Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, Volume I

J. C. S. Files

No. 600
Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff

top secret
C. C. S. 877/1

[Washington,] 30 June 1945.

Basic Objectives, Strategy, and Policies

References:	CCS 8771
	CCS 824/52
	CCS 746/10 & 746/243

1. The British Chiefs of Staff would like to propose three amendments to the memorandum put forward by the United States Chiefs of Staff (C. C. S. 877).

2. First, at the end of paragraph 4 a. they would like to change the words “British Isles” to read “British Common wealth.” As at present phrased, the wording would not safeguard Imperial requirements, e. g., for India and Australia.

3. Second, for the reasons already given in paragraph 5, C. C. S. 824/4,⁴ the British Chiefs of Staff would still prefer to delete the words “or delay” in the last line of paragraph 5.

4. Third, the British Chiefs of Staff point out that since discussions regarding the formula for priorities began, the cargo shipping review has been completed and formal approval to it should be given shortly. This review will cover all present foreseen requirements, but it remains to safeguard approved military operations against additional civil requirements not now covered in the cargo shipping review. For this reason, therefore, the British Chiefs of Staff would like to suggest that a paragraph should be added to the memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff as follows:—

“7. The above formulae relate to cargo shipping, only in so far as additional requirements arise. Schedules of proposed military and civil allocations for the period 1 July 1945 to 30 June 1946 have been agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C. C. S. 746/24). The combined shipping authorities have given assurances (C. C. S. 746/10) that no civil allocations additional to the above, which might prejudice approved operational requirements, will be accepted without prior consultation with the appropriate Chiefs of Staff.”

5. Subject to the above remarks the British Chiefs of Staff are in full agreement with the memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff (C. C. S. 877), and would not propose to submit any separate formula on priorities. If the United States Chiefs of Staff feel able to accept the amendments proposed above, the British Chiefs of Staff suggest that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should adopt the formula in C. C. S. 877, as amended by this paper, at once and incorporate it in the final report of the Terminal Conference.

1. The United States Chiefs of Staff had made the following recommendation in C. C. S. 877, dated June 14 (J. C. S. Files):
   “The agreed summary of broad principles regarding the prosecution of the war, set forth in C. C. S. 776/3 [see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 827], was based upon the agreed concept that Germany was the principal enemy. The unconditional surrender of Germany, and the vital importance of rapidly reorienting strength so that the maximum possible effort may now be brought to bear against Japan, make it desirable that this summary of broad principles be revised in consonance with the changed situation. Acceptance now of these principles will establish appropriate emphasis on the war against Japan, while taking cognizance of the changed situation in the European Theater. Accordingly, the United States Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the following statements of basic objectives, strategy, and policies.”

   For paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of the draft statements referred to, see the left-hand column of the enclosure to document No. 1263, printed in vol. ii . Paragraph 4 read as follows:

   “4. The following basic undertakings are considered fundamental to the prosecution of the war:—

   “a. Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Isles.

   “b. Support the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas with first priority given to those forces in combat areas.

   “c. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication.”

2. Not printed.
3. Neither printed.
4. The reasons referred to are stated as follows in C. C. S. 824/4, a memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff dated May 3, 1945: “They [the British Chiefs of Staff] would also like to omit the words ‘or delays’ … as these words could be interpreted very widely and this might lead to subsequent misunderstandings.”