June 8, UNCIO Documents, vol. 11, p. 699.
23. Doc. 459, III/1/22, May 21, ibid., p. 332.
24. Memorandum not printed.
25. Department of State Bulletin, March 25, 1945, p. 479.
27. Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp. 58 and 661.
28. For statement by the Acting Secretary of State on the vote on the trade agreements program in the House of Representatives, see Department of State Bulletin, May 27, 1945, p. 955.
29. Doc. 2, G/7(o), March 21, UNCIO Documents, vol. 3, pp. 386–387.
30. Doc. 649, III/3/34, May 28, ibid., vol. 12, p. 391.
31. Ambassador Gromyko accompanied the Soviet representative (Zarapkin) to the thirteenth meeting of Committee 1/2, May 25, 8:45 p.m. (Doc. 604, 1/2/42, May 26, UNCIO Documents, vol. 7, p. 113).
32. Doc. 2, G/14(1), Mat 5, ibid., vol. 3, p. 544; Doc. 176, 11/2/7(1), May 9, ibid., vol. 9, p. 265. Memorandum entitled “The American Position of the light of the General Assembly to Discuss Any Matter Within the Sphere of International Relations” (U.S. Gen. 267), not printed.
33. For text of working paper as approved and amended in full Committee through May 24, see WD 33, II/4/A/1, May 25, UNCIO Documents, vol. 10, p. 701.
34. Record of Five-Power meetings on trusteeship not printed; at the meeting of May 23, the Chairman, Commander Stassen, pointed out that Mr. Sobolev was not in position to make a definite agreement on any part of the Exploratory Working Paper on Trusteeship, but that it was apparent that the group was on the verge of agreement on all parts of the document (PCT Minutes 6).

35. Article 22, paragraph 4, reads as follows: “4. Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wished of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.

    For text of Iraqui proposal, see Doc. 877, II/4/35, June 9, UNCIO Documents, vol. 10, p. 515.

36. Doc. 552, II/4/23, May 24, and Doc. 580, II/4/24, May 26, ibid., pp. 477 and 486, respectively.
37. Doc. 2, G/14(1), May 5, UNCIO Documents, vol. 3, p. 548; Doc. 575, 13/4/12 (a), May 25, ibid., vol. 10, p. 695.