Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1941, The Far East, Volume V

740.0011 P. W./80: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, February 7, 1941—11 p.m.
[Received February 7—2:03 p.m.]

180–183. Following the Embassy’s telegram No. 827, September 12, 1940,⁸⁴ I respectfully submit the considerations set forth below, by way of once again taking stock of the political and military situation in the Far East as viewed from the angle of this Embassy.

1. As concrete manifestations of the rapid progress of Japan’s policy of southward advance we are confronted with the following recent developments, factually reported.

(a) The presence of Japanese naval vessels in Camranh Bay and of one or more Japanese cruisers, a seaplane tender and destroyers in the Gulf of Thailand, as well as rumors of a Japanese landing force at Songkla, a Thai base not far from the northern frontier of the Malay States.

(b) Progressive military encroachment by the Japanese in Indochina, including control of the air ports, mediation in the dispute with Thailand, and reports that Japan expects to be paid for her mediatory services through the granting of special facilities in the use of naval bases.

2. These developments represent the logical extension of the steps already taken during the past two years involving Japanese seizure of Waichow, Hainan, the Spratley Islands and Northern Indochina. They represent the Japanese technique of tentative sallies and thrusts in the desired direction, followed by pauses to feel out the effects and results of the accomplished steps, differentiating in effect the nibbling policy foreshadowed in the Embassy’s telegram under reference, a policy which is now obviously achieving progressively increased momentum under Nazi stimulation.

3. By following this policy Japan has edged her way cautiously to a position from which with some added preparation [it] could invest Singapore, establish a bypass for supplying Axis ships in the Indian Ocean and eventually launch an attack on Singapore. Such an assault may well be planned to synchronize with the expected German all-out offensive against the British Isles. While conservative strategy would appear to counsel delaying such a single handed Japanese assault on Singapore pending the outcome of developments in Europe, nevertheless we must reckon with the present headstrong do or die spirit of the Japanese military leaders and their categories [associates?] to achieve their objectives before either the United States or Great Britain could or would intervene.

4. The importance of Singapore to the immediate defense of British Isles has been effectively set forth in the Department’s unofficial memorandum dated December 4, 1940,⁸⁵ and without further argument may be accepted as fundamental. In view of the fact that Great Britain cannot today or presumably in the near future spare further important naval vessels for the defense of Singapore, it would seem to follow logically that our expressed policy of supporting the British Empire dictates measures on our part to prevent the control of that strategically essential base from passing into hostile hands.

5. In this connection it is believed that the whole structure of the morale of the British in the Far East, the Netherlands East Indies and the Chinese Nationalist Government depends in large measure upon hopes of eventual American assistance. The Dutch are under great pressure in Batavia and the British in the Far East may be confronted with acute pressure, even suddenly, in the near future. It is axiomatic that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. Should the Dutch morale suffer a sudden collapse, the task of rehabilitating this morale would be difficult if not impossible. Without effective Dutch determination, the defenses of the East Indies and Singapore would become problematical. Chinese morale has held up astonishingly well during the past three and a half years, but the effect of the fall of Singapore would have to be regarded as virtually a death blow to the Chinese Government. The effect of such a blow upon the British position in the eastern Mediterranean and in the Near East would be incalculably dangerous.

6. The nature of the measures to be taken by the United States and the moment for their inception are matters of high strategic policy not within the competence of this Embassy to determine. We believe, however, that the point to be discussed is the taking of half measures of a character which would evoke all the possible undesirable results without proving effective. I have expressed the opinion that the principal question before us is not whether we must call a halt to the Japanese southward advance, but when. Increased American naval concentration in the Far East would entail inevitable risks of war. Those risks constitute an imponderable factor which cannot be appraised with assurance, and they should not be undertaken unless the United States is prepared to face war. On the other hand we believe that those risks are less in degree than the future dangers which would inevitably confront us if we were to allow the Japanese advance to proceed indefinitely unchecked. We also believe that the Japanese are counting upon the quiescence of the United States. The moment decisive action should be taken, if it is ever to be taken, appears to us to be approaching.

Grew

84. Foreign Relations, 1940, vol. iv, p. 599.
85. Printed in Pearl Earoor Attack: Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 79th Cong., 2d sess., pt. 19, exhibit 159, p. 3492.