Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1944, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, The Far East, Volume V

740.0011 European War 1939/6–2344

The British Embassy to the Department of State

Aide-Mémoire

On June 16th His Majesty’s Ambassador at Ankara telegraphed to the Foreign Office to the following effect:

(a) Turkey’s relationship to the Allies has recently undergone a considerable change for the better. The question of the Straits and the export of chrome have both been settled and an assurance has been given that Turkey wishes to cooperate whole-heartedly with the Allies.

(b) The moment seems exceptionally favourable for making real progress in our relations with Turkey. This can best be achieved, not by a piecemeal approach to individual questions but by the establishment of a general framework of cooperation. The time for the proposed exchange of economic notes has passed. This would merely give us in writing what we have already obtained in practice. A new approach is needed and it is important that this approach should not fall short of the standard which the Soviet Government has already laid down for Turkey’s rehabilitation.⁴⁵ In return, however, we must be prepared to tell Turkey exactly what we are prepared to contribute to her equipment for the role in which we now propose to cast her.

(c) Meanwhile, we cannot continue stalling indefinitely but should make an immediate response to recent developments, with a view to encouraging the Turkish Government and at the same time gaining time for the preparation of our desiderata. With this end in view, we should at once inform the Turkish Government that His Majesty’s Government has taken note with satisfaction of their decision on the Straits question, that they welcome the assurance given by the Turkish Government, that they are anxious to follow it up immediately and that they would like to know whether the Turkish Government are now ready to enter into discussions with a view to reaching an agreement on the methods by which their assurances can best be implemented.

2. In replying to His Majesty’s Ambassador at Ankara, Mr. Eden⁴⁶ agreed that an exchange of notes on the lines originally proposed no longer meets the needs of the situation as it now presents itself. The atmosphere in Ankara, hitherto unpropitious, has now changed to one in which it should be possible to make a bolder and more open bid for Turkish cooperation than was considered feasible at the time of drafting the notes.

3. On the other hand, Mr. Eden considers that the action proposed by Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, as outlined in paragraph (c) above, is inadequate. Whilst agreeing that His Majesty’s Government should express their satisfaction at the Turkish Government’s decision on the Straits question and at the assurances received, Mr. Eden feels that H.M.G. should follow this up with some concrete suggestion of their own for the immediate implementation of this new attitude: they should not lag behind the Soviet Government, who have already told Turkey that she should break off relations with Germany and enter the war against her. Whilst not wishing at this stage to go quite so far or so fast as the Russians, Mr. Eden feels that, acting on the assumption of full and immediate Turkish cooperation, H.M.G. should forthwith make the following concrete proposal to the Turkish Government:

4. “The whole situation has been altered by the opening of the Western front and the measure of assistance that the Turkish Government were prepared to give us before this development (viz., a complete ban on chrome supplies to Germany and a 50% reduction on the export of other strategic commodities) should now be increased to meet the changed circumstances. The time has therefore come when the Turkish Government should consider breaking off economic and diplomatic relations with Germany, so as to put an end once and for all to the German manoeuvres of playing off Turkey against Great Britain and her Allies. It is only in this way that Turkey can clarify her policy which has become obscure and confused by recent events, and fill the international position to which she is entitled both during the war and at the peace making”.

5. Mr. Eden’s telegram continues in the following words:

“I do not think it would be desirable at this stage to accompany this proposal by a direct appeal to Turkey’s obligations under her Treaty of Alliance with Great Britain.⁴⁷ But if in the course of discussions it becomes necessary to invoke the Treaty, the Turkish Government would be reminded that the only occasion on which His Majesty’s Government have formally appealed to the Treaty of Alliance was when Italy came into the war and that it was suggested to the Turkish Government that in default of their being able to declare war on the Axis they should at least break off diplomatic relations. On that occasion the Turkish Government appealed to the second protocol of the Treaty, alleging that any action on their part would endanger their relations with the Soviet Union. The imminent collapse of France furthermore gave the Turks some justification for feeling that the Treaty no longer fitted the new situation, where, with the collapse in the West, German and Italian enemies could be concentrated on South-East Europe. It could be pointed out to the Turkish Government that to-day the Soviet Government have made it quite plain to the Turkish Government that they wish Turkey to break off relations with Germany and the landings in Normandy have more than restored the military balance to that in which the Anglo-Turkish Treaty was designed to operate.

6. It is true that if we make a request to the Turkish Government to sever diplomatic relations with Germany we may be faced with demands to know what assistance we could give Turkey in the event of Germany retaliating forcibly. We certainly cannot commit ourselves on this point and would have to try and persuade the Turkish Government that the Germans would neither be able, nor wish, to take violent counter-measures. By taking violent action they would automatically bring Turkey into the war and much as they would dislike the rupture of relations, they would dislike even more the prospect of Turkey being an actual belligerent since militarily they have not the forces available to enable them to take on a fresh campaign and because in particular a belligerent Turkey would seriously affect Germany’s position in Bulgaria and also enable Great Britain to get at vital Aegean Islands from Turkish bases. It is to be hoped that these arguments, though wasted on Numan, might convince his successor. Meanwhile I should prefer to avoid resuming military conversations at the present moment, though I realise that the Turkish Government might press for them as the price for their breaking with Germany.”

7. Lord Halifax⁴⁸ is instructed to bring the foregoing to the attention of the Government of the United States and to enquire whether, if it agrees to the line of action proposed, it will consider the despatch to the United States Ambassador at Ankara of the necessary instructions to support his United Kingdom colleague.

Washington , June 23, 1944.

45. See telegram 2327, June 28, midnight, from Moscow, p. 863.
46. Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
47. Treaty of Mutual Assistance between the United Kingdom, France, and Turkey, signed at Ankara, October 19, 1939, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cc, p. 167; British Cmd. 6165, Treaty Series No. 4 (1940).
48. The British Ambassador.