740.00111A.R.–N.C./134
Memorandum by Mr. Philip W. Bonsai of the Division of the American Republics
The Declaration of Panama
The recommendation of the Inter-American Neutrality Committee entitled “Recommendation on the Security Zone Created by the Declaration of Panama” is dated Rio de Janeiro, April 27, 1940 and Pan American Union, Washington, D. C., May 1, 1940. However, it was not officially made available to the Department by the Pan American Union until the end of May. A copy of a preliminary translation of the recommendation was sent to Mr. Welles by Professor Fenwick with an airmail letter dated May 3 which was referred to Le89 and RA.90 (See in this connection Mr. Hackworth’s memorandum of May 14 and my memorandum of May 21.91) The recommendation as well as the two memoranda just mentioned were discussed on June 11 by Mr. Duggan, Mr. Daniels, and the writer.
It is the purpose of this memorandum to record the writer’s tentative conclusions and recommendations in view of this discussion and of current developments:
- (1)
- The international situation has changed since the date of the original formulation of the Declaration of Panama as well as since the issuance of the Committee’s recommendation in regard thereto. The Declaration itself says that the inherent right therein asserted is a measure of continental self-protection to which the American Republics are entitled “so long as they maintain their neutrality”. It is of course beyond the scope of this memorandum to attempt to define the present status of some of the American republics including the United States; it is sufficient to point out that there has been a substantial reorientation from the traditional concept of neutrality which, with the exception of certain traditional neutral rights specifically waived (notably in the case of the United States), governed the position of the American republics from the outbreak of the war until April of this year. This orientation implies, as far as the United States is concerned, a determination to render all possible material aid to the Allies and, therefore, to take no steps which would hinder the Allies.
- (2)
- The recommendation of the Inter-American Neutrality Committee provides for both punitive and preventive measures (see pages 3 [Page 320] and 4 of my memorandum of May 21). The preventive measures involve the detention in the ports of the American republics of belligerent merchant ships which may be presumed to have abandoned their ordinary commercial activities, if, in the opinion of the American republic concerned, such departure would give rise to a violation of the Security Zone. It is my belief that while it would be desirable to exercise control over belligerent merchant vessels which are obviously using the ports of the American republics to seek refuge from the war vessels of the opposing belligerent it hardly seems advisable for that control to be exercised in such a manner as to imply a conviction that the opposing belligerent has no intention of respecting the zone.
- (3)
- The justification for the internment of belligerent merchant vessels under certain conditions might be said to arise from the fact that the continued use by such vessels of the ports and harbors of a non-belligerent for the purpose of escaping capture by an opposing belligerent, although at the same time the said merchant vessels preserve freedom of action, constitutes, in effect, the rendering of assistance by the non-belligerent to the opposing belligerent. Such use of non-belligerent ports tends to immobilize armed vessels of one belligerent just as surely as if the armed vessels of the other belligerent were permitted to remain in the said non-belligerent ports indefinitely instead of having a choice between departure within the legal period or internment.
- (4)
- A practical justification for the internment, as it relates specifically to Italian and German vessels, arises from the fact that Germany has sunk a large amount of neutral shipping since the outbreak of the war and that early this month the Argentine vessel Uruguay was similarly treated; it might be argued that pending a clarification of the German attitude with respect to the Uruguay case in particular and the treatment of the vessels of the American republics in general the merchant vessels of Germany and of his ally Italy might well be treated to some extent as hostages.
- (5)
- The punitive measures proposed by the Inter-American Neutrality Committee would most immediately apply to Allied warships interfering with the movements of Italian or German merchant vessels and would therefore be inconsistent with our present policy.
- (6)
- It appears to me that the measure which would most immediately and effectively contribute to prevent the commission within the security zone of hostile acts of an undesirable nature, that is to say, attacks on Allied and neutral shipping by Italian and German submarines, as distinguished from hostile acts such as attacks on Italian and German merchant vessels by Allied war vessels, would be the adoption by all the American republics concerned of measures providing for the exclusion of belligerent submarines along the lines of the [Page 321] measures already adopted by seven of the American republics; a circular telegram suggesting such action has already been forwarded to our missions in the twelve republics concerned.
I recommend, therefore, (a) the adoption of measures looking to the internment for the duration of the war of belligerent merchant vessels which have sought refuge in the waters of the American republics, and (b) the continuance of efforts already initiated in order to secure uniformity of action in excluding belligerent submarines from the waters of the American republics.