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  4. Document 197

761.00/339: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Thurston) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 1, 1940—midnight.
[Received August 2—5:16 p.m.]

945. At this evening’s joint session of the Supreme Soviet Molotov read a report on Soviet foreign relations from which the following excerpts are presented in the order of delivery:

1.
After reviewing developments in the European war, he stated that “of the two Allies that confronted Germany and Italy only England remains and she has decided to continue the war relying on the assistance of the United States”. He attributed the collapse of France in part to the fact that “unlike Germany, ruling circles in France adopted too light minded an attitude toward the role and weight of the Soviet Union in European affairs”. He added “We are now on the eve of a new stage of intensification of the war between Germany and Italy on one side and England, which the United States is assisting, on the other.”
2.
He reiterated Soviet policy with respect to the war in these words: “All these events have not changed the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. Due to its policy of peace and neutrality the Soviet Union is not taking part in the war”.
3.
With respect to Germany he asserted that relations are governed by the Nonaggression Pact of last year,75 which has been strictly observed [Page 209] by the Soviet Government. “Developments in Europe not only have not weakened the strength of the Soviet–Germany Nonaggression Pact but have on the contrary emphasized the importance of its existence and further development”. Referring to speculation regarding the possibility of disagreement between the Soviet Union and Germany and “attempts to intimidate us by the prospect of the growth of Germany’s might” he repeated that the friendly relations between the two countries “are not based on fortuitous considerations of a transient nature but on fundamental state interests of both the Soviet Union and Germany”.
4.
Relations with Italy have improved. No essential change in relations with the British has occurred “although the appointment of Cripps76 as Ambassador to the Soviet Union possibly reflected a desire on the part of Britain to improve relations with the Soviet Union”.
5.
A description of the restoration of Bessarabia and transfer of North Bukovina to the Soviet Union implies that the conflict between the Soviet Union and Rumania has been “peacefully settled”.
6.
An extensive discussion of recent events in the Baltic States contains nothing new.
7.
After referring to postwar negotiations with Finland he stated “further development of Soviet-Finnish relations favorable to both countries depends mainly on Finland herself. It is understandable that if certain elements of the Finnish ruling circles do not cease their repressive acts against some of the Finnish public which are striving to improve good neighborly relations between the Soviet Union then harm may come to relations between the Soviet Union and Finland”.
8.
The statement that no important changes have taken place in the relations of the Soviet Union with Turkey was qualified by the assertion that the German White Papers77 had cast “an unpleasant light on certain aspects of activity in Turkey”. Reference was also made to the flight last April of a “certain foreign airplane from Turkish territory” to the area of Batumi. Relations with Iran were dealt with in the same manner and it was charged that in March two foreign airplanes coming from the direction of Iran were sighted in the Baku area. In consequence it was decided that the Soviet Government must intensify its vigilance on those southern frontiers.
9.
Relations with Japan have lately begun to assume a somewhat normal character and there are indications that Japan desires to improve relations with the Soviet Union. This is feasible “with mutual recognition of the interests of both parties and as soon as both parties will understand the necessity of removing obstacles on this path which have lost their significance. There is much however that is unclear in the program of the new Japanese Government concerning the establishment of the ‘new political structure’.
10.
The following references to the United States were delivered by Molotov in a sarcastic manner and, although they seem devoid of any humor, provoked general laughter and applause among the deputies:

“I shall not dwell on our relations with the United States if only for the reason that there is nothing good that can be said about them. We have learned that certain people in the United States are not pleased by the successes of Soviet foreign policy in the Baltic Countries. But we confess that we are little concerned over this circumstance inasmuch as we are coping with our tasks without the assistance of these displeased gentlemen. Nevertheless the fact that the authorities in the United States unlawfully detained gold which our State Bank recently purchased from the Banks of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia evokes a most energetic protest on our part.78 In this case we can only remind both the Government of the United States and the Government of Great Britain, which adopted the same procedure, of their responsibility for these illegal acts.”

11.
Chinese relations were dealt with briefly “as regards our relations with Great National China fighting for her existence, they have retained their good neighborly and friendly character in line with the Soviet-Chinese nonaggression pact.”79
12.
In concluding his report Molotov indulged a final taunt at United States in the following statement:

“Imperialist appetites are growing not only in distant Japan but also in the United States where there are more than a few people who like to conceal their imperialist plans by well advertised ‘concern’ for the interests of the entire ‘Western Hemisphere’ which these gentlemen are prepared to turn into their property with all its numerous republics and with the colonial possessions of other countries on islands in the neighborhood of the American continent. All this harbors the danger of a further extension and kindling of war and its conversion into a world imperialist war.”

13.
The prospect just alluded to is then in conclusion cited as justification for measures strengthening the Soviet Union so that “no tricks of our foreign enemies could catch us unaware.”

Thurston
  1. Signed at Moscow on August 23, 1939; for text, see Department of State, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1948), p. 76, or Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945, Series D, vol. vii, p. 245.↩
  2. Sir Stafford Cripps, appointed British Ambassador to the Soviet Union on June 12, 1940.↩
  3. Reference is to the publication during 1940 of captured Polish documents (in March) and documents of the French General Staff (in July). The Soviet press depicted the latter especially as revealing alleged Anglo-French intentions for an attack upon the Soviet Union, particularly for the bombing of Baku and Batum, and implicating Turkey and Iran. The Chargé reported to the Department in telegram No. 820, July 6, 2 p.m., that it seemed likely that “the Soviet Government is in part at least distorting the evidence for domestic consumption and for its possible ulterior purposes.” (740.0011 European War 1939/4449)↩
  4. This Soviet protest was transmitted to the Department in telegram No. 885, July 20, 9 p.m., vol. i, p. 395.↩
  5. Signed at Nanking on August 21, 1937, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. clxxxi, p. 101.↩