893.00/14866
The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State
No. 501
Chungking, July 7,
1942.
[Received July 31.]
Sir: I have the honor to enclose copy of a
despatch, dated July 5,62
from Mr. John Davies, Jr., Second Secretary of Embassy attached to the staff
of Lieutenant General Joseph Stilwell, U. S. A., Commanding General of the
American Army Forces in China, Burma and India. Mr. Davies’ despatch submits
copy of a memorandum to General Stilwell dated July 5,63 summarizing and commenting on
attached copies of memoranda of conversations with
- Madame Sun Yat Sen (widow of Dr. Sun Yat Sen)62
- General Chou En-lai (official representative at Chungking of the
Chinese Communist Party)64
- Mr. Chang Han-fu (Communist newspaper editor at Chungking)62
- Mr. Sun Fo (President of the Legislative Yuan; son of the late Dr.
Sun Yat Sen)62
- Mr. T. C. Lin (a former professor of Yunnan University, and
incidentally, the paid “Chinese consultant” of Dr. E. M. Gale,
representative in Chungking of Colonel William Donovan, coordinator
of Information at Washington. I have also heard Mr. Lin described as
an advisor to General Ho Ying-chin) .62
[Page 99]
The views of these several Chinese being summarized in Mr. Davies’
memorandum, there is no occasion for me to review them here. The Embassy
concurs in general with the comments made by Mr. Davies in his
memorandum.
Respectfully yours,
[Enclosure 1]
Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in
China (Davies) to the Commanding
General, American Army Forces in China, Burma, and India
(Stilwell)
Summary of and Comments on Recent
Conversations
The attached memoranda of conversations in Chungking are summarized and
commented upon in the following paragraphs.
Both Communist and Kuomintang officials interviewed anticipated a
Japanese attack on Siberia in the near future. This expectation appeared
to be based upon a belief that (1) Japan must round out its defensive
position, therefore the threat of Siberia must be eliminated; (2) as the
defeat of Germany would have disastrous effects upon Japan, a Japanese
attack on Siberia to ensure a prompt German victory over the Soviet
Union is indicated; and (3) time is operating against the Japanese,
consequently they must act promptly.
None of the Chinese interviewed suggested that the outbreak of
Russo-Japanese hostilities would be seized by the Chinese as an
opportunity for taking offensive action against the Japanese. The
Communists anticipated, in the event of a Russo-Japanese war, a
determined Central Government effort to crush the Communist forces in
Ningsia, Shensi and Shansi.
The Chinese interviewed all displayed what was to me, after talking to
some of our officers, a strange confidence that the Japanese would not
and could not knock out China. Chou En-lai said, and I think accurately,
that even though the Generalissimo were forced to fall back into
northwest China he would never capitulate to the Japanese.
Relations between the Central Government and the Communists would appear
to have deteriorated. Chou En-lai and Madame Sun were definite in their
statements that relations between the two sides had worsened with the
tightening of the Central Government’s blockade of the Communist area.
General Chou declared that 441,000 Central Government troops were
enforcing the blockade. Dr. Sun Fo and Mr. T. C. Lin sought to minimize
the significance of the blockade and suggested that the Communist forces
could not be considered effective and modern fighters.
[Page 100]
This general picture of mutual distrust and antipathy between the two
principal Chinese factions together with the apparent reluctance, with
which you are familiar, of the Government to expend its strength against
the Japanese lends color to Chou En-lai’s suggestion that the Central
Government military authorities are conserving their strength out of
domestic political consideration and leaving offensive action against
the Japanese primarily to the United States and the British Empire. In
this connection Madame Sun observed that the Central Government military
leaders were interested in problems closer to home than the retaking of
Burma.
General Chou and Mr. Chang Han-fu, the Communist editor, reacted
significantly to the subject of Chinese Government hints which have been
made from time to time of impending capitulation and the resultant
extension of American military and financial aid. The former remarked
that the Chinese intimations were made for the effect which they
produced. The latter asked why we did not call the bluffs.
It is not unlikely that their attitude reflects a belief that American
material aid to the Chinese Government will someday be turned against
the Communists.
Mr. Tsiang Ting-fu, Political Vice-Minister of the Executive Yuan, said
on June 27 that the Generalissimo’s attitude was that India should
immediately be granted independence and that General Chiang had not
hesitated to let the British know his position in the matter. Dr. Sun
seemed to hold some rather vague and not well-founded ideas on the
Indian problem. In contrast, the Communists and Madame Sun appeared to
be aware of the complexity of the problem. This was probably due in a
large measure to their realization that the Indian National Congress and
the Muslim League are reactionary on virtually every issue save that of
independence.
Mr. T. C. Lin’s forecast on the European war envisaged an Anglo-American
race against the Russians to Berlin. He also warned against the
development of a situation at the termination of the war in which the
Soviet Union would again feel itself isolated and compelled to build up
armaments sufficient to repel any possible combination of enemies. In
such a situation he foresaw the possibility of an Anglo-Japanese
understanding.
From my conversation with Mr. Tsiang and Mr. Lin I derived the impression
that these two gentlemen and the influential group in the Central
Government which they, in a minor capacity, represent are acutely aware
of the manoeuvering by each of the United Nations (excepting perhaps the
United States) to husband its military strength so that it may arrive at
the peace table with its maximum bargaining power. My guess is that the
Chinese Government is withholding
[Page 101]
offensive action against the Japanese and
conserving its strength out of international as much as domestic
political considerations.
[Enclosure 2]
Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in
China (Davies) to the Commanding
General, American Army Forces in China, Burma, and India
(Stilwell)
Chungking, June 29,
1942.
Conversation With Chou En-lai
General Chou En-lai, Communist representative at Chungking, was
recovering from an operation when I saw him at the Central Hospital on
June 29.
Since the beginning of the Pacific War, General Chou stated, he has not
been called in for consultation with the Central Government authorities.
During the past three weeks, as the expectation of a Japanese attack on
Siberia increased, the Central Government’s blockade of the Communist
area in the northwest has tightened. General Hu Tsung-nan commands an
army of 441,000 maintaining this blockade. Twice I tried to lead him out
on what the Communist reaction would be to the withdrawal of substantial
numbers of Central Government troops from the blockade. His replies were
not clear beyond that he believed such action unlikely, but that if it
were taken the Communists would probably return eastward.
General Chou did not anticipate a Japanese attack on Kunming. He pointed
out that the Japanese knew that the decisive subjugation of China would
be a never-ending task and, in effect, that more important objectives
still lay before them. Current Japanese operations he regarded as an
interim campaign preceding a major effort against either Siberia or
India. An attack on Siberia he considered to be more likely.
Although General Chou did not expect Kunming to be attacked and occupied
by the Japanese, he said that if the capital of Yunnan were taken, he
would expect the Generalissimo to withdraw to Lanchow. He declared that
others may be able to seek peace with the Japanese, but never the
Generalissimo. He remarked with a significant smile that rumors of the
Chinese being prepared to accept Japanese peace offers were staged for
effect.
In commenting on General Ho Ying-chin, the Communist representative said
that General Ho’s objective was to conserve the military strength of the
Central Government, leaving the defeat of Japan to the United States and
Great Britain. If Germany, however, emerged victorious over the United
States and Great Britain he was also prepared
[Page 102]
to come to terms with the Germans. In any event
the Minister of War was opposed to the expenditure of the Central
Government’s military power; it would be needed after the termination of
the war with Japan. Therefore to any program for military action General
Ho could be expected to present objections and discover obstacles in the
way.
According to General Chou, not more than 600,000 troops at the most would
acknowledge the personal leadership of General Ho, as against some
2,500,000 which the Generalissimo can personally depend upon. The
Communist leader said, “General Ho can command some Szechuan troops, he
can command the Yunnan troops—perhaps—and he can command a part of Ku
Chu-tung’s armies; that’s all.” The War Minister’s power lies, General
Chou explained, obviously not in the relatively weak forces which might
respond to his command, but in his administrative hold developed over a
period of more than a decade.
The Indian problem interested General Chou. He asked many questions.
Apparently he had no sympathy for the Congress and was visibly amused by
the incongruity of the tacit alliance in India between British colonial
imperialists and the Communists.
Unified command is the most important factor, General Chou stated with
emphasis, in any attempt to retake Burma. He said half laughingly half
seriously that if the Generalissimo would permit him, he would take
Communist troops under his command for a Burma campaign and “I would
obey General Stilwell’s orders!”
