740.0011 European War 1939/24313
The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 16.]
Sir: I have the honor to present certain general observations which may be of some possible interest in evaluating the probable attitude of Spanish Morocco in the event of an Allied landing in French North Africa.
In the event of such a landing, whether in French Morocco, in Algeria or Tunisia, it may be expected that pressure would be exerted at once by the Axis upon Spain for aid and assistance in repelling the Allied forces. Such aid would comprise no doubt, in part, the granting of air and submarine bases in Spanish Morocco and possibly the use of Spanish troops for the purpose of creating a diversion in French Morocco, as well as the use of Spanish vessels for employment between the Peninsula and North Africa.
The attitude of Spanish Morocco toward such demands would depend, of course, very largely on the international situation at the moment and Spanish calculations concerning the respective chances for victory of the United Nations and the Axis. Inasmuch as since about December, 1941, Spanish sentiment, as reflected locally, has betrayed a loss of faith in the possibility of a German or Axis victory, and for the reason that since that time also Spanish disinclination to be involved in the war has steadily declined, it may be assumed on the basis of the actual present situation that, in the face of German demands such as those outlined above, every reasonable effort would be made to avoid acceding to them.
[Page 482]Spanish calculations in such an event would no doubt be based on the assumption that a yielding to German demands for assistance which went no farther even than the granting of air and submarine bases in Spanish Morocco would probably entail inevitably the involvement of Spain and Spanish Morocco in war against the United Nations. On the other hand, the Spanish would probably calculate that a refusal to grant such aid might not necessarily involve Spain in the war through the use of force by Germany to obtain such bases. (In evaluating this factor of course much would depend on the position at the moment of Germany and whether it might have the land or air forces necessary to bring substantial pressure against the Pyrenees frontier of Spain or against Spanish Morocco.)
A distinction must be made between the probable attitude of Metropolitan Spain and that of Spanish Morocco in the eventuality outlined above. It is possible, though not altogether probable, that a decision on the part of the Madrid Government to yield to Axis demands might be met with refusal by the authorities of Spanish Morocco to execute orders of the Central Government. It is known that General Orgaz, Spanish High Commissioner, is strongly desirous of maintaining the neutral character of Spanish Morocco and at a given moment it is by no means improbable that General Orgaz might, under favorable circumstances, be induced to decline to agree to the use by the Axis of Spanish Morocco as a base of operations even if permission therefor might be granted by the Madrid Government under pressure.
There is always the likelihood that as one strong inducement to persuade the Spanish to create a diversion on behalf of the Axis in the event of an Allied landing in French North Africa, the promise of Northern Morocco and of the region around Oran would be held out by the Germans to the Spanish as the price of their support. Northern Morocco, particularly the region north of the so-called Sebou line and the region in the vicinity of Oran, have been parts of French North Africa which have figured in Spanish territorial aspirations for many years. One of Spain’s territorial aspirations in Spanish North Africa, namely Tangier, was acquired by it in 1940 following the collapse of France when the troubled international situation made it possible for Spain to take at least temporary possession of Tangier when other interested Powers were too pre-occupied with other more important problems to interfere. There can be little doubt that Spain’s hesitancy to embark upon other territorial adventures in North Africa has been due to a consideration of the risks involved. One very important consideration which might curb the Spanish in undertaking a diversionary march into French Morocco from the north or into Oran from Melilla would be the realization that no single act would do more to solidify French sentiment [Page 483] actively against the Axis and in favor of the United Nations. It is on that account important that should an Allied landing at any time be undertaken in the future in French North Africa, the most explicit assurances should be given at once that the Allies entertain no territorial aspirations in North Africa. Such a declaration would do much to rally French assistance actively in behalf of the Allied cause in the event Spain should choose the moment of an Allied landing for an attempt to occupy any territory in French North Africa.
In presenting the foregoing considerations it must be emphasized that much, of course, will depend upon the complexion of the situation at the given moment, and this involves so many unpredictable factors that it would be idle to attempt to do more than sketch the possibilities in the broadest outlines.
Respectfully yours,