Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: The United Nations, Volume I

RSC Lot 60–D 224, Box 96: US Cr Min 56

Minutes of the Fifty-Sixth Meeting of the United States Delegation, Held at San Francisco, Monday, May 28, 1945, 9 a.m.

San Francisco, May 28, 1945, 9 a.m.

[Informal Notes]

[Here follows list of names of persons. (36) present at meeting.]

The Secretary convened the meeting at 9:00 a.m.

Secretary’s Radio Statement⁴⁴

. . . . . . .

Voting Procedure in Security Council

The Secretary asked Mr. Pasvolsky to report to the Delegation on the progress made in the Committee of Deputies to the Heads of Delegations. Mr. Pasvolsky presented three documents for the consideration of the Delegation. They were:

1. The May 27, 1945 draft of a new paragraph 3 to be incorporated in the Four-Power statement.

2. The May 27[26?], 1945 draft of a new section to be added to the statement setting forth the view of the sponsoring governments that the Charter itself should “contain an indication of the application of the voting procedures to the various functions of the Council specified in the Charter.”

3. A sample of the type of clarification which should be included in the Charter itself entitled To Insert Somewhere In The Charter Proper Language To Express The Following Idea.

Mr. Pasvolsky turned first to the new paragraph 3, which reads as follows:

“3. It is clear from paragraph 2 of Section A of Chapter VIII that any state may bring to the attention of the Security Council any dispute, or any situation, which may lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute. The Council can discuss and consider any such dispute or situation and, in deciding whether or not to discuss a particular dispute or situation, the Council should obviously operate by a procedural vote which does not require unanimity of the permanent members. It follows that no individual member of the Council can prevent a consideration and discussion by the Council of such dispute or situation. Nor can parties to such a dispute be prevented in this manner from receiving a hearing before the Council. Likewise, the requirement for unanimity of the permanent members cannot prevent any member of the Council from reminding the members of the Organization of their general, obligations assumed under the Charter as; regards peaceful settlement of international disputes.”

Mr. Pasvolsky was of the opinion that the new, paragraph was a great deal clearer than the original which had caused the British: difficulty as to exactly which matters were to be considered by a procedural vote. The Secretary asked whether Mr. Pasvolsky would present to the Delegation a picture as to exactly what the entire situation was at that time. Mr. Pasvolsky declared that at the meeting of his Committee on the previous day there had been no doubt as to the interpretation that should be given to the Yalta formula. There had been no vagueness in the meeting on Sunday. The entire draft had been approved in principle although final word had not arrived from the Chairman of the Russian Delegation which was still studying the matter. However, the Russian representative on Mr. Pasvolsky’s Committee, Mr. Sobolev, had left no doubt in the minds of the other members as to his support for the draft.

. . . . . . .

Mr. Pasvolsky reported that the Committee had discussed a second point in its meeting on Sunday, namely the practical effect of the declaration under consideration. There had been raised again the problem of whether or not the effects of this statement should be embodied in the Charter itself. The decision of the Committee had been that the implications of the statement should be incorporated in the Charter. The second paper that Mr. Pasvolsky had presented to the Delegation was the result of this decision. This paper was intended to constitute a second part of the Four-Power statement and read as follows:

“In the light of the considerations set forth in Part I of this statement, the answers to the questions submitted by the Subcommittee should be clear, with the exception of Question 19. The answer to that question is as follows:

1. In the opinion of the Delegations of sponsoring governments, the Charter itself should contain an indication of the application of the voting procedures to the various functions of the Council specified in the Charter.

2. In this case, it will be unlikely that there will arise in the future any questions of great importance on which a decision will have to be made as to whether a procedural vote would apply. Should however, such a question arise, it must obviously be settled by a vote of seven members of the Security Council, including the concurring votes of the permanent members.”

Part II of the statement was intended to supply the answers to some of the questions which were not covered in the broad statement interpretation. Among these was question 19 of the questionnaire: “In case a decision has to be taken as to whether a certain point is a procedural matter, is that preliminary question to be considered in itself a procedural matter, or is the veto applicable to such preliminary questions?” The answer to this question, Mr. Pasvolsky said, is provided in Part II.

Mr. Pasvolsky turned next to the third paper he had placed before the Delegation and reported that this was a British suggestion for insertion in the Charter. It read as follows:

“If a dispute or situation is brought before the Security Council under the terms of paragraph 2 of Section A of Chapter VIII, the question whether the Security Council shall consider and discuss that dispute or situation shall be settled by a procedural vote.”

The Secretary asked whether the Delegation would agree to accept these three papers. Senator Connally declared that he had one question to ask concerning the new paragraph 3 of the draft Four-Power statement. He wondered what was the significance of the second sentence concerning the necessity to operate by procedural vote when the Council intended to “discuss and consider any such dispute or situation.” Senator Connally was of the opinion that this was an automatic procedure and could not understand why there was a provision in this sentence concerning the Council’s not discussing a particular dispute or situation. Mr. Pasvolsky replied that the point of that sentence was that the Security Council could not be prevented from taking this action by the veto of any one power. Such action could, of course, be blocked by the votes of any six powers. He further declared that any action which was mandatory upon the Council could effectively be stymied by the intrusion of the time element. The decision referred to in the sentence under consideration was whether or not to discuss a particular dispute at any one time. Senator Connally expressed the opinion that too much emphasis on procedural matters was confusing anyhow. Senator Vandenberg agreed and declared that he could not see the difference between this paragraph and the third document submitted to the Delegation. Mr. Pasvolsky explained that the latter paper was a sample of language actually to be included in the Charter.

Commander Stassen declared that he thought an excellent solution had been reached. The Four-Power statement provided a clear interpretation of the formula, and he was in agreement with the decision to outline the effects of the statement in the Charter itself. Senator Connally said that it was also his impression that the Five Powers had agreed to this in their meeting on the previous day. Mr. Pasvolsky replied that they had agreed to recommend this to the Heads of their Delegations and that that was what he was doing. The Secretary declared that he was greatly impressed with the work that had been accomplished. Mr. Dulles observed, however, that, the words: “should be clear” in the first sentence of the draft Part II of the Four-Power statement should be changed to “are clear.”

Mr. Kane asked how this interpretation would affect the voting arrangements under paragraph 8 of the Chapter on Trusteeship. This paragraph provided for the unanimous vote of the permanent members of the Security Council on certain issues concerning trusteeship. He asked how these two parts of the Charter, would tie together. The Secretary replied that the voting procedure on trusteeship was spelled out separately and was really an independent and separate question. Mr. Kane declared that despite the unique characteristics this was, nevertheless, a voting matter. Senator Connally stated that it was his opinion that the unanimity rule would apply in the Trusteeship Chapter and Mr. Pasvolsky replied that there could be no question on that. Secretary Stettinius was in agreement.

Senator Connally declared that he expected to run into difficulty in future negotiations because Ambassador Gromyko wanted an answer to Question 19 before his Delegation would agree on any interpretation of the entire Yalta formula. Mr. Pasvolsky remarked that this matter would probably require reference to Moscow. The Secretary inquired if the matter had not already been referred to Premier Stalin. Mr. Pasvolsky said that he was not sure of that and observed that the definition of procedural matters had not yet been referred to Moscow. Question 19, he said, would be easy to answer once procedural matters had been properly defined. There were other questions which had not been answered, among them the procedure on electing a Secretary General and choosing the Judges of the Permanent Court. The whole matter, he thought, would take several more days before a final solution could be achieved.

Mr. Pasvolsky reported that the Chinese had indicated a desire to delete the final sentence of the new paragraph 3. Senator Vandenberg remarked that it was “a funny sentence.” The Secretary asked Mr. Pasvolsky what his recommendation was, and the latter declared that he had wanted to have adopted some wording of the order of “cannot prevent the Council from reminding”; the other powers, however, had insisted on the insertion of the words “any member of” which was not so acceptable to this Government. The Secretary asked what Mr. Pasvolsky would recommend, and he replied that he favored dropping the entire sentence. The Delegation agreed unanimously that the last sentence should be omitted.

Senator Connally expressed the hope that the action taken by the Delegation would not in any way weaken the attitude that had been taken with respect to the various phases of discussion up to the investigatory phase.

Mr. Hackworth raised an objection to the insertion proposed by the British. Including this memorandum by itself, he thought, would serve to weaken the entire memorandum designed to answer the questions prepared by the Subcommittee of the Committee on Security. Mr. Hackworth asserted that he would favor leaving the memorandum as it was without any effort to insert this paragraph in the Charter—unless further insertions were made. Mr. Pasvolsky explained that this paragraph was only a sample of the insertions that would have to be made in order to carry out in the Charter the implications of the Four-Power statement. The Charter would finally include, he said, a statement of which matters were procedural and would also outline those on which decisions would be taken by a qualified majority. He said that the importance of having a specific delineation of procedural matters in the Charter itself lay not so much in the clarification of the unanimity rule as in the fact that such a distinction would eliminate the possibility of the Organization being stymied. If there were specific language on procedural matters in the Charter, the Big Five would be unable to force non-procedural matters into the sphere of procedural matters.

Commander Stassen asked if he were right in his understanding that the idea was so far as possible to spell out procedural matters now. In the future a concurring vote by the permanent members would be necessary to transfer any matter from a procedural to a non-procedural vote, or vice-versa.

The Secretary asked the Delegation to take a position on the acceptance of the draft as presented by Mr. Pasvolsky. Senator Connally declared that he accepted the paper To Insert Somewhere In The Charter Language To Express The Following Idea as being a sample of the type of insertion which would be made to fulfill the implications of the Four-Power statement. Mr. Pasvolsky added that this single paragraph grew out of the decision taken by the Big Five in the draft Part II of the Four-Power statement.

Mr. Pasvolsky asked whether the rearrangement of the paragraphs of Chapter VIII, Section A, proposed by Mr. Dunn at an earlier meeting, was precluded by the recent decisions. Mr. Pasvolsky said that nothing was precluded by these new papers and that they involved merely a specification of procedural matters. Mr. Rockefeller asked whether there would be any change from the position taken by Mr. Dulles that paragraphs 2 and 3 should be considered procedural matters. Mr. Pasvolsky replied that this would not deny Mr. Dulles’ suggestion. Mr. Dunn clarified the situation by declaring that in his opinion the power of the Security Council outlined in paragraph 3 to “call upon the parties” would not have any great significance. His rearrangement would present a clear picture of full discussion involving only voluntary obligation to settle disputes. Mr. Rockefeller asked whether the recent decisions precluded settlement by the member states themselves, and Mr. Dunn replied that such a solution was not precluded.

Mr. Rockefeller objected to the use of the word “obviously” in paragraph 2 of the draft Part II of the Four-Power statement. He declared that it would not be so clear to the smaller nations as it would be to the Big Five and therefore would have the connotation of the imposition of the views of the Big Powers. The Delegation agreed to delete the word “obviously.”

The Delegation agreed unanimously to accept the entire solution of the voting problems as had; been presented by Mr. Pasvolsky. Mr. Dunn, however, wanted to point out that, although there was agreement in spirit on the part of the USSR, the actual wording of the draft statement and of the new portions of the Charter would probably have to go to Moscow for approval.

Commander Stassen asked if he was right in understanding that it would be impossible to get Russian approval of language modifications without instructions coming from Moscow, and Mr. Dunn replied that this interpretation was correct. Mr. Hackworth urged that it be borne in mind that in attempting to incorporate language into the Charter there would be necessary a great deal of negotiation on the exact phraseology. He thought that for this reason the Four-Power statement should be attached to the Charter, more or less as a protocol.Mr. Pasvolsky declared that the British would not accept this solution

French Amendment on Neutrality

“The Secretary announced that Mr. Pasvolsky had a report to make on other problems soon to arise, but he expressed the hope that it would not be necessary to consider them at this time. Mr. Pasvolsky, however, insisted that he had several important matters to discuss, the first being, the proposed French amendment concerning neutrality.⁴⁵ The French, he declared, were thinking about proposing an amendment to the effect that neutrality was inconsistent with the responsibilities incurred in the Charter. However, in conversation with the French, he had convinced them that the proposed amendment was not a very good idea. The French had countered with a proposal that they should introduce the amendment in the Committee and should be supported by one of the other big powers, whereupon the French would “gracefully, withdraw” their amendment. The representative of the other member of the Big Five should agree with the principle underlying the French amendment but should express the view that the situation was adequately covered in the existing provisions in the Charter, and that the French amendment was worded too narrowly.

Mr. Pasvolsky thought that this was a good idea, and the Delegation was unanimously agreed.

Procedure on Agreements for Supply of Forces

Mr. Pasvolsky reported that the Committee dealing with security questions had considered the problem of making possible the conclusion of agreements for the supply forces to the Security Council, instead of merely among the member states.⁴⁶ Specifically, it had been proposed to substitute the words “by them” for “among themselves” in paragraph 5 of Section B, Chapter VIII of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. The Committee had agreed that these agreements for the supply of forces should be negotiated on the initiative of the Security Council. However, the Chinese had taken the position that the Security Council could not negotiate or be a party to an agreement without specific authorization. Consequently, the Chinese had been unwilling to accept the new words “by them.” Mr. Pasvolsky declared that he understood the United States position was to adopt phraseology which would leave the matter open to future decision. He said that he had mentioned in the Committee that the United States would favor conclusion of the agreements by the Security Council.

Senator Connally declared that he had always agreed that the Security Council should be a party to agreements for the supply of forces. He pointed out, however, that the objection had been raised that such a policy on the part of the Security Council, would give the Organization the appearance of a world super-state. However, Senator Connally was of the opinion that the Council’s power to use the forces placed at its disposal under the agreements had the same effect in the long run. He thought that the Security Council should make the agreements with the member states in order: to eliminate confusion. Senator Vandenberg asked how this question had been treated in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, and Mr. Pasvolsky remarked that the matter had been left open.⁴⁷ Senator Connally reiterated that in his opinion the Council should sign the agreements for support of forces.

Mr. Hickerson remarked that Admiral Rodionov had asked him whether Senator Connally would speak against the Australian amendment to substitute the words “by them” for “among themselves.” Mr. Hickerson said that he had replied that the United States could not speak against this proposal but would adhere to its obligation and would vote with Russia.

Mr. Pasvolsky reiterated that the Chinese had held the position that the Council would have no power to be a party to an agreement of any nature unless it was granted specific authority. Mr. Pasvolsky suggested that the matter be referred to the “hard working” jurists. This same question, he said, had come up at Dumbarton Oaks. Mr. Hackworth declared that there was no doubt in his mind that the Council could be a party to an agreement if the signatory powers were in favor of this procedure. When asked by Representative Eaton if he thought it would be advisable to vest, this power; in the Security Council, Mr. Hackworth replied that this would make for an easier and much better situation. Senator Vandenberg declared that any realist would see that these special agreements for the support of forces were the stumbling block of the Organization. Someone, he said, would have to be charged with the initiation of these agreements. He added that these agreements would have to be approved by the United States Senate, and it would be adding another difficulty to require Senate approval for initiating the agreements. Senator Connally voiced the opinion that this function should devolve upon the Security Council, and Mr. Hackworth remarked that this question should be finally settled “here and now.” Senator Vandenberg agreed with Senator Connally.

Mr. Pasvolsky remarked that he had a legal question for the Delegates to consider. If the words “by them” were to be included in the Charter, would that in itself constitute sufficient authority for the Security Council to become a party to the agreements for the support of forces? Mr. Hackworth declared that the answer to that question was very clear. The League of Nations had been entering into contracts since its inception, and the new Organization would undoubtedly have to do the same. Senator Connally asked whether the Charter would not establish the Security Council as an entity, and Mr. Hackworth replied that that was correct. Senator Vandenberg asked whether Mr. Dulles cared to express his opinion on the legal aspects of this question, and the latter replied that there was no doubt that the Organization would have the authority to make treaties.

Mr. Hickerson asked what position Senator Connally should take in the 10:30 meeting.⁴⁸ He pointed out that the Delegation had already decided at the previous meeting⁴⁹ that the phraseology should be changed but that it appeared as if the United States was in disagreement with the other members of the Sub-Committee of Five. Mr. Pasvolsky replied that he had never reported to the Delegation that the Sub-Committee of Five had turned down this suggested revision. He had reported, he declared, that the Sub-Committee had not reached a decision. The United States, he said, had been accused of getting out on a limb, and it was essential that the position of this country be made clear. Mr. Pasvolsky suggested that Senator Connally get together with the representatives of the other four major powers on his Committee in order to reach an understanding on this matter in view of the fact that there would be no time before the 10:30 meeting to have a decision by the Committee of Five. Mr. Hickerson declared that he would try to get a postponement on this question.

Senator Connally, who was in the chair because the Secretary had had to leave the meeting, asked whether the Delegation wished to express its opinion on the question at issue. Senator Vandenberg proposed a formal motion that the Delegation support phraseology which would permit the Council to be a party to the agreements for the supply of forces to the Organization. The Delegation unanimously accepted this motion. Mr. Pasvolsky emphasized that the wording suggested would leave the matter open and would merely make participation of the Council in these agreements possible.

Mr. Hickerson remarked that he had promised the Russian delegates that the United States would not vote for the Australian amendment. Senator Connally declared that he would try to postpone the question, but if he were maneuvered into casting a vote he would vote according to the Delegation’s wishes as expressed in their decisions of a few meetings earlier. This, he declared, was a realistic situation. The Security Council had the actual authority to make war and take other important steps. It was foolish, he said, to leave it to the states to take the initiative in supplying forces to the Organization.

Mr. Pasvolsky suggested that Senator Connally try to leave the situation flexible. It was necessary, he declared, to reach an understanding with the other four powers. Mr. Pasvolsky urged that Senator Connally attempt to work out some arrangement at the meeting. Mr. Hickerson observed that the Russians appeared to be in opposition to the Australian amendment while the British favored it. He had not spoken with the Chinese representatives on this matter.

Senator Connally declared that he would accept the wording “by them with the approval of the Security Council.” Mr. Pasvolsky asked why Senator Connally would not stand on the more advanced position which the Delegation had taken. Mr. Johnson suggested that, if necessary, the solution might be to delete the words “concluded among themselves,” but Mr. Pasvolsky replied that it would be impossible to achieve acceptance for this change. Mr. Armstrong asked what was the real reason for the Russian opposition to the Australian amendment, and Mr. Hickerson replied that he was unable to answer that question. Senator Connally declared that the opposition was derived from the unwillingness of a number of “little old countries” to supply troops to the Organization. Mr. Hickerson replied, however, that Russia could hardly be called a “little old country.” Mr. Pasvolsky reiterated that the Chinese opposition was based on legal grounds, and Representative Eaton interpolated that the opposition of the U.S.S.R. was based on Russian grounds. Mr. Pasvolsky declared that the Russians had suggested the phraseology “by some or all” but Mr. Pasvolsky was of the opinion that this was a very dangerous wording because under it some states could claim exemption from the requirement for the supply of forces.

Mr. Hickerson suggested that the Delegation devote some time to the question of the French amendments to Chapter VIII, Section B, paragraphs 5, 6, and 9. Dean Gildersleeve declared that she also had some important business to discuss with the Delegation concerning the Australian “pledge” amendment. Senator Connally suggested that Dean Gildersleeve speak first in view of her senior position.

Australian “Pledge” Amendment

Dean Gildersleeve reported that she had objected to the Australian amendment⁵⁰ that “all members undertake to cooperate with the Organization and with each other and to take separate action by (political and economic) methods of their own choice for the achievement of these purposes.” The Australians had introduced two alternative wordings as follows:

1. “All members pledge themselves to take separate action and to cooperate with the Organization and with each other to achieve these purposes. Insofar as separate action is concerned each member shall be entitled to pursue these purposes by political and economic methods of its own choice.”

2. “All members pledge themselves to take action within their own territories by methods of their own choice to achieve these purposes; and, where appropriate, to collaborate with the Organization and with each other in seeking joint measures directed toward their universal realization.”

Dean Gildersleeve reported that she had countered⁵¹ with the following wording:

“All members undertake to cooperate with the Organization and with each other and to take separate action, consistent with their own political and economic institutions, for the achievement of the purposes stated above.”

The Canadians had submitted a fifth draft as follows:

“All members undertake to cooperate with the Organization and with each other and to take separate action in accordance with their respective constitutional processes to achieve these purposes.”

Dean Gildersleeve reported that the Russians would probably support the United States draft but that it was fairly certain that the Canadians would not. Commander Stassen urged that the Canadian wording “constitutional processes” would not include within its scope the economic institutions of the member states. It was not necessary, he declared, to alter constitutional arrangements in order to change economic institutions. Dean Gildersleeve declared that the Canadian wording could probably be voted down. Commander Stassen remarked that it would indeed be interesting to discover whether this Committee was interested in voting down the United States amendment which proposed proceeding according to existing institutions. Mr. Rockefeller said that he would be glad to appear at the Drafting Committee meeting in order to assist Dean Gildersleeve. The latter remarked that she had reserved the position of this Government pending clarification of the issues involved.

Mr. Dulles restated the position he had taken at an earlier meeting that this amendment was not within the scope of the Conference. He thought that Dean Gildersleeve should raise in Committee the question of whether the Conference was competent to consider a pledge for individual action. To admit that this amendment was within the scope of the Conference’s powers, he thought, would be to open the door to many more similar amendments. Senator Connally agreed with this position and Dean Gildersleeve also declared that she favored Mr. Dulles’ position but that she was afraid that the other members of the Committee would not accept this argument. Mr. Dulles declared, however, that this was something on which we could not legally be outvoted. As an example, he said that the United States might be outvoted 48 to 1 on a proposal obligating this country to grant lend-lease aid to Europe for a period of ten years but that the United States would not be legally bound because the question was not within the scope of the Conference.

Commander Stassen was of the opinion that this Government should not oppose this measure without sufficient justification. It was important, he thought, to keep the alternative proposal of the Delegation in the fore so that the press could not twist the intentions of the United States. Representative Bloom was of the opinion, however, that the submission of an alternative proposal would not be consistent with Mr. Dulles’ proposition. An amendment by the United States would be a tacit admission that the matter was actually within the terms of reference of the Conference. Commander Stassen declared that what had gone before pointed to a need for political and legal assistance for Dean Gildersleeve in Committee II/3 and he suggested that Mr. Rockefeller and Mr. Dulles attend the meetings of this body.

Dean Gildersleeve asked whether the Delegation would want her to have Mr. Stinebower continue to press the United States amendment or whether he should continue to reserve the United States position. She remarked that it would be easier to gain acceptance for the Canadian amendment involving “constitutional processes.” Mr. Rockefeller thought that some of the members of the Organization did not have constitutions and thus could not have constitutional processes.

Mr. Dulles declared that the wording involved in the Canadian proposal that the member states pledge to act according to their constitutional processes was contrary to what the United States was attempting to avoid in this section. Mr. Rockefeller suggested that the two wordings involved in the United States and Canadian amendments be combined. Dean Gildersleeve asked Mr. Stinebower what the chances were of gaining acceptance for support of a combination. Mr. Stinebower was of the opinion that the chief opposition for such a proposal would come from the Chairman of the Committee who seemed to think that the wording “institutions” was subject to misinterpretation. Mr. Stinebower pointed out that “institutions” could mean broad sociological phenomena as in the present discussion and might be limited to organizations such as a “banking institution.” Furthermore, the Chairman of the Committee pointed out that institutions changed from time to time. Mr. Stinebower pointed out that the Australians had proposed a substitute amendment which used the phraseology “by (political and economic) methods of their own choice.” Mr. Pasvolsky suggested the wording “where appropriate, take separate action of their own choice.” Mr. Rockefeller remarked that this would not eliminate the opposition of the Canadians and suggested ““consistent with their political and economic institutions and in accordance with their constitutional processes.”

Commander Stassen remarked that the word “pledge” had been eliminated in the United States draft, but Mr. Stinebower expressed the fear that the substitution of the word “undertake” which appeared in the United States proposal would be voted down in the Committee. Mr. Rockefeller asked Mr. Stinebower to give the Delegation the background of the Australian proposal with specific reference to the attempts of the Australian government to avoid their constitutional processes by treaty commitments. Mr. Stinebower replied to the Delegation that the Australians had been trying to get the necessary authority to carry through domestic reforms. An international obligation that they could point to would give them the necessary springboard. Commander Stassen remarked that it boiled down to the fact that the Australians were trying to use the international Charter to force a change in their own country, and Commander Stassen pointed out that this weapon could be used elsewhere.

Mr. Dulles pointed to the wording in the invitation by the four sponsoring governments to the other members of the United Nations to attend the Conference. He pointed out that the invitation stated that the purpose of the Conference was “to prepare a charter for a general international organization for the maintenance of international peace and security.” Mr. Dulles asked what a proposal for individual obligations could possibly have to do with the preparation of such a Charter. This amendment, he thought, was outside the competence of the present Conference. Dean Gildersleeve thought that the meaning of the amendment was that the members undertook to cooperate with the Organization by separate and joint action, and Mr. Dulles declared if this were so the amendment would fall within the competency of the Conference. However, Mr. Stinebower declared that the Chairman of the Drafting Committee II/3/A would move against the United States if he were to press this position. Mr. Stinebower thought that legally the Chairman would have grounds for objecting to this position of the United States because the amendment had been accepted in principle in the full Committee, and the Drafting Committee had no authority other than to carry out the wishes of the full Committee.

Mr. Hackworth urged that the Delegation adhere to the line established by Mr. Dulles. He thought it was the safest approach and urged that great pressure would develop if the United States attempted to temporize. This, he thought, was a dangerous proposition. Mr. Dulles voiced the opinion that this amendment was tied in with Chapter II. If the United States did not carry out the pledge suggested for inclusion in Chapter IX Section A, paragraph 1, it would forfeit its rights under the Charter. Senator Connally asked what course of action Mr. Dulles would suggest, and the latter replied he thought Dean Gildersleeve should reserve the position of this government in order that the matter might be taken up in the Steering Committee. Mr. Stinebower asked whether he should assist in perfecting the language of the amendment or reserve the United States position completely and not formulate any language at all. Representative Bloom was of the opinion that it was impossible to take two positions. Mr. Dulles said the United States could not consistently make an alternate proposal. Dean Gildersleeve declared that she had reserved the United States position pending clarification of the issue. Now that the matter was clarified she understood clearly that the Delegation was opposed to the amendment.

Mr. Dulles pointed out that ratification of a document containing a clause with provision for the bringing into operation of constitutional processes provided a somewhat similar situation. If the operation of constitutional processes blocked the carrying out of the obligations incurred in the document, the state involved would still have an international obligation with respect to its pledge incurred at the time of ratification.

Mr. Hickerson remarked that in this event the reference to constitutional processes was only a matter of procedure. Mr. Stinebower urged that no obligations would be broken if a treaty having a clause providing for the operation of constitutional processes failed of ratification by reason of these processes.

Commander Stassen declared that Australia was trying to do something which the Conference could not do. It was obvious that political and economic assistance was needed in Committee II/3. He stated emphatically that Dean Gildersleeve had been doing an outstanding job in a difficult situation. The Australians had been trying to accomplish something not germane to the Conference.

Mr. Dunn declared that he thought the matter should be handled in the Penthouse in a special meeting of the interested parties. Mr. Rockefeller declared that he had received instructions from Mr. Tomlinson that this course should not be followed because the matter was being handled in another way. Mr. Notter declared that Mr. Tomlinson had called on the question of expulsion, and Mr. Rockefeller agreed that he had been in error.

Mr. Stinebower remarked that the Australians had been forced on the defensive by the presentation of the United States draft “consistent with their own political and economic institutions.” Representative Bloom urged that the Delegation stand; on the legal position taken by Mr. Dulles. He thought that Dean Gildersleeve should, rise on a point of order. Representative Bloom was of the opinion that the United States would not get anywhere by pressing separate proposals. This, he thought, would recognize, the legality of the Australian amendment, but Commander Stassen declared that his proposal was that the United States suggest language which would bring the amendment within the legitimate scope of the Conference. Mr. Stinebower declared that the only part of this amendment which was acceptable to the United States was the first part ending “and with each other.” Mr. Notter suggested that Mr. Hackworth and Mr. Dunn attend the meeting in order to assist Dean Gildersleeve. Otherwise, he thought the United States was certain to be outvoted.

French Amendments Regarding Military Agreements

Mr. Pasvolsky remarked that General Fairchild had something to bring before the Delegation.

General Fairchild reported that a discussion had been held concerning the French amendments to Paragraphs 5, 6, and 9 of Chapter VIII, Section B. He presented the paper, French Amendments Regarding Military Agreements; U. S. Gen 188,⁵² which he declared toned down the original French language. This, he declared, was satisfactory to all the military advisors and would probably be cleared by the U.S.S.R. Mr. Hickerson declared that the French were certain to accept this new wording and that the Russians would also undoubtedly be willing to accept it.

General Fairchild declared that Admiral Rodionov had asked that the decision on this question be postponed until clearance was obtained by the Russians.

The Delegation agreed unanimously to accept the new wording.

Trusteeship

Commander Stassen declared that there was a tense situation With respect to the efforts of the Arab League. The representatives of the Arab League had told him that they thought that the Trusteeship draft must prejudice their interest in some way. Therefore, they were strongly urging the inclusion of Paragraph 4 of Article XXII of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The amendment they proposed read as follows:

“The rights referred to in Paragraph 5 of this Chapter would include the rights indicated in paragraph 4 of Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant, which specifically states that ‘Certain communities… have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.’”

Commander Stassen remarked that he was aware that it was not good form to refer to another document, but he favored acceptance of this paragraph if it would satisfy the Arabs. He thought that the new wording would not materially affect the document. Representative Bloom strongly opposed the inclusion of this new wording because he said he was afraid of the opposition of the Jewish population of this country who were just biding their time waiting for an opportunity to express their opposition to the Arab policy. The Jews of the United States would charge that the Delegation was giving in to the Arab position. Representative Bloom was further afraid that there might be some further implications in paragraph 4 of Article XXII of which the Delegation might not be aware. He reiterated that the Jewish element of this country would be up in arms charging abdication to the Arabs. Commander Stassen declared that he had successfully beaten down all the amendments proposed by members of the Arab League. He said that he had been assuring the Arabs that the United States was not trying to take anything away from them. Representative Bloom declared that he understood the situation but that he knew what the Jewish reaction would be. Commander Stassen urged that Representative Bloom present this clause to the Jewish leaders and discuss it with them, but the latter replied that each and every Jew was a leader and that they would raise a big disturbance if this were considered. Representative Bloom declared that if a provision should be necessary he would accept it but that he would not favor incorporation of Paragraph 4 of Article XXII in the Trusteeship Chapter unless it were absolutely necessary. Representative Bloom pointed to the attacks that had been made on him by the Jewish press, and he declared that he was not attempting to protect any one group but was working for all groups. He thought that the Arab and Jewish questions should be left alone and that they had gotten along all right until agitators moved in.

Commander Stassen reminded the Delegation that the British had insisted that Committee II/4 must listen to the Iraqui proposal.⁵³ Commander Stassen declared that he did not want to antagonize any group but did not want to give the Arabs anything which they did not deserve. Representative Bloom declared that the British had their reasons for urging that consideration be given to the Iraqi proposals. He said that he did not want the entire question of Palestine and the Jews and the Arabs imposed upon this Conference.

Mr. Rockefeller declared that he wanted to report to the Delegation on confidential conversation he had had with President Roosevelt after the latter had received Rabbi Stephen Wise. Rabbi Wise and the Arab leaders whom the President had seen during his trip to Yalta^53a indicated that they were ready to go to war over this situation. The Arabs were insistent that they wanted no change in the immigration policy and had indicated that they were willing to fight to preserve the existing situation. Mr. Rockefeller stated that he had mentioned this conversation in order to emphasize the tension that existed with respect to the whole question of Palestine.

Commander Stassen declared that he wanted to insure that no rights were altered. The Arab leaders had declared that Palestine was “a sick patient” and they were afraid of an “operation.” Commander Stassen had assured them that there would be no “operation.” He was of the opinion that the silence of the Jewish elements on this question had caused the Arabs to take the position that if the Jews were satisfied they, the Arabs, should be dissatisfied. Representative Bloom declared that he had been a Jew for 75 years and therefore knew what to expect.

Mr. Dunn declared that it had been the intention of the State Department and continued to be the intention to maintain the status quo. There was one thing, he thought, that seemed to stick in the mind of the Arabs and that was the phraseology in Paragraph 8 of the Trusteeship draft which left open the way for future agreement in the individual trusteeship arrangements. He thought that it was this exception that worried them. Mr. Gerig declared that it did look as if future arrangements might change the status quo. Commander Stassen declared that the subsequent agreements were to be purely voluntary, and Mr. Dunn declared that all the states concerned would be parties to them. Commander Stassen was of the opinion that as a matter of strategy it might be best to assure the Arabs on the basis of national policy rather than on the basis of; the international Charter.

Representative Bloom referred to the last sentence of the new draft which referred to the wishes of the communities in question. Commander Stassen declared that this was quoted word for word from the League Covenant. Representative Bloom wondered whether these wishes might not be the majority wishes and pointed out that in Palestine the Arabs were in a substantial majority. He declared that according to the Treaty of 1925⁵⁴ no changes could be made in the mandated status of Palestine without the consent of the United States. The British White Paper⁵⁵ was illegal according to the terms of the mandate. The Arabs, he declared, were trying to obtain something for their own protection. The Jews in Palestine were in the minority, and with immigration stopped the Arabs were trying to keep them in the same ratio. Mr. Dunn agreed that this was the correct interpretation. Representative Bloom declared that the Arabs had no right to take this position according to the mandate and the treaty with the United States. He declared that he had been successful in maintaining a friendly relationship with the Arabs and had never fought with them. Mr. Dunn was of the opinion that there would be no disturbance from either quarter if both sides were assured that there would be no change in the status. Commander Stassen was of the opinion that either Mr. Dunn or Secretary Stettinius should meet with the Arabs and give them the necessary assurance. Mr. Dunn declared that he had met with some of the Arab leaders at a luncheon a few days earlier and had maintained the position that no change would be made in the status quo. Everybody, he said, was satisfied with the existing situation but were demanding assurance in the Charter that no changes would be made. Representative Bloom declared that he had no strong opinion one way or the other and that he understood everyone’s desires.

Mr. Dunn suggested that the phraseology of Paragraph 8 of the Trusteeship Chapter should be changed so that the maintenance of the status quo would be mandatory and so that the paragraph would not constitute an exception to the general principle laid down. Representative Bloom remarked, however, that an exception had already been made in the White Paper. Commander Stassen declared that if the Delegation were agreed that the special clause should be included in the Charter it might open up questions related to other territories. Mr. Dunn declared that he thought the wording should be changed to get away from the exception established. He suggested that it be made mandatory that the trusteeship arrangements maintain the existing situation.

Representative Bloom declared that the Arabs were not fools and would construe any phraseology according to their own interests. Commander Stassen urged once more that if the United States was willing to assure both the Jews and the Arabs that the trusteeship arrangements would insure carrying over the League situation the whole matter could be separated from the Charter. Mr. Dunn remarked that this should not be a unilateral affair and that the other interested governments should also sponsor the assurance. Representative Bloom was of the opinion that no mention of either the Jews or the Arabs should be included in the Charter. He replied to the suggestion that the matter should be taken up with Jewish leaders by pointing out that there were two opposing factions and that some of the chief leaders had already left San Francisco. No steps could be taken without full agreement. Mr. Dunn asked what should be done about the exception established and urged that it would raise objections from both sides. Representative Bloom remarked that he was opposed to changing the idea of the mandate and was just trying to keep out of trouble.

Commander Stassen observed that this was essentially a problem of the political relationship of the United States to the Arabs, and he thought that someone from the State Department should see the Arab groups. Mr. Dunn wondered what position the British and Russians would take on this issue, and Representative Bloom replied that it was the British who were the important factor. He went on to say that the matter was still open because it had been agreed in the Committee on Trusteeship that the Iraqi representative should be permitted to present his case. Commander Stassen indicated that he was sure that he would be able to outvote any amendments proposed by Iraq. Representative Bloom declared that the if corporation of this paragraph of Article XXII might be equally dangerous with respect to other territories than Palestine. Dunn reiterated that no change should be made. Representative Bloom agreed and declared that there should be no changes whatsoever. The Jewish groups, he declared, had no right to come to San Francisco, and he had not wanted them to come. He pointed to his experience with respect to the Bermuda Conference on Refugees⁵⁶ and declared that that had been a failure in the eyes of the Jewish population before he left La Guardia Field. Commander Stassen urged that the matter, be held over until representatives of the State Department should have a chance to consult on the political situation involved.

Commander Stassen reported that Russian approval of the issues still facing the Committee had not been received at that time. The next meeting of Committee 11/4 was to be at 8:30 p.m. Tuesday evening.

The meeting was adjourned at 10:40 a.m.

44. Text of radio address by Mr. Stettinius to be delivered Monday, May 28, at 7:30 p.m., PWT, at the Fairmont, pp.tel, was transmitted to the Department in telegram 4; May 28, not printed; for printed text of the address, see Department of State Bulletin, June 3, 1945, p. 1007.
45. Doc. 423, 1/1/20, May 19, UNCIO Documents, vol. 6, p. 312,
46. Doc. 628, III/3/33, May 26, UNCIO Documents, vol. 12, p. 382; Doc. 289, III/3/11, May 13, ibid., p. 608.
47. See memorandum by Messrs. Gerig and Yost, November 20, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, p. 901.
48. Doc. 649, III/3/34, May 28, UNCIO Documents, vol. 12, p. 391.
49. Minutes of meeting of United States delegation, May 24, 9:05 a.m., p. 862
50. Doc. 599, II/3/31, May 26, UNCIO Documents, vol. 10, p. 99.
51. Summary report of meeting of Committee II/3/A, May 26, 3 p.m., not printed.
52. Not printed.
53. Doc. 580, 11/4/24, May 26, UNCIO Documents, vol. 10, pp. 486–87 (Iraqi interest in paragraph B, 5).
54. On his return from the Conference at Yalta President Roosevelt met at Great Bitter Lake, Egypt, on February 13–14, 1945, with King Farouk of Egypt, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, and King Abdul Aziz al-Saud of Saudi Arabia; for documentation, see vol. viii, pp. 1 ff.
54. Convention between the United states and Great Britain relating to rights in Palestine, signed at London, December 3, 1924, Foreign Relations, 1924, vol. ii, p. 212. For text of mandate for Palestine, assigned to the United Kingdom at San Remo, April 25, 1920, and approved by the Council of the League of Nations, July 24, 1922, see ibid., p. 213.
55. British Cmd. 6019: Palestine, Statement of Policy, May 1939.
56. For documentation on the Anglo-American Conference on Refugees, held at Bermuda, April 19–28, 1943, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. i, pp. 134 ff.