740.00111A.R.–N.C./103
The American Member of the Inter-American Neutrality
Committee (Fenwick) to the Under Secretary
of State (Welles)
Rio de
Janeiro, May 6, 1940.
Dear Mr. Welles: I do not want to trouble you
with the affairs of our Neutrality Committee here in Rio, for I know you
have weightier matters on your mind at the moment. Nevertheless, just to
keep you in touch with what we are doing, I would like to make a few
observations on the subject of Postal Correspondence, which is being
considered by the Committee in response to an inquiry of Brazil.
As I explained in my telegram a few days ago,73 the members of the Committee are divided as
to the best way to handle the problem. Some of them want to do no more
than re-affirm the principle of inviolability without any exceptions or
qualifications other than those
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prescribed in the Hague Convention. This group proposes to overlook
entirely what happened during the World War and to be satisfied with
re-affirming the principle of inviolability even though they know there
is no chance whatever that their recommendation on the subject will have
the slightest effect on the belligerents.
A second group, including myself, feel that as “technical experts” we
cannot turn our backs upon the practice of governments during the World
War, when it was conceded that the inviolability of postal
correspondence was limited to “genuine” postal correspondence and did
not include sealed mail which contained contraband.
But this second group is divided as to how to solve the conflict between
the right of the neutral to inviolability and the right of the
belligerent to search for contraband,—a conflict which Secretary Lansing
pointed out very clearly in his notes on the subject. The plan which
seems to find favor with this group is to re-assert the principle of
inviolability but to concede that it must be limited to genuine postal
correspondence; and in order to determine what is genuine postal
correspondence the suggestion is being taken up that the neutral State
undertake to do this, since only in this way could it prevent the
belligerent from doing so.
For myself, I believe that this is the better way to handle the problem,
to limit our demand for inviolability to what is feasible and to take a
stand on that. The objection is of course that if we limited our demand
for inviolability to certain designated mailbags certified as not
containing contraband, the belligerent would feel that he had a free
hand in searching other mail. But he is doing that already and is at the
same time censoring genuine correspondence which he has no right
whatever to do.
The system we are discussing by which the neutral might certify that
certain mailbags contain only genuine postal correspondence would be an
entirely voluntary one on the part of those sending the letters and it
would not involve censorship of any kind by the postal authorities of
the neutral State. It would be something in the nature of registration,
except that in this case the registration of “certification” would
precede or rather attend the sealing of the letter in the presence of
the postal authorities. That could be done without the authorities
reading the letter or doing more than observe that it contained no
contraband.
The postal authorities here seem to think the plan entirely feasible; but
inasmuch as the postal authorities in Washington do not think so
probably the recommendation of the Committee will not get very far even
if it is made. But inasmuch as we are a technical committee we feel that
we must handle the problem not from the point of view of political
considerations but from the point of view of
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reconciling belligerent and neutral claims and
salvaging something from the unlimited censorship that is going on at
the present day.
This is all tentative and I am merely letting you know what the Committee
is discussing and shall keep you in touch with later developments.
Sincerely yours,
[Enclosure]
Draft Contention for the Sub-Committee,
Submitted by C. G. Fenwick, May 5, 1940
Postal Correspondence
Considering
- 1
- —that Article 1 of the XI Hague Convention of 1907, relative
to certain Restrictions with regard to the Exercise of the Right
of Capture in Naval War, recognized the principle of the
inviolability of the postal correspondence of neutral states
found on the high seas by a belligerent on board a neutral or
enemy ship;
- 2
- —that the grounds for the recognition of this principle were
the fact that the grave inconvenience and harm done to neutral
states by the search of their mails overbalanced any military
advantages that might accrue to the belligerents from the
detention of correspondence destined directly or indirectly to
the enemy;
- 3
- —that although the Hague Convention was not ratified by all of
the signatories, nevertheless the principles and rules it laid
down may be regarded as expressing the consensus of opinion of
the nations assembled at the Hague Conference;
- 4
- —that during the World War of 1914–1918 certain of the
belligerents asserted the necessity of distinguishing between
genuine (“missive”) correspondence and other sealed packets
enclosed in neutral mail bags, admitting the inviolability of
genuine correspondence, but claiming that the other mail was
subject to the belligerent right to search for and seize
contraband destined to the enemy;
- 5
- —that the experience of the World War showed the necessity of
developing the principles of the Hague Convention so as to take
account of certain uses of the postal service not contemplated
at the time the Hague Convention was adopted, particularly the
fact that sealed packets, normally entitled in many countries to
the privileges of “first class” correspondence, may actually
have no character whatever of postal correspondence but may be
in respect to their contents no more than articles of
merchandise;
- 6
- —that the determination of what constitutes genuine postal
correspondence as distinct from other sealed packets can not be
left to
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the
belligerent which intercepts neutral mails en route to neutral
ports, in as much as such action on the part of the belligerent
would of necessity result, and has in actual practice resulted,
in the most minute and prolonged examination by the belligerents
of sealed neutral mail, thus exposing to the belligerents
confidential business correspondence and other equally
confidential personal affairs, and subjecting neutral sealed
mail to censorship of the most exacting character;
- 7
- —that if belligerents are to be kept from searching neutral
postal correspondence in order to prevent contraband goods from
reaching the enemy the neutral states themselves must undertake
individually to determine by preliminary inquiry the genuineness
of the postal correspondence for which inviolability is claimed;
so that, when the neutral state is assured of this fact, it may
be able to insist more effectively upon the inviolability of
postal correspondence thus segregated and bearing an indication
of its genuine character;
- 8
- —that this determination on the part of the neutral state of
the genuineness of postal correspondence which may thus be
guaranteed as to its character should be carried out in such a
way as to be consistent with the domestic standards of the
neutral state in respect to the inviolability of postal
correspondence; and that in consequence submission to the
methods of preliminary inquiry into the contents of the letters
should be entirely at the option of the persons sending the
letters which are to be guaranteed as being genuine postal
correspondence;
- 9
- —that it may also be possible for the neutral state to devise
ways and means by which the genuineness of postal correspondence
may be assured by resort to external tests, such as the size and
weight of sealed mail packets; which tests, although not
assuring absolutely the non contraband character of the contents
of designated mail bags, would nevertheless do so to such an
extent that the amount of contraband that might be included
would be negligible relative to the importance of the principle
of inviolability;
- 10
- —that the claim of belligerents of a right to prevent
“intelligence”, whether of a military character or otherwise,
from reaching the enemy by way of sealed letter post is
completely lacking in any basis of international law and must
therefore be rejected as in contravention of the principle
itself of inviolability, in as much as the enforcement of such a
claim would require the censorship even of genuine postal
correspondence never regarded heretofore as coming under
belligerent scrutiny;
- 11
- —that the inviolability attaching to neutral correspondence on
the high seas is not in any degree lessened by reason of the
fact that neutral vessels may be compelled by force to put into
a belligerent contraband
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control port for purposes of search at the greater
convenience of the belligerent; but rather that the
inviolability remains the same in such case as if the vessel
were on the high seas;
- 12
- —that neutral states do not claim inviolability for
correspondence destined to or proceeding from a blockaded port
when there has been a violation of blockade by the vessel
carrying such correspondence:
For These Reasons the
Inter-American Neutrality Committee Recommends:
- I
- —That the American States reaffirm the principle that postal
correspondence, as distinct from post parcels, found by
belligerents on neutral vessels on the high seas is
inviolable.
- II
- —Tha/t the American States recognize the exception, contained
in the XI Hague Convention, of correspondence destined to or
proceeding from a blockaded port, but only in case of violation
of blockade.
- III
- —That the American States, acting individually and each in
accordance with its own national constitution and laws and
regulations made in pursuance thereof, undertake to distinguish
genuine postal correspondence from other sealed mail matter and
to segregate the two classes of mail.
- IV
- —That this distinction and segregation may be carried out by;
- a)
- —establishing a special bureau in important
post-offices at which persons may voluntarily submit
letters destined to belligerent or neutral countries and
have them sealed in the presence of the postal officer
and certified as not containing contraband, this service
being rendered without inquiry by the postal authorities
into the message contained in the letter submitted and
upon payment of a fixed charge for the service;
registration of the said letter being also required by
the neutral state when considered desirable;
- b)
- —fixing, by special postal regulations, a limit for
the size and weight and form of sealed mail packets with
the object of preventing the transmission of contraband
in more than negligible quantities;
- c)
- —prescribing, when deemed desirable, penalties against
the transmission in letters addressed to belligerent
countries of money, in the form of bank notes, bills of
exchange or otherwise, or other contraband destined
directly to belligerent countries.
- V
- —That correspondence thus determined to be genuine postal
correspondence, and segregated from other sealed mail, be placed
in mail bags specially marked as containing “letter mail”,
“epistolary correspondence”, or other designation indicating
that the said letters have been certified as not containing
contraband.