740.00112 European War 1939/10487: Telegram
The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 6—4:48 p.m.]
605. Department’s 280, March 30, and 291, April 3.17 In my opinion the action proposed by the British would lay the foundation for the adoption in the future, if found desirable, of a rigorous economic and commercial policy towards Turkey. Although the language of the proposed text particularly the words “further export” appears to be open to two interpretations it seems reasonably clear that what the British have in mind is to prevent the Turks from entering into any new agreements rather than to compel them to violate existing obligations under which the Germans have already performed. This would, of course, apply to chrome. In this connection as the repudiation by Turkey of its obligation to deliver agreed quantities of chrome to Germany in return for military equipment already delivered to Turkey by Germany would undoubtedly be regarded in Germany as tantamount to a declaration of war the Turkish Government could hardly be expected to repudiate this obligation unless prepared to enter the war. In light of present strained Anglo-Turkish relations it seems to me that the most that could be expected in respect of chrome would be a substantial reduction in the amount of deliveries to Germany. Such action would not constitute a flagrant violation if it were attributed by the Turks to transportation or other difficulties [apparent omission] our arsenal for further economic reprisals is pitifully barren or that Turkey’s standard of living is such that it is not economically vulnerable to blockade action. Turkey’s economy would [Page 823] be severely damaged by a stoppage or even substantial reduction in shipments of civilian supplies from the British Empire and the United States. Furthermore, the Turkish Government is fully alive to the inevitable time when its imports via the Balkans will be completely shut off and Turkey for a considerable period of time thereafter will be wholly dependent on imports from the United Nations. Faced with this eventuality the Turkish Government would seriously hesitate to provoke economic sanctions by the British Empire and the United States and which it must anticipate would be continued as a punishment after Turkish imports via the Balkans had been cut off. While limited supplies of oil are still obtainable by Turkey from Rumania these deliveries become more precarious from day to day and their discontinuance is subject to the consideration pointed out above.
I have no reason to believe that the suggested approach without Russian participation or concurrence would be interpreted by the Turks as a wedge between the Allies. As there is practically no trade between Turkey and Russia, the Turks would not find it unnatural if the approach were made without Russian participation or concurrence and would not be likely to interpret such action as a wedge between the Allies. Furthermore, Russian participation or concurrence in the approach would add little to its effectiveness as the Russians are only in a position to threaten to discontinue non-existing trade.
The suggestion that the Turks might regard the proposed approach not as a hardening of Anglo-American policy but as a relatively friendly gesture because of what they might expect from the Axis under similar circumstances completely overlooks the fact that the British are Allies of the Turks and that the United States and Britain have succeeded in convincing Turks that their treatment of the smaller countries has been and will be somewhat above Nazi standards. In my opinion the proposed approach runs not the slightest risk of being regarded as a relatively friendly gesture but, quite the contrary, will be regarded as a further step taken by the British with American concurrence to compel Turkey to enter the war.
I am at loss to understand why any individual who is prepared to advocate that Turkey be compelled to flagrantly violate contractual obligations with Germany in respect of chrome should have any compunctions about taking direct action against rail communications while formally recognizing Turkey’s right to continue to trade with Axis. Nor can I see any connection between formal recognition of neutral Turkey’s right to continue to trade with Axis and destruction of bridge in enemy Bulgarian territory as consequence of which Turks may be unable to avail themselves of use of a particular railroad [Page 824] passing through non-Turkish territory. In this connection and as I have pointed out on several occasions, Turks have been expecting destruction of bridges for over a year and some Turks have referred to their nondestruction as evidence of Allied incompetence to wage war effectively.
With respect to the tentative Departmental and FEA counter proposals: a. (I again urge the immediate execution of the special project.)
With [apparent omission] we invite the attention of Department and FEA to the fact that in considering the imposition of economic sanctions against Turkey it is important to bear in mind that Turkey is still an ally of Great Britain and that while there has been a disagreement between them as to the conditions under which Turkey would be prepared to enter the war at this time in so far as I am aware the British have by no means abandoned their hope that Turkey will enter the war, a development which they may find it desirable or even necessary to bring about at some time in the future as a result of unforeseen military or political developments or the prolongation of the war. Even though Turkey should not enter the war there are innumerable services which the Turks may be able to render the British or ourselves in the future no less in the political than in the economic field which may grow out of developments not now foreseeable in view of the complexities of the political and military situation. For this reason the Department may wish to consider whether it is in the interest of the United States and Britain at this time to treat Turkey as Spain, Switzerland and Sweden are treated and thereby create the impression in the minds of the Turks that they are no longer to be regarded as Allies but as Neutrals from whom only neutrality is expected. Should economic sanctions be applied to Turkey at this time and should the British find it expedient or necessary in the near future to seek Turkey’s assistance the accomplishment of their purpose would be seriously impeded and delayed by the inevitable time lag in removing the sanctions and by the resentment aroused in Turkey as a result of their application.
In view of the foregoing and having regard to all of the numerous factors involved, political as well as economic, I recommend that my British colleague and I be instructed to present to the Turk Minister for Foreign Affairs immediately a statement no stronger than the text proposed by London. In this connection it is essential that such statement as it is to be presented be submitted immediately in view of the fact that negotiations have already begun or are about to begin [Page 825] with Rumanian, Hungarian and German delegations for new commercial agreements.18
- Regarding telegram 291, see footnote 16, above.↩
- In telegram 312, April 8, 8 p.m., the Ambassador was informed that “Both Department and FEA concur in your recommendation that an immediate joint declaration be made to the Turks”; he was authorized to prepare a statement with the British Ambassador, “closely following” an amended draft worked out in London, of which a paraphrase was simultaneously transmitted (740.00112 European War 1939/10487). In telegram 325, April 14, 1 p.m., the Ambassador was instructed to keep the Soviet Ambassador “fully informed regarding joint declaration” (740.00112 European War 1939/10487).↩