Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, The Far East, Volume V

891.5018/36: Telegram

The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State

Tehran, April 15, 1944—11 a.m.
[Received 11:36 p.m.]

266. We have recently discussed grain collection prospects our 1944–45 harvest year with Millspaugh, MESC and British Embassy. Situation seems to be as follows:

(1) Despite excellent harvest in 1943, Iranian Government will have only small reserve of perhaps 25,000 tons on hand as it enters new crop year; (2) If northern provinces of Azerbaijan and Zenjan, and to some extent Khorassan, which are under Soviet occupation, had contributed even their minimum expected share, this reserve could have been larger by at least another 18,000 tons; (3) Joint Anglo-American efforts have produced results 25% above original target in southern areas of Iran; (4) At most an average harvest for country as a whole is expected for the coming crop year, but good harvest is again anticipated in Zenjan and Azerbaijan as well as other northern provinces.

Because of expected smaller harvest, Millspaugh fears large-scale hoarding may make collections difficult unless something is done quickly to establish public confidence. He therefore wishes to have at an early date a guarantee from Allies, including Soviets, along lines of 1942 grain agreement.⁵³ Along with guarantee, Millspaugh feels Allies should make early shipment to Iran of about 10,000 tons grain. In addition to assisting in establishment of confidence and so helping collections, such an actual delivery would enable Iranian Government further to reduce prices paid for grain, with wholesome effect upon economy of country as whole. (It is proposed in any case to reduce grain prices by about 10%.) Amount delivered if not ultimately needed by Iran, could be returned later to Allied Armies or other agencies this area. Although British Embassy, MESC, Tehran and ourselves agree that guarantee would be desirable, Dr. Murray⁵⁴ of MESC, Cairo, tells us that Allied Governments would probably find difficulty in assuming an obligation of this kind in light of present world grain supply and transport situation, increasing Allied commitments, and shortage of shipping. It is therefore doubly necessary that complete Soviet cooperation with Iranian authorities be obtained in order to ensure collection and delivery to Tehran, from next harvest, of at least 25,000 tons from Zenjan and Azerbaijan, as well as normal amounts from other northern provinces. (25,000 tons is well within capacity of two provinces cited). Important reason for unsatisfactory results during present harvest year in north has been refusal of Soviet authorities to allow foreign advisers to Iranian Government free access to and freedom of movement in Soviet zone. Such freedom of action is essential for adequate organization and coordination of Iranian Government’s transport and grain collection operations in the area. Although Soviet authorities have recently issued 3-month permit for Azerbaijan to an American employee of Cereals and Bread Section,⁵⁵ there is no assurance that they will continue this slightly more liberal attitude. The fact that 3-month limit was imposed is not good augury for future grain operations in the region.

In summary, if times were normal it would appear that Iran could be self-sustaining in grain for 1944–45. Under present conditions, however, and in view of anticipated serious deficit in extreme southern districts, it seems that Allied Governments must choose between three alternatives: (1) making sure that maximum possible surplus of grain from northern provinces is moved to Tehran; (2) bringing in grain from outside Iran; (3) risking famine conditions in certain districts of the south.

British Embassy is sending similar telegram to London.

I would appreciate an indication of Department’s views.

Paraphrase by air mail to Cairo for Landis.

Ford

53. Tripartite food agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Iran, signed at Tehran, December 4, 1942, 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1835, or Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 292; for correspondence regarding this agreement and the 1942 food crisis, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. iv, pp. 120 ff.
54. Keith Murray, Food Director, Middle East Supply Center, Cairo.
55. The Cereals and Bread Section of the Millspaugh Mission, of which Albert C. Black, formerly Governor of the Farm Credit Administration in the United States Department of Agriculture, had been appointed Chief Administrator.