711.91/7–1244: Telegram
The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 13—10:27 a.m.]
494. Having just weathered with fair success another American adviser crisis80 in Iran, Legation feel it desirable to enlist Department’s aid in clarifying and perhaps strengthening our policy in Iran. Although situation is now more calm following recent period of acute uncertainty, the forces which created crisis are still existent and may be expected shortly to step up campaign to discredit our efforts here.
Two courses appear open to us and whether we take one or the other would seem to depend upon future role we hope to play in Middle Eastern affairs. One would ultimately return us to relatively unimportant position we occupied before war, present implementation [sic]. It would require only that we keep Iranians reasonably satisfied regarding our good intentions in order to protect our military supply line. Being designed for present usage only it would lead nowhere and so would necessitate no longer range consideration. In this connection it seems to me that as the threat to military operations formally [formerly?] presented by disturbed conditions in Iran no longer looms so large, I think Axis defeats will deter any important group from endeavoring to interfere seriously. The tribes even though discontented with conditions do not appear disposed to provoke the Allied forces and most Axis agents have been rounded up. The formal alignment of Iran with the United Nations81 also helps in this regard. The maintenance of civil food supply and transport and improvement of general economic conditions, of course, remain important from security standpoint but I am not sure we can assume that this could not be accomplished after a fashion by the British and/or Russians without our help if we should decide to abandon the Iranians to whatever fate their neighbors might choose for them.
The second course open to us would necessitate a stronger and broader implementation of policy than we have hitherto attempted. As I see it, we would have to decide that our interests in Iran political [Page 341] and economic, practical and idealistic, are sufficiently important to warrant continuing strong affirmative action regardless of whether or not such action could be directly related to the prosecution of the war; this is true premise adopted by the British and Soviets who by no means restrict their activities in Iran to promotion of the war effort.
This second course would require the active unconditional cooperation of each agency of our Government which could in any way help with Iranian problems. It would require a new directive to PGC82 which without subordinating our war effort would nevertheless provide for affirmative present participation by our military in building up our prestige and realizing our hopes for a future prominent position in Iran. It would require strong unequivocal backing by the Department of our advisers in their efforts to strengthen Iran. A policy of all-out continuing advice and assistance based partly on our presently enunciated aim of helping Iran to help herself and partly on our determination to assume a positive rather than negative position in the Middle East would be imperative.
This Legation keenly aware of actual or potential Russian and British opposition and faced daily with adviser problems largely the result of proffered help to an ignorant people dominated by leaders who prefer not to be helped is nevertheless inclined to favor the second harder course. The hoped-for acquisition of an oil concession in Iran83 is alone sufficient to justify a strong stand here both now and in the future. The long-range protection of our oil concessions on the Arabian side of the Persian Gulf84 and the potentialities of Iran as a market for American goods present further reasons for such a course. And beyond these concrete considerations there is the desirability, long recognized by the Department, of preventing Iran from continuing to be a bone of contention and source of friction between Great Britain and the Soviet Union. But if we decide to follow this line we must do the following things:
- 1.
- Restate our policy clearly and firmly and make it understood and accepted by all agencies of the United States Government and so far as may be politic by the American Adviser and the Iranian and Allied Governments. (There are still Americans in Iran including General Connolly and some of the advisers who profess that the United States had no policy toward this country.)
- 2.
- Obtain the affirmative cooperation of the War Department in issuing directives to its forces here to render concrete aid separate and distinct from the overall war effort in furtherence of our policy—a policy based upon our long-range objective rather than the exigencies of the moment. (This is not to belittle General Connolly’s piecemeal [Page 342] assistance which has proven useful in current emergencies but is of no great value in the permanent structure our advisers are trying to build.)
- 3.
- Treat Iran’s needs for supplies and her other economic problems on a basis at least as favorable as that applied to other countries whose good will and well-being we especially desire to promote. This would involve convincing the economic agencies of our Government, once and for all, that Iran is a country of immediate interest to the United States and not a “sphere of British responsibility”.
- It would also involve reduced emphasis on immediate cash return for our assistance.
- 4.
- Empower our ambassador here to exercise a firm overall (through [though?] behind the scenes) supervision over our entire adviser effort in this country. To make this effective, strengthen the Legation staff along the lines indicated in my airgram No. A–23 of June 6, 1944 and my despatch No. 980 of June 6, 1944.85
- 5.
- Strengthen the advisory mission when need arises by taking the initiative in replacing men who for any reason do not measure up to the requirements of the situation. This would include replacing the head of the mission if necessary.
The Department’s ready understanding and vigorous support of forceful stand we felt obliged to take during the recent Millspaugh crises are deeply appreciated and lead me to believe that in the suggestions set forth above we may be merely outlining an attitude toward which the Department is already moving.
- For correspondence regarding this situation, see pp. 411–420.↩
- For correspondence regarding this matter, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. iv, pp. 428 ff.↩
- Persian Gulf (Service) Command.↩
- For correspondence concerning oil negotiations, see pp. 445 ff.↩
- For correspondence regarding United States concern for American oil interests in the Middle East, see pp. 8 ff.↩
- Neither printed.↩