Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, Volume I

J. C. S. Files

No. 601
Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

top secret
C. C. S. 877/2

[ Washington ,] 10 July 1945.

Basic Objectives, Strategy, and Policies

1. With reference to the amendment proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff¹ to paragraph 4 a., “Basic Undertakings and Policies for the Prosecution of the War,” of C. C. S. 877,² the United States Chiefs of Staff had not proposed to change the wording of this paragraph, even though it does not fit the present situation. Now that the point has been raised, however, it is considered that the paragraph should recognize that, at this stage in the war, there is no longer any particular connection between “security” and “war-making capacity” in so far as the completion of the war against Japan is concerned. They agree to the inclusion of the term “British Commonwealth” in the statement in so far as “security” is concerned, even though the entire Commonwealth is not at war with Japan.

2. It is the view of the United States Chiefs of Staff that with the end of the war with Germany, justification does not exist for expanding the basic undertaking concerning “war-making capacity” which has been agreed during the period of a two-front war. Rather, now that our entire productive capacity is no longer being devoted to an all-out war, the wording should clearly restrict to this war the commitment in the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

3. Since the British Chiefs of Staff do not wish to continue the original wording, the United States Chiefs of Staff consider that paragraph 4 a. of the statement proposed in C. C. S. 877 should be deleted, the following substituted therefor, and paragraphs 4 b. and c. re-lettered accordingly:—

“4. a. Maintain the security of the Western Hemisphere and the British Commonwealth.

b. Maintain the war-making capacity of the U. S. and the British Isles in so far as it is connected with the prosecution of this war.”

4. As to the proposal to delete the words “or delay” from the sentence, “No other operations will be undertaken which hazard the success of, or delay, these main operations.”, such deletion would make it meaningless in so far as establishing a priority for operations is concerned. The United States Chiefs of Staff see reasons for inclusion of the phrase and see no reason even for considering its deletion unless the British Chiefs of Staff intend to propose an operation which might delay the main operations.

5. As to the proposal that a paragraph be added relating to cargo shipping, the intent of the memorandum proposed by C. C. S. 877 was to establish broad principles for the prosecution of the war. The United States Chiefs of Staff believe that interpretation of these principles to apply to specific cases should be considered as separate matters. The statements of broad policy contained in C. C. S. 877 will serve as guides to resolve problems in allocation of forces and resources. However, after meeting requirements for the supreme operations against Japan, there may remain matters of logistical and operational priorities which will require resolution by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and will have to be considered on their merits as they arise. It is therefore suggested that priorities for cargo shipping be excluded from the statement of basic policies and remain under consideration in the CCS. 746 series.

1. See document No. 600.
2. See document No. 600, footnote 1.