Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, General, Volume I

740.0011 Moscow/10–2843

Record of the Tenth Meeting of the Tripartite Conference Held at the Guest House of the Peoples Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, October 28, 1943, 4 p.m.

October 28, 1943, 4 p.m.

Present:	Mr. Eden
	Sir A. Clark Kerr
	Lt.-General Sir H. Ismay
	Colonel Price
	Mr. Cordell Hull
	Mr. A. Harriman
	Major-General Deane
	Brigadier-General Vandenberg
	Captain Ware
	Mr. Molotov
	Marshal Voroshilov
	Major-General Gryzlov
	Mr. Vyshinski
	Mr. Berezhkov
Interpreters:	Mr. Pavlov
	Mr. Birse

Mr. Molotov was the chairman of the meeting.

Mr. Molotov stated that questions would be welcomed and an exchange of views desired on the topic to be discussed at this meeting, namely: the shortening of the war against Germany and her allies in Europe. It was indicated that the possibility of the entry into the war by Turkey and Sweden would be discussed.

Marshal Voroshilov gratefully acknowledged the two written reports received, one from Lt.-General Ismay, and one from Major-General Deane.¹⁷ He indicated that he wanted clarification on a particular point. He referred to the prerequisite condition of having in northern Europe not more than 12 full divisions of mobile troops at the disposal of the Nazis at the moment of the planned Allied invasion across the channel. Marshal Voroshilov asked if there were not 12, but 13 or 14 divisions, would the invasion go ahead as planned. What was the range? If 15 or 16 divisions, then what? If the Germans had that many mobile divisions, would that serve as a reason for postponing the moment of attack, or effect difficulties? What is the measuring stick by which this number of 12 divisions was arrived at? If reliance is placed upon military intelligence, how can it be determined whether or not the Germans can move 15 divisions more or less, along the lines of communication?

Lt.-General Ismay outlined some of the major difficulties which would be met in connection with invasion operations. Ports in Northern France are prepared for complete demolition by the Germans, and could not be counted on for use by the Allies until 60 days after capture. In calculating the number of mobile German divisions available to combat the cross-Channel operation, it is impossible to be precise. The estimate of 12 divisions is an approximation. The actual number the Germans may have available depends on their preoccupation elsewhere. At the present time it does not look as though the Germans would have divisions to spare from any other front.

Marshal Voroshilov May God see it so.

Lt.-General Ismay In this cross-Channel operation, the whole weight of Allied air support is expected. German communications will be hampered by the bombing of road and rail lines. At this time, bombing of industrial Germany will be suspended to offer further support to the operation of bombing lines of communication. Approximately 4,000 bombers will be available at that time.

Mr. Molotov Do these statements represent the official attitude?

Mr. Hull The attitude of the British and American governments together with the experience of the military General Staff.

Mr. Molotov asked whether the affirmation made at Quebec regarding the cross-Channel operation in early spring of 1944 is still valid.

Mr. Eden asserted that the decision made at Quebec is still valid. This decision, however, is not a binding legal contract; though we will do all in our power to work out the plan which we are following for our common aim.

Mr. Hull stated that the situation at this time is that Lt.-General Ismay and Major-General Deane have in the frankest manner made statements to the appropriate Soviet officials, and that these officials will be kept regularly informed of future developments. This should result in a working relationship between the general staffs of these governments.

Mr. Molotov thanked Mr. Hull and Lt.-General Ismay for the above expressed views, in which he himself joins. The meeting, therefore, has a positive value in this respect, and will have its beneficial effect on the populace in the U.S.A., United Kingdom and U.S.S.R. Then Mr. Molotov proposed a decision on the first part of the question put forward by the Soviet delegation, on the shortening of the war against Germany and her allies in Europe. He suggested that a formulation of this decision together with the written reports presented by Lt.-General Ismay and Major-General Deane be made a part of the protocol of the Conference. The draft decision is to express facts only, to contain nothing not stated at the Conference. There should be a reiteration of statements and a clarification of suggestions which had been brought up. The Soviet delegation expressed the hope that events decided upon for the spring of 1944 will be carried out as planned. Mr. Molotov suggested that the document be drawn up with the British and American views on each point stated on one side of the page, and the Soviet on the other side of the page.

Mr. Hull expressed his desire to have this proposal in writing, to avoid misunderstanding and possible suspicion.

Mr. Molotov stated that from the beginning he proposed to have these things in writing, and that he sees no grounds either for misunderstanding or suspicion. The Soviet delegation has reason to hope that the measures in draft will be carried out; and would want a generally accepted agreement that we can all count on: Mr. Eden, Mr. Harriman and Mr. Molotov.

Mr. Eden remarked that we have tried to be completely frank, and that after we see the documents, he feels sure a generally acceptable agreement can be worked out. He added that last night when talking with Mr. Molotov and Mr. Stalin, he had told them of the latest developments just as he would have told them to Mr. Churchill.

Mr. Molotov suggested passing to the next question.

Mr. Hull would want the President and General Staff to look it over first, if anything new was to be inserted into the discussion.

Mr. Molotov assured that no new element was contemplated, and that it would all be within the limits of the protocol.

Mr. Hull remarked that he just didn’t want the heads of government and their respective military staffs to think that we at the Conference were trying to take over their functions. Mr. Hull said that he felt that a meeting between the three heads of government would be desirable and that he hoped it was being contemplated.

Mr. Molotov remarked that the heads of government and the general staffs have more important business to attend to than what we were considering at the Conference.

Mr. Hull said that we came here with the idea of talking about the cross-Channel operation and reiterating our intentions; and that we will continue to inform the Soviet government periodically as to current developments. In this connection, Mr. Hull said he hoped for mutual understanding.

Mr. Molotov thanked Mr. Hull for this explanation, stating that these were his ideas, too; and that this is the purpose of the Military Mission in Moscow.

Returning to the question of the formulation of the accomplishments of the Conference, Mr. Molotov reminded us that we all would be asked how the Conference concluded, what answer shall we give? The formulation of the answer should help our common cause. Therefore, a generally accepted statement would be desirable, in a finally agreed form.

Mr. Eden said we must look it over, and that he thinks we can reach an agreed form. At this point, Mr. Eden brought up the question of information. We both expect to be operating in Europe on a larger scale. We would like much more information on the successes of the Russians against the German armies. We have given our information, but now are getting less information on Soviet action than before. The desire for more information does not stem from idle curiosity; but we have lots to learn. Mr. Eden suggested that the protocol should include a statement to the effect that all information, military and technical, regarding the mutual enemy be made mutually available.

Mr. Molotov said he considers Mr. Eden’s request quite natural. He said that until today he had not heard of such shortcomings in regard to information, that none had been mentioned to him or to Mr. Stalin. This matter should have the attention of the Conference. Mr. Molotov would like to ask Mr. Eden for his proposal in writing, and would like to facilitate a decision by holding a preliminary discussion with his military colleagues.

Intermission

Mr. Molotov then opened for discussion the question of Turkey and Sweden, stating that the communications from Mr. Eden and Mr. Hull¹⁸ had been received.

Mr. Eden said that he would like very much to see Turkey at war; that on this point his government agrees with the Soviet government. However, the question as to how this could be accomplished remained a question in his mind. A possible method has been suggested. Any other suggestion for any other method would be welcomed, especially if it could bring quicker results than the neutrality to non-belligerency method.

Mr. Molotov suggested that possibly we should consider Turkey and Sweden separately.

Mr. Hull reiterated the United States suggestion of requesting from Turkey air bases and the use of transportation facilities.

Mr. Molotov observed that so far no agreed opinion has been achieved on this point; that the 3 proposals give the impression of 3 points of view, Mr. Hull suggests that Turkey remain neutral but help the Allies, and that consequently it is not advisable to induce Turkey to enter the war. England’s proposal contains many points. To fully consider these would require two more conferences. But there is Mr. Eden’s proposal to change Turkey from a neutral to a non-belligerent country. Mr. Eden says it would be useful if Turkey entered the war as soon as possible, but the British government does not think it advisable to suggest to Turkey that she enter the war immediately. Therefore, the Soviet proposal to ask Turkey to enter the war immediately does not meet with the support of Mr. Eden and Mr. Hull and their respective governments. The Soviet attitude is that notwithstanding the difficulties indicated by the American and English delegations if Turkey were to enter the war now, nevertheless, the complications facing Hitler would be much greater than any which might develop for the Allies. Time is too short to fully go into the matter. If Turkey’s entrance into the war is to be postponed, why should she be receiving shipments of armament? Mr. Molotov suggested that it be announced to Turkey that further shipments of armament will be stopped if she fails to enter the war immediately. Bases, Mr. Molotov contended, would not be enough to request of Turkey at this time. Turkey’s participation is needed now; later it will not be so necessary, claimed Mr. Molotov, who concluded that therefore Turkey should be asked to come into the war now. A three-power request to Turkey, Mr. Molotov suggested, would not be disregarded.

Mr. Eden stated that in his opinion the request to Turkey merely on the basis of threatening to stop shipments would not be enough to get the desired result. Mr. Eden expressed a desire to communicate more with his government on this matter, reaffirming his desire to get Turkey into the war now.

Mr. Hull pointed out that Turkey has neither the necessary shipping nor supplies that would enable her to proceed efficiently with military movement. Furthermore, there is not enough U.S. shipping available to back up Turkey in a war at this time. He emphasized the already heavy commitments made by U.S. in the Mediterranean and Italy, and in preparation for the coming cross-Channel operations. Mr. Hull suggested that he would be glad to present the whole question for further consideration to the President and the U.S. military authorities.^18a

Mr. Molotov reiterated the Soviet position that bases were half-measures not of decisive importance, and that he would rather see Turkey’s immediate entry into the war. He added that the Soviet government was particularly interested in results now. The Soviet suggestion, he added, is now in the interest of Turkey as well as of the Soviet Union.

Mr. Hull underlined the U.S. opposition to the Soviet proposal, stating that we could not give Turkey the needed support in ships, armament and supplies because already our operations are very spread out all over the world.

Mr. Eden stated that in regard to Sweden, he had become better informed than previously, and that therefore he had now come to a conclusion counter to his first idea. Swedish airfields could not be used as effectively as existing ones now in the hands of the Allies.

Mr. Molotov raised the question of the possible use of Swedish air bases by the Soviet Union air force. The use of Swedish bases he said would be a step ahead compared to the present situation. Perhaps after further consultation with the military authorities, some conclusions may be reached.

Regarding Turkey and Sweden and measures for shortening the war, are there any other proposals? Is there anything else to suggest, if we do not take concrete serious measures concerning the Soviet proposals on this subject? Mr. Molotov emphasized that he still maintains that the matter of shortening the war is in the interest not only of the Soviet government. Admitting that the Soviet proposals may not be sufficiently worked-out or may be considered untimely—are there other proposals?

Mr. Eden stated that air bases in Turkey would be much more valuable than air bases in Sweden. He said he was willing to agree to the American proposal to further consider the question of Swedish air bases; and had nothing further to add to the picture presented by Lt.-General Ismay.

Mr. Molotov again stated that bases are too little to require of Turkey. Now that Italy is practically out of the war, Turkey should feel freer to act.

Mr. Hull brought up the proposal submitted by Major-General Deane in regard to air bases, meteorological stations, weather information, communications and transport.^18b Mr. Hull asked if the Russian experts would take up this proposal with Major-General Deane.

Mr. Molotov asked if there was any further discussion on proposals for shortening the war. Are there any new proposals?

Mr. Hull expressed the belief that if the General Staffs were in closer working relationship and if the heads of our respective governments were in closer cooperation, those questions would come to mind which had to be dealt with, and this would facilitate the conduct of the war more than anything. Mr. Hull said he believed this type of closer cooperation would come about, and that there are gratifying possibilities for the future.

Mr. Molotov said that Mr. Hull’s considerations are very valuable, but that we do not want to get away from the subject under discussion today. Therefore, let us continue with the question of shortening the war as quickly as possible. Let us confine ourselves to an exchange of views and conclusions which may be drawn. Tomorrow we shall discuss the economic phases of the same general question, at 3 o’clock.

The drafting committee reported that disagreements had arisen among themselves. These disagreements the committee would try to-liquidate. If these differences remained, however, they would be cleared up at the next session of the Conference. Tomorrow’s session begins at 3 p.m., with the draft report.

Session adjourned.

17. Marshal Voroshilov evidently referred to written texts of the statements presented orally at the session of October 20; these statements were subsequently included as Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 to the Most Secret Protocol, pp. 774 and 778, respectively.
18. For latter, see supra. Mr. Eden’s communication has not been found in Department files, but see the telegrams sent to him by Prime Minister Churchill, October 23 and 25, in Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: Closing the Rmg (Cambridge, 1951), pp. 288 and 289, respectively.
19. A telegram of October 29, 1943, from Mr. Hull to President Roosevelt (received at Washington October 31 and forwarded by the White House Map Room to President Roosevelt at Hyde Park) stated, with reference to this discussion of Turkey’s role in the war: “I held persistently to the view expressed in your telegram [i.e., that of October 26, 6:15 p.m., p. 644] but agreed that the matter might be the subject of further discussions by the Heads of Governments and informed Mr. Molotov that I should be pleased to present the Soviet views to you upon my return. It was agreed that the matter should be dropped during this conference and that the discussions be reported to the Heads of Government with a view to further consideration of the matter at a later date.”
20. See section (c) of the Most Secret Protocol, p. 773.