867N.01/10–2744
Memorandum, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)
Mr. Stettinius: I have come to the conclusion that the reaction in the Near East to recent developments in this country affecting Palestine is going to have so serious an effect upon our foreign relations as to make it advisable for you to discuss this matter with the President at the earliest opportunity.
The Arabs of Palestine and Iraq have already protested, and it is most likely that this reaction will spread to neighboring Arab countries and will become intensified. Such a development will have such far-reaching effects upon our relations with the area that I feel you would be entirely justified in bringing it to the President’s attention, even at this time.37 In discussing this with him, you will, of course, wish to make it quite clear that we entirely appreciate the present domestic position. The endorsement of a Jewish state, however, goes beyond any previous official American pronouncements on Palestine, which have been limited to expressing sympathy with the idea of a [Page 625] Jewish national home rather than a Jewish Commonwealth. It is inconsistent, moreover, with the assurance which the President gave to King Ibn Saud on two occasions during 1943, to the effect that both Arabs and Jews would be consulted in the reaching of any definitive settlement of the Palestine question.38 Finally, on several occasions early in the present year the President authorized us to inform a number of Near Eastern Governments and political leaders that in the view of this Government no decision should be reached without full and prior consultation with all concerned, including both Arabs and Jews.
It is difficult to see how recent developments can be taken by the Arab countries as showing anything but a lack of good faith and an intention on the part of this Government not to carry out its previous commitments when political expediency dictates otherwise. Such an impression, if not speedily and completely counteracted, would seriously prejudice our ability to afford adequate protection to American interests in the Near East.
This does not only imply that our prestige, which has been declining for some months as a result of recent pro-Zionist manifestations in this country, will reach a new low in the Near East. It does not simply mean that the Department and the Foreign Service will be placed in a difficult position in attempting to promote American business and philanthropic interests in that area. It means, specifically, that the basic long-term American economic interest in Saudi Arabia will be seriously threatened and possibly jeopardized. King Ibn Saud, whose wholehearted opposition to Zionism has been made known in no uncertain terms, will now undoubtedly be inclined to question the sincerity of this Government’s intentions toward Palestine as previously communicated to him. Since the King is in entire control of his country’s policy, this in turn will have a very definite bearing upon our relations with Saudi Arabia and upon the future of the American oil concession in that country, which is of incalculable value to the present and future strategic requirements of the United States.
Another aspect of the matter which is rather disturbing is the effect which these developments will unquestionably have upon our position in the Near East vis-à-vis the two other great powers who are now interested in that area, Great Britain and Soviet Russia. The British, whose situation with regard to Palestine is admittedly a difficult one and who must realize the conflicting nature of the commitments which [Page 626] they themselves have made regarding that country, welcome any development, such as this, which strengthens their own position with the Arabs by putting us in an unfavorable light.
Even more serious are the implications as far as Russia is concerned. We have had the most definite indications that the Soviet Union is showing growing interest in the Near East and that this is no temporary manifestation. The Russians are in effective occupation of a considerable portion of Iran, and we have recently received reports to show that they would like to expand their influence and gain some sort of long-term foothold, through the concession of a free port or by other means, upon the shores of the Persian Gulf. This, of course, would place the Russians within a very short distance not only of the oil fields in southern Iran, Iraq, and Kuwait, but also of those in Bahrein and eastern Saudi Arabia.39
As far as the Soviet position toward Palestine is concerned, we have never had any reason to doubt that the Soviets were opposed to Zionism. We now, as you will recall, have pretty definite evidence that Soviet Russia opposes the creation of a Jewish state. This, of course, would be completely consistent with the recent manifestations of Soviet interest in the Arab world.
The situation as I have tried to outline it above is so serious that I have no hesitation in urging you to find an early opportunity to discuss frankly with the President its implications from a realistic point of view. Needless to say, I would be pleased to discuss this entire question with you at your convenience.
- A reference to the presidential election campaign; the election was held on November 7, 1944.↩
- See undated letter from President Roosevelt to King Ibn Saud (about June 12, 1943), Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. iv, p. 790; see also telegrams 1307, July 23, 1943, 9 a.m., from Cairo, and 1059, July 31, 1943, 5 p.m., to Cairo, ibid., pp. 800 and 802, respectively, concerning remarks to be made to the King by Lt. Col. Harold B. Hoskins, on special mission for President Roosevelt to confer with King Ibn Saud.↩
- For correspondence concerning the Soviet interest in oil concessions in Iran, see pp. 445 ff.; regarding the Soviet interest in a free port on the Persian Gulf, see telegram 737, October 7, 3 p.m., from Tehran, p. 454.↩