740.0011 Stettinius Mission/136
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Foy D. Kohler of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs
| Participants: | British: | Sir Maurice Peterson, K.C.M.G., Under |
| Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; | ||
| Mr. C. W. Baxter, C.M.G., M.C., Head, Eastern Dept; | ||
| Hon. R. M. A. Hankey, Eastern Dept; | ||
| Mr. William Hilary Young, Eastern Department, FO | ||
| American: | Mr. Wallace Murray, State Department; | |
| Mr. Foy D. Kohler, State Department; | ||
| Mr. Robert Coe, American Embassy. |
Mr. Murray opened the discussion by stating that the Department had been increasingly apprehensive about Soviet economic exploitation of the Russian zone in Iran, contrary to the Atlantic Charter, the Tehran Declaration and Soviet pledges to Iran. He cited in particular the onerous Soviet-Iranian financial agreement of March 18, 1943, the agreement between Iran and Russia for the manufacture of small arms and ammunition; the agreements of November, 1943 for the disadvantageous exchange of Iranian rice against Russian cotton piece and other goods; and the Russian requirement that the Iranians pay for road and railway maintenance in the Soviet zone and for other railway services provided to the Russians. Mr. Murray said that while direct representations to the Russians on these points would obviously not be fruitful, the Department had felt that talks based upon the implementation of the Tehran Declaration might be desirable and, we hope, lead to a more cooperative attitude on the part of the Russians.
Sir Maurice said that the Foreign Office completely sympathized as to the desirability of getting the Russians to ease up on Persia. He felt, however, that Russian diplomatic representatives abroad are given so little latitude by their Government that it would probably not be productive to take the matter up “cold” in Tehran itself or in Washington or London. In this connection he said that the former Soviet Ambassador Maisky had called on him last year and presented a new counsellor who was familiar with Iranian matters. When Sir [Page 323] Maurice suggested that he would be glad to see the counsellor and discuss Iran from time to time the Ambassador said that such matters should be discussed with him (Maisky). The net result was that the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office seldom has an opportunity to talk with the Russians about Middle Eastern matters. Consequently Sir Maurice thought that the question must first be broached in Moscow. He expressed some doubt as to whether any conversations were likely to be fruitful so long as the Russians continued to carry the principal military burden on land and to be as conscious of this as they are at present and thought that we should have to give careful consideration to the timing of any approach. Sir Maurice suggested, however, that a list of points which we would be interested in trying to cover with the Soviets be drawn up during our current talks. The list could then be cleared with the Northern Department in the Foreign Office and, after Mr. Murray’s return to Washington, with the appropriate authorities in the State Department so that an agreed basis might be established on which we could proceed at the appropriate time.
During the resulting discussion on Soviet-Iranian relations the Foreign Office representative said that the marked friendliness which the Russians had shown toward the Iranians at the time of the Tehran Conference had now been replaced by a policy of sulking, due mainly to Russian resentment over Persian resistance to the conditions requiring reception of Soviet officers by the Iranians in connection with the USSR’s recent offer of planes and tanks.50 The point was made by Mr. Hankey that perhaps we and the British could make more headway in helping the Persians in such situations of Soviet exploitation if the Persians would put up more resistance in advance, since it was much easier for the British and American Governments to back up a Persian stand in these matters than to try to talk the Russians out of something which had become an accomplished fact. Sir Maurice cited as an example that the Iranians had not consulted either the British or Americans before ceding to the Russians on the small arms manufacturing deal and expressed the opinion that this onerous contract might have been avoided or at least ameliorated if the Iranians had taken a stand and had been backed up by the Americans and British.
Mr. Baxter raised the point as to whether it would be desirable to include the Persians in the proposed talks with the Russians. After some discussion it was agreed that it would be better not to include [Page 324] the Persians, at least at the beginning, but that arrangements should be made to keep them currently informed.
Referring to Iranian financial difficulties, Mr. Murray suggested the possibility that British goods might be provided to Iran on a credit basis instead of against cash as now required by the UKCC.51 Sir Maurice replied that he had understood that Iran actually had excess sterling, mainly from Anglo-Iranian oil royalties, and that the British were in fact favoring the Persians by thus removing inflationary possibilities. He had thought that the main trouble was a shortage of rials due to the absorption of a large quantity of currency by the Soviets. However, he said that the British would be glad to look into this matter to see if the adoption of a credit procedure in regard to payment for British goods would ease the situation.
Mr. Murray expressed the Department’s appreciation of the support which the British have given to the American advisers to the Iranian Government. He said he thought that the Russians were inclined to be suspicious of these advisers and Sir Maurice agreed that the Foreign Office had received indications confirming that this was the Russian attitude. Sir Maurice continued that the British were wholeheartedly behind the American advisers for a number of reasons. To mention only the lowest motive, and he begged us to believe that they had higher ones as well, the British consider that foreign advisers are indispensable and realize that British nationals would not under present circumstances be suitable. Consequently, they were glad indeed to have the advisers be of American origin. He said that there was only one aspect of the adviser program which he would venture to mention with some diffidence and that was an apparent need for better coordination. To illustrate, he said that while Millspaugh desired on the one hand to economize, General Ridley and Colonel Schwartzkopf desired to expand and thus to spend. Sir Maurice accordingly hoped that the new American Ambassador, Mr. Leland Morris,52 would be the type of man who could “pull the team together”. Mr. Murray said that the Department was very interested in securing increasingly better coordination among the American advisers. He considered Mr. Morris well suited to effect such coordination and said that he would be instructed to do everything possible in this line. He added that the Department had recognized that Millspaugh had certain weaknesses in the administrative field, but that his knowledge of Persia and earlier experience in that country had in the Department’s view outweighed this weakness. Sir Maurice agreed and said that the British held Mr. Millspaugh in high esteem.
- An offer to provide Iran with 30 planes and 35 tanks, made originally by Soviet Premier Stalin to the Shah in a personal interview during the Tehran Conference. This failed to materialize because of Soviet insistence on a formal agreement, including provision for 250 Russian technicians and instructors to train the Iranians in operation of the vehicles, which the Iranian Government had declined. (891.24/625, 633, 641)↩
- United Kingdom Commercial Corporation.↩
- Leland B. Morris, appointed Ambassador to Iran on March 21, 1944, presented his credentials on September 7, 1944.↩