891.51A/1120: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran ( Ford )

303. The following is the proposed note to the Prime Minister, referred to in the Department’s preceding instruction:

“The American Government has observed with growing anxiety the increasing intensity and frequency of the attacks being made against the American advisers in the Iranian Majlis and press. The failure [Page 403] of the Iranian authorities to give the persons attacked the support which they have the right to expect not only as foreign advisers but also as high officials of the Iranian Government has been observed in Washington with especial surprise and concern.

It should be recalled that the American advisers were sent to Iran at the repeated and insistent request of the Iranian Government. The Department of State has done its utmost to cooperate, by selecting men of ability and integrity to staff the various missions and to expedite their departure in spite of war restrictions on travel. The Iranian authorities were confidently expected to be no less cooperative in return.

The Legation endeavored to make clear to the Iranian Government from the outset that it was worse than useless to send advisers to Iran unless they were given full support and sympathy by all persons concerned and that the American Government would hardly feel justified in continuing its efforts to furnish advisers unless the Iranian Government shared this attitude. This viewpoint was expressed to Prime Minister Qavam on August 11, 1942, by Minister Dreyfus acting under the Department’s instructions.98 It is only after receiving the Prime Minister’s warm assurances of support for the advisers that the Department agreed to lend its assistance.

The Department deprecates any suggestion that American advisers were sent to Iran to act as mere political buffers. They were sent to Iran to assist the Iranian Government to rebuild its financial and economic structure which had suffered so severely because of the war, and for no other purpose. The American Government would welcome assurances that the Iranian Government concurs in our view of the purpose of the adviser program.

Moreover, it is sincerely hoped, for the ultimate benefit of Iran and in the interests of the cordial relations existing between our two countries, that the Iranian Government may be able to bring about an atmosphere of harmony in which the advisers will be able to accomplish the task which they have undertaken and which the Department ardently desires be carried to a successful conclusion.

President Roosevelt, in sponsoring and signing the Declaration on Iran of December 1, 1943,99 manifested his sincere desire to devote the influence of the United States and its available resources to the assistance of Iran. The American adviser program is a prominent implementation of this policy. If the Iranian Government and people do not desire this help, the American Government has no intention of pressing them to continue to accept it.”

Hull
  1. For Department’s instruction, see telegram 207, August 8, 1942, 8 p.m., to Tehran, Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. iv, p. 245; for the Minister’s reply, see telegram 257, August 11, 1942, 4 p.m., ibid.
  2. For text of the Declaration Regarding Iran, signed December 1, 1943, at Tehran by President Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Churchill, and Soviet Premier Stalin, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 646; for correspondence concerning efforts by the United States in 1944 to implement the Declaration, see ante, pp. 306 ff.