Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, General, Volume I

740.0011 Moscow/10–1843

Summary of the Proceedings of the Eleventh Session of the Tripartite Conference, October 29, 4 p.m.¹⁹

October 29, 1943, 4 p.m.

At the opening of the session, on behalf of the Drafting Committee Mr. Vyshinski reported on the status of the drafts for the Italian Advisory Council and the proposed London Commission.

In regard to the first Mr. Vyshinski said that some differences of opinion had arisen in regard to the representation on this Council and a few minor points of drafting. In regard to the composition of the Council he said that although the opening paragraph provided that the Advisory Council should be composed of representatives of the three powers here and of the French Committee of National Liberation, in subsequent paragraphs it appeared that through the inclusion of Greece and Yugoslavia the Council would be composed of representatives of six powers. The minor drafting points were cleared up at the conference.

Mr. Eden stated that on the question of the composition of the Council his Government felt very strongly that Greece and Yugoslavia should be represented since both of those countries had suffered greatly at Italian hands and had contributed in no small measure to the Italian defeat. He then proposed an amendment to the effect that the High Commissioners of Greece and Yugoslavia should be brought in as full members of the Council as soon as the original four members considered it desirable.

Mr. Molotov then said that from the correspondence between the President and Marshal Stalin²⁰ it was clear that Mr. Roosevelt had desired to limit the representation on the Politico-Military Commission in Algiers to the representatives of the three powers here and participation of the French Committee was to be on a limited basis.

The Secretary then said that it was his understanding that the President’s views to which Mr. Molotov referred related to the Politico-Military Commission which was originally intended to sit in Algiers and not to the immediate question under discussion, namely the Inter-Allied Advisory Council for Italy. He went on to say that he thought the President had felt it would not be advisable to have any other groups or elements given voting power on this Commission. He added, referring to the Advisory Council for Italy, that a proposal had been received from our military authorities regarding its composition and Mr. Hackworth and the Drafting Committee had therefore supported that view.

Mr. Molotov said he had understood the Secretary’s remark to be in conformity with the President’s message of October 17 to Marshal Stalin on the subject of the Politico-Military Commission.²¹

Mr. Eden then stated that the Politico-Military Commission was one thing and the Italian Advisory Council was another. He said that the proposal for the latter had been agreed upon by General Eisenhower to include representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, the French Committee, Greece and Yugoslavia. He said that he had always regarded the Politico-Military Commission as originally planned as having now become the proposed London Commission.

Mr. Molotov suggested that the question of the Italian Advisory Council be resubmitted to the Drafting Committee.

Mr. Vyshinski then turned to the question of the London Commission.^21a He said that there were disagreements in the Drafting Committee on two points: (1) the composition of the Commission, and (2) its terms of reference. On the first point he said that the Soviet representative on the Drafting Committee considered that provision should be made in paragraph one, in conformity with the spirit of the British memorandum of July l,^21b to include other members of the United Nations when their interests were involved, whereas the British and American representatives desired to confine the Commission to three members. On the second point of disagreement Mr. Vyshinski said that the Soviet view was that the Commission should deal in the beginning only with the questions involved in the termination of hostilities and the drawing up of armistice terms, whereas the British and American view was that the Commission should have broad consultative powers on all European questions connected with the war.

Mr. Eden pointed out in this connection that in the last analysis the Commission would deal only with questions which the three Governments considered advisable to submit to it and that already the Conference itself had referred to the proposed London Commission several questions such as liberated territories, the administration of France, attitude toward Germany, which were outside the narrow question of armistice terms.

Mr. Molotov said that he merely wanted to make sure that the London Commission would have clearly defined functions as otherwise its work would be needlessly complicated, and he felt that the document setting up the commission should express unequivocally its exact purposes.

Mr. Eden then proposed, in regard to the terms of reference of the Commission, that paragraph two be changed so as to limit the terms of reference to European questions connected with the ending of the war. He added that if membership was not limited to the three powers represented here every other Government in Europe or in exile would want membership.

Mr. Molotov replied that the British Government did not appear to have had this feeling on July 1. Mr. Molotov’s proposal to resubmit the draft on the proposed London Commission to the Drafting Committee was accepted.

After the intermission the Conference turned to the consideration of the United States proposal on economic questions under Item 15. The Secretary said that several days ago he had distributed to the Conference four documents: 15 (a) dealing with cooperation in the rehabilitation of damage in the U.S.S.R.;²² 15 (b) joint action for assistance to other countries;²³ 15 (c) collaboration on an international basis dealing with matters such as food and agriculture, transport and communications, finance and trade, and the International Labor Office;²⁴ and 15 (d) dealing with the question of reparations.²⁵ The Secretary then said he would like to know if it would be agreeable to the British and Soviet representatives here to express their views on the general principles laid down in these documents and also when the Soviet Government might be prepared to submit to the Government of the United States, and to other Governments if it so desired, estimates of the specific kinds and amounts of goods needed from abroad for the rehabilitation of war damage in the U.S.S.R.

Mr. Molotov said that his Government approved the idea advanced in the United States proposal under Item 15(a) to have negotiations-on this question conducted between representatives of the Soviet Government and the United States Embassy in Moscow.

The Secretary then said that in regard to the United States document under Item 15 (b) he would like to have the views of the British and Soviet representatives on the first sentence of paragraph two which reads: “We believe that it would be desirable to have the longer-range work of reconstruction dealt with on a cooperative, joint-action basis.”

Mr. Molotov said that he could approve that proposal but he would suggest an addition which would make it clear that the assistance would be given primarily to members of the United Nations.

The Secretary replied that the whole scheme had been originated for the purpose of assisting the United Nations and possibly some neutral states. He went on to say that his purpose in submitting these documents was not to put before the Conference concrete proposals which would be discussed or agreed upon here, but merely to give an indication to the Soviet and British Governments of the lines along which the American Government was working in preparing the ground for the proper consideration of economic questions after the war. He added that all of these questions were interrelated and that he recalled very clearly the inadequate preparation on economic matters at the time of the Versailles Conference and the incalculable harm which the world suffered as a result of the inadequate treatment of economic problems after the last war. He wished to ensure that this time economic questions should be considered in good time. He mentioned that informal conversations had been in progress between the British and American Governments on some of these related economic matters and the Soviet Government had been cordially invited to participate.^25a He hoped that the Soviet Government would find it possible to take part.

Mr. Molotov said that he could state that the Soviet Government viewed favorably the general principles set forth in the first three of the four United States documents submitted by the Secretary on economic questions. However, in regard to the fourth, 15(d), there were certain objections from the Soviet point of view to the purposes set forth in paragraph one and he therefore did not believe that it would be wise to set up a special commission for [reparation] until these purposes were more clearly defined and agreed upon.

Mr. Eden said that he was sure that his Government was in general agreement with the principles outlined in the documents submitted by the Secretary to the Conference, but that naturally the subject would require very close and detailed study.

Mr. Molotov agreed that before any commission could be established for the study of these economic questions the three Governments should give further study to the entire question.

The Secretary said he merely wished to remark that he regarded all these questions as interrelated and that a rise in the living standards of the peoples of the world was only possible through the proper consideration and treatment [of] the various related economic questions.

The Secretary then said that he had circulated to the Conference a paper²⁶ setting forth certain views of his Government considering desirable policy in regard to dependent peoples but that he realized that there was not sufficient time for the Conference to consider this question.

Mr. Eden replied that he was not prepared to discuss this question but he could state that his Government was not in agreement with the views set forth in the Secretary’s paper on the question.

Mr. Molotov said that he felt that the question of dependent peoples should receive further study and that his Government attached great importance to this matter.

The Conference then turned to the consideration of the question of Poland. Mr. Eden said it was a matter of great regret to his Government that no diplomatic relations existed between Poland and the Soviet Union, both members of the United Nations, and he felt a great personal regret at this situation since he had taken an active part in the establishment in July 1941 of relations between those two countries.²⁷ He said that his Government was prepared to make any contribution that it could at this Conference looking toward a reestablishment of those relations. He mentioned the fact that the Polish Government had recently requested that the combined chief s-of-staff of the United States and the United Kingdom send arms to the Polish resistance movement in order that they might carry out increased sabotage against German lines of communication. Up to the present only small quantities of explosives and some money had been sent to the Polish underground and the combined chief s-of-staff before making a decision on the request of the Polish Government desired to have the views of their Soviet allies on this point.

Mr. Molotov said that even though he was not a military man it was quite clear that the most important factor in the sending of arms anywhere was to make sure that these arms fell into reliable hands and would be used for the purpose intended. He went on to say that the Soviet Union was of course vitally interested in the question of relations with Poland since Poland was a neighboring country and he felt that was a question that primarily concerned the Soviet Union and Poland. He said he wished to make clear that the Soviet Government stood for the independence of Poland, but there must also be a Polish Government which entertained friendly feelings toward the Soviet Union and it was precisely this element which was lacking. He repeated that not only did the Soviet Government desire to see an independent Poland but was prepared to help it provided there was a Polish Government friendly to the Soviet Union. He said that there were other United Nations who through no fault of the Soviet Government have no diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, but in the case of Poland he thought it was a question that primarily concerned the two countries.

The Secretary then said that in so far as his Government was concerned when two neighbors fell out the other neighbors, without going into the causes or merits of the dispute, were entitled to express the hope that these differences could be patched up. He added that in the United States there were groups of people friendly toward Poland and others who were likewise friendly toward the Soviet Union, and that without knowing the causes of the dispute these elements in the United States did hope that the two neighbors would be able to reestablish normal and friendly relations.

Mr. Molotov said that that was also the hope of the Soviet Government.

Mr. Eden said that he was in the same position as the Secretary in so far as the British people went, but that the position of the British Government was complicated by the fact that they had treaties with both Poland and the Soviet Union. He said that just prior to his departure the Polish Prime Minister and the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs had expressed a desire to reestablish good relations with the Soviet Union.

Mr. Molotov replied that this was the first that the Soviet Government had heard of this desire and that he merely wished to add that the Polish division on the Eastern front was fighting heroically against the common enemy.

Mr. Eden said that he hoped there would soon be other Polish divisions fighting the Germans and that any delay which had occurred in that was due to the decision of the British military leaders who felt that the Polish troops had been insufficiently trained and not the fault of the Poles.

Mr. Molotov then remarked that he believed that General Sosnkov-ski,²⁸ as was well known, had opposed Sikorski²⁹ when the latter reestablished relations with the Soviet Union.

Mr. Eden then said that he had spoken his piece on the subject of Poland and merely desired to reiterate that his Government was prepared to make any contribution which would be found possible looking toward the reestablishment of friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Poland.

The Secretary then inquired whether Mr. Molotov had any suggestion as to the time of signature of the Four-Nation Declaration.

Mr. Molotov suggested that the signature might take place at the end of tomorrow’s session.

Mr. Molotov then inquired as to the status of the proposal^29a he had made previously concerning the setting up of a commission of representatives of the three powers to study the question of the future establishment of a world organization.

The Secretary said that he was strongly in favor of Mr. Molotov’s proposal in general but that he felt that the same results could be achieved through less formal methods. He was fearful that if a special committee was set up for this purpose political groups and other elements in the United States might give undesirable publicity to this commission and stir up agitation in regard to a future world organization. He therefore suggested that the three Governments designate representatives in one or another of the three capitals to act as a commission but not to announce it publicly.

Mr. Molotov said that he had not had in mind making a public announcement of the creation of any such commission.

Before closing the session Mr. Molotov inquired if the British had had any reply on the Soviet request for Italian ships, adding that he could not state that the reply from the United States Government³⁰ had been satisfactory.

Mr. Eden replied in the negative.

Mr. Molotov then said that he did not understand why such a simple question should be postponed and referred to the meeting of the three Heads of Government, particularly when the time of that meeting was still indefinite and it was not even sure that the meeting would take place in the near future.

The Secretary said that upon his return to Washington he intended to press for an early decision on the Soviet request and that in mentioning the proposed meeting of the three Heads of Government he felt that that was only one possible method of giving further consideration to the request.

The Conference then adjourned until four o’clock of the following day.

19. Drafted by Charles E. Bohlen of the American delegation.
20. See pp. 782–800, passim.
21. See letter of October 18, 1943, from the Chargé in the Soviet Union to the Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, p. 562.
22. See Conference Document No. 8, p. 710.
23. See Conference Document No. 7, p. 708, and footnote 84, p. 710.
22. Conference Document No. 36, p. 739.
23. Annex 8 to the Secret Protocol, p. 763.
24. Annex 9 to the Secret Protocol, p. 763.
25. Conference Document No. 39, p. 740.
26. For documentation on discussions regarding postwar economic policy and monetary and financial arrangements, see pp. 1054 and 1099 ff.
26. Document No. 44, p. 747. The Secretary of State submitted a copy of this proposal to Mr. Molotov on October 24. At the same time, Mr. Hull informed the British delegation of his action. On October 26, Mr. Eden addressed an informal note to Mr. Hull stating that the draft declaration had reached his hands at the close of his visit to Washington in March 1943 (vol. iii, pp. 1 ff.), and that subsequently he had had conversations with Ambassador Winant in London. “From what I said to Mr. Winant on that occasion”, Mr. Eden wrote, “you will have learnt that the memorandum and draft resolution would not be acceptable to His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom in their present form.” (740.0011 Moscow/342)
27. For correspondence regarding interest of the United States in measures culminating in the signature of the Polish-Soviet Agreement in London on July 30, 1941, establishing diplomatic relations between the two Governments, see Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. i, pp. 240–248, passim. For correspondence relating to the interest of the United States in the reestablishment of relations between the Polish Government in Exile in London and the Soviet Government following the rupture on April 25, 1943, see ibid., 1943, vol. iii, pp. 389–494, passim.
28. Gen. Kazimierz Sosnkowski resigned as Deputy Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile in London on July 26, 1941, in protest against the decision to conclude the Polish-Soviet Agreement of July 30, 1941.
29. Gen. Wladyslaw Sikorski, Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile.
30. See Conference Document No. 5, p. 705.
30. See telegram No. 262234, October 26, from President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State, p. 643. On October 28 Mr. Hull informed Mr. Molotov of the position set forth in President Roosevelt’s telegram, and—perhaps in the light of the reference, in the telegram, to the determination of title to the Italian ships “at a later date”—he added, “Further discussion should be held between the staffs of our three Governments, or perhaps by the heads of Governments”; Hull, Memoirs, vol. ii, p. 1302. On October 20, 1943, Prime Minister Churchill cabled Mr. Eden that “it would be better to put off this question till ‘Eureka’ “(The Tehran Conference, November 22–December 1, 1943); Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 295. For further documentation on the question, see Foreign Relations. The Conference at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, under index entry: “Italy: Soviet Union, request for Italian naval and merchant shipping.”