Department of the Army Files: Telegram

No. 300
The Chief of the Military Representation on the Allied Control Commission for Rumania ( Schuyler ) to the War Department 1
top secret

M 1150 from Schuyler Rumania to AGWar for War Op Div. Top Secret. ComGenMed, ACC Bulgaria and ACC Hungary.

In my M–1149 of this date,2 I outlined to the War Department certain considerations which may affect decision by the United States in the matter of current British proposals for conclusion of an early peace with Rumania I now wish to set forth certain objectives toward which I believe our policy should be directed, with a view to improving the present situation to the maximum extent practicable.

First. There is an urgent and immediate need for establishing once and for all the total value of the obligations which Rumania must meet under the various clauses of the Armistice, particularly articles 10, 11 and 12. As reported in my M–1063 of 8 June 1945,3 present Russian demands under article 12 amount to some 950 billion lei, which sum is 75 percent as large as the entire six-year reparations obligations under article 11. Under article 10, Rumania has already furnished supplies and services for Russian troops amounting to approximately twice her article 11 reparations payments. With over one million troops now being quartered in Rumania, additional obligations under this article will tend to become astronomical. Considered altogether, total Russian demands under these three articles [are] sufficient to ruin completely the economic structure of the nation. Since our government participated in the initial discussions which established the reparations values prescribed in article 11 it is equally logical that we should now participate in full and final discussions as to total demands to be made on Rumania under the even more burdensome articles 10 and 12. It is recognized that the finally determined total value of goods and supplies to be furnished under these articles will be such as to place a severe strain on Rumanian resources, but the total should of course be determined with proper consideration for the minimum internal needs of the nation. The important point is that the definite fixing of the total of obligations will permit the country to begin readjusting itself to the new situation, with some hope of a return to normal life after these specific obligations have been met. Under present conditions no such hope exists and the national economy may be said to be operating entirely on a day-to-day basis.

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Second. There is of course an urgent need for the establishment of a truly tripartite Allied Control Commission. Though this is recognized as probably impracticable at present, nevertheless it is obvious that we should work toward a broadening of the commission as far as may be feasible. This objective needs no further elaboration here.

Third. There is also a basic need for establishment of a government in Rumania truly representative of all political parties. Such a government should not be made up of ministers hand picked by the Russians, but rather it should include proportionate representation from all parties, each such party being permitted to select or at least to pass upon its own representatives in the cabinet. The posts of Prime Minister, Minister of the Interior and Minister of War should go to individuals who either have no political affiliations or who are members of a “middle of the road” party.

Fourth. Even under normal peace time conditions, a representative government in Rumania would find it difficult to maintain itself in power. Rumanians have had no experience in democracy for over ten years, and the ability of members of any coalition government to work in harmony for the common goal, regardless of personal or party problems, must be open to question. With the added difficulties occasioned by the necessity for meeting the ever-increasing armistice burden, any such government will for some time to come require careful supervision by and probably active support from Allied agencies. To meet this end I feel we should insist that the Allied Control Commission, operating on as near to a tripartite basis as may be practicable, remain in existence in Rumania for a considerable period in a general supervisory capacity.

Fifth. One of the primary though not necessarily immediate duties of a representative government should be preparation for and the holding of free elections. Since Rumanians have had little experience in such matters, the ACC will find it necessary to supervise carefully all activities connected with the election. Detailed agreement on governmental levels should be reached as to exactly how and [to] what extent such control should be exercised. If practicable, arrangements should be made for increasing temporarily United States and British representations on the ACC in order to permit tripartite supervision throughout the country both during the electioneering period and during the elections themselves.

While I do not consider that our complete objectives as set forth above are attainable at the present time, nevertheless I feel that our attitude on these matters should be clearly stated on a high level and that we should continue to press these points at every opportunity. Until some generally satisfactory solution along these lines can be reached, our participation in the ACC should continue under the most favorable terms which may be practicable of attainment at present.

The contents of this cable have been discussed in detail with my British colleague on the ACC, Air Vice Marshal Stevenson, and he has expressed full agreement on all points covered therein.

  1. Received by the United States Delegation to the Berlin Conference on July 16 as a retransmission from the War Department. See document No. 299, footnote 1.
  2. Document No. 299.
  3. Not printed.