810.20 Defense/5–2940: Telegram
The Ambassador in Argentina (Armour) to the Secretary of State
[Received 10:53 p.m.]
163. The Department’s telegram No. 76, May 23, noon.36 The Minister of Foreign Affairs informed me he has discussed this matter with the President who will gladly consider the question further in the light of the whole situation but feels that some more detailed plan of what we have in mind would be useful in reaching his decision. On the facts now before him Ortiz is inclined to doubt whether any useful purpose could be accomplished by such conversations. The President feels that an ill-prepared offense [defense] would constitute the poorest form of defense and only tend to invite attack. Cantilo himself feels that the best defense for the American continent for the present would be a victory for the Allies and that the greatest assistance the United States could render to continental defense at this stage would be to assist the Allies as much as possible.
From their estimate of the United States defense requirements, based upon President Roosevelt’s message to Congress37 and the statements [Page 23] of Generals Marshall and Arnold forwarded by Espil;38 Cantilo and the President feel that our Government probably for 2 years would not be in a position materially to assist them and other distant republics in the event of attack or aggression. For these reasons the President is inclined to favor their relying on their own defense resources for the time being, awaiting the outcome of the present phase of the European struggle.
I am not at all certain how far Cantilo is speaking for the President or to what extent the above are his own views. Cantilo suggested that I might wish to discuss the matter myself with Ortiz and I think this might be advisable if the Department agrees. In this case perhaps I could be furnished with further material which you feel would be useful in the light of talks thus far, also accounts of any replies received to date from other governments, notably Brazil.
On the other hand I feel that the following should be taken into consideration. It seems highly probable that the immediate reason behind the objections offered to our proposal may be the internal situation here, outlined in our recent telegrams and despatches, which is causing the Government to hesitate to take any action which, if it became known, might give further strength to the opposition as reported, the army officers are predominantly the less Nazi and pro-Fascist in their sympathies including Inspector General of the Army and the majority of higher officers who are in close touch with chief of German military mission, General Niedenfur. Any talks our officers might have even with leading chosen Argentine Army officers and to a lesser extent Naval officers could not be kept secret from pro-Nazi group. For this reason I am inclined to feel that so far as Argentina is concerned, the procedure would not only accomplish little but might well prove dangerous for us as well as for the Government here.