Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, Volume I

Department of the Army Files: Telegram

No. 299
The Chief of the Military Representation on the Allied Control Commission for Rumania (Schuyler) to the War Department ¹

top secret
priority

[Bucharest,] 28 June 1945.

M 1149 from Schuyler Rumania to AGWar for War Op Div top secret.

Having recently seen State Department message number 310 dated 21 June to US Representative in Rumania, I desire to invite attention of the War Department to certain considerations which have come to my attention as ACC Representative and which may have an important bearing on any decision relative to the British proposals [f]or conclusion of an early peace with Rumania:

1. Participation by the United States in peace negotiations with the present Government would appear to be tantamount to a recognition that such Government is acceptable to US. Since the Government as presently constituted is representative of only a small proportion of the Rumanian people, any such recognition by the United States would seem to be a distinct violation of principles agreed upon and announced at Yalta.² Undoubtedly any such action would be viewed in this light by the majority of the Rumanian people.

2. There appears to be little basis for the British assumption that with the conclusion of peace Soviet troops should be entirely withdrawn from the country. At present the authority of the Rumanian Government is by no means effective throughout the nation, and that Government appears quite willing to accept Soviet military assistance in preserving order generally patrolling the country. The Government, being representative of only a small minority, actually depends on this Russian backing to maintain its position, and its Communist elements, who are now virtually in full control, would without question be entirely content to have small Soviet forces remain here on one pretext or another long after an actual Treaty of Peace has been signed. The Russians themselves cannot fail to realize the danger of a Coup d’État, and would, I believe, be most reluctant to withdraw completely at this time.

3. Entirely apart from the need for continued Russian military support to maintain the Government, there is a further need for Russian troops to insure strict compliance with Armistice provisions as presently interpreted by Soviet authorities. Russian ACC officials with small groups of Russian soldiers are now scattered throughout the nation in all the more important towns and villages. Their activities have been highly effective in expediting Armistice deliveries. Assuming that current Soviet interpretations of the Armistice provisions will continue in force, it is doubtful that withdrawal of these Russian forces would be practicable for a long time to come.

4. Although the authority exercised by this delegation is admittedly meager and although our prestige is certainly suffering under present conditions, nevertheless I am convinced that as a result of the mere presence in Rumania of this and the British Delegation, the general political and economic situation within the country is somewhat better than it might otherwise have been. Moreover, by timely intervention with Soviet ACC authorities we have at times been able to afford some measure of protection to American firms and American commercial interests in the country. Since on conclusion of peace the ACC would be withdrawn, there would no longer exist in Rumania any over-all Allied Agency responsible for the protection of Allied interests. It is doubtful whether or not the present Communist controlled Government could be counted on to afford adequate protection.

In view of the above considerations, I strongly recommend against any action at this time looming [looking?] toward an early conclusion of peace with the present Rumanian Government. In lieu of such action, I feel that we should henceforth direct our policy for Rumania toward the attainment of certain clearly defined primary objectives with a view to effecting such improvement in the present situation as may be practicable in the light of other world problems.

These objectives will be discussed in a succeeding cable.³

1. Cf. telegram No. 439 of June 28 from the Acting Representative in Rumania (Melbourne) to the Secretary of State ad interim (file No. 740.00119 EW/6–2845): “On the subject of the Dept’s tel 310 of June 21 [document No. 290], please see Genl Schuyler’s telegrams M–1149 and 1150 dated today.”
2. See vol. ii, document No. 1417, section v .
3. Document No. 300.